The Unity of Philosophical Experience by Etienne Gilson , New York , 1937
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It has often been said by historians, and not without good reasons, that the whole philosophy of the Middle Ages was little more than an obstinate endeavour to solve one problem – the problem of the Universals. Universals are but another name for what we call concepts, or general ideas.
經常被歷史學家提及的，且並非無的放矢，整個中世哲學祇不過是全力在解決一個問題－共相。共相即我們所稱的概念，或普遍觀念。
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The great significance of Peter Abailard in the history of mediaeval philosophy is due to the fact that he was the first to deal at length with that central problem: what is a class of things, or in other words, what is the essence of universality?
Abailard在中世哲學史中之所以那麼重要就是由於他是第一位處理這個核心問題：事物是怎麼分類的？換言之，普遍底本質為何？
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To such a question the easiest answer obviously was that, since things by themselves are essentially particular, the generality which belongs to our concepts cannot have any other origin but the mind….our knowledge by general ideas is without an object; it is not a science, but a mere logic.
對於這樣的問題，很明顯地，最簡單的回答是，因為事物本身是個別的，那麼，我們底概念之普遍性就祇能來自於心智…我們對於普遍觀念底知識是不具對象的；那不是科學，而是邏輯。
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even if it were to be said that our so-called concepts, or general ideas, are mere words, the same problem would still remain: how is it that we can give the same name to several different things? Perhaps we do no more than name them, but they must at least be such things as can be named. In short, the generality which belongs to our concepts cannot possibly come from the mind alone; it must also, in some way or other, be found in things. What then is the nature of generality?
既使把我們所謂的概念或普遍觀念說成祇是語詞，問題同樣依舊存在：我們如何能賦予許多不同的事物同樣的名稱？也許我們真地祇是為它們命名，但它們至少有些什麼東西能被我們命名吧。簡言之，我們概念之普遍性不可能僅靠心智；它必以某種方式居於事物中。那麼，普遍性底本性是什麼？
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Abailard’s greatness lay in his acute feeling for philosophical problems; his weakness was always to deal with them as though they were logical problems. Seeking, as he did, to mould the philosophical order into conformity with purely logical principles, he was bound ultimately to fail in his undertaking and to entangle his successors in hopeless difficulties.
Abailard底偉大之處在於他對哲學問題之敏銳感覺；他底不足之處在於總是把這些哲學問題當作邏輯問題看待。他企圖將哲學秩序符合於純邏輯原理，他底努力終將注定失敗，他底後繼者亦捲入無望的困難中。
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what is the nature of our ideas and their relation to things? This was exactly the kind of philosophical question that would naturally arise in the mind of a logician, because it arises on the borderline that divides logic from philosophy. An almost invisible line indeed; yet as soon as you cross it, you find yourself in an entirely different country, and if you do not notice it, you get lost. It was Abailard’s misfortune to cross it, quite unaware of what he was doing.
我們底觀念之本性是什麼？它與事物之關係又為何？這正是邏輯學家心中自然會浮現的哲學問題，因它正處於分隔邏輯與哲學之交界處。一個幾乎看不見的線，然而一旦你跨越了，你就發現處在完全不同的國度，倘若你稍不留意，就會失足。這也就是Abailard的不幸。他跨越了邊界，且毫無知覺自己做了什麼。
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What is a universal? It is, Abailard answers, that which can be predicated of several individual things taken one by one. Man, for instance, is a universal because the term can be applied to every individual man. This was a logical definition.
何謂共相？Abailard回答，那是能指稱許多個別事物的東西。比如，人是共相，因這個詞能應用在每一個個人。這是邏輯定義。
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but philosophy stepped in as soon as Abailard asked this other question: what is the nature of that which can be predicted of many? Has it even got a nature of its own? Is it a thing?
然而Abailard提出了另一個哲學問題：那個能指稱許多東西的，其本性是什麼？它有其自身底本性嗎？它是一個事物嗎？
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Abailard’s own professor of Logic at Paris, William of Champeaux, had always favoured the view that the genera and species were not mere conceptions of our mind, but real things actually existing outside the mind. In short, he was what mediaeval philosophers would call a realist.
Abailard在巴黎的邏輯老師總認為，種與類不僅是我們心中底概念而已，也是心外實存之物。簡言之，他就是中世哲學家所謂的實在論者。
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Abailard was not slow to detect a fallacy in his master’s reasoning. If human nature is but partly present in Plato and in Socrates, neither Socrates nor Plato can truly be said to be a man. If, on the other hand, human nature is entirely present in one of them, it cannot be present at all in the other. Since it can be found in them neither partly, nor entirely, it cannot possibly be something, it is nothing.
Abailard很快地就發現他老師推論上的謬誤。如果人性祇是部分地出現在柏拉圖與蘇格拉底中，那他們兩人皆不能算是真的人。反之，若人性全部呈現在兩人之一，那另外一個就根本不可能成為人。因此，人性既非部分又非全部存在於他們之中，它不能是什麼東西，它是虛無。
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William and Abailard were equally convinced that a purely logical method would ultimately bring forth an adequate answer to the question. Now logic, and quite especially mediaeval logic, is ruled by the principle of contradiction, which always works when it is applied to concepts, but not always when it is applied to things…both were logically right and philosophically wrong.
Abailard師生皆相信，以純邏輯方法終能足以為共相問題提出解答。邏輯，尤其是中世邏輯，是由矛盾律決定的，它運用在概念上是夠的，但若用在事物上則會有問題。…兩人是邏輯上對，哲學上錯。
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William hoped to elude Abailard’s criticism by substituting a simple lack of difference between two things for the presence of a common element in those things. The reason why Plato and Socrates are men is this: not in the least that the same human nature is present in both, but that they do not differ in the nature of humanity. In short, the only reason why Socrates and Plato are the same, is that they are not different.
威廉為了要避開Abailard底批評，以兩者間之缺少差異來取代兩者共同的要素。柏拉圖與蘇格拉底是人，並非因為兩者有著相同的人性，而是兩者在人性上沒有什麼不同。簡言之，兩人相同之唯一理由是他們沒有不同。
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a mere lack of difference between two things is not enough to account for their resemblance.
兩物間之缺少差異並不足以說明它們底相似性。
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Abailard had clearly proved that William was wrong, but not in the least that he himself was right…both he and his pupil were asking the right question in the wrong way.
Abailard很清楚地證明老師錯了，但也不見得他自己就是對的…他們師生倆是以錯的方式去問一個對的問題。
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Abailard…having clearly proved that human nature cannot be considered as a real thing, actually existing outside the mind, the problem for him was to say on what ground our mind is justified in ascribing the same nature to different individuals.
Abailard…清楚地證明了人性不能被視為真實事物，實存於心之外，他的難題是要說明，在什麼基礎上，我們底心智能把相同的本性歸給不同的個別者。
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Abailard was just as tempted to mistake grammar for logic as he was to mistake logic for philosophy.
Abailard誤把文法視為邏輯，如他誤把邏輯視作哲學。
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If you ask a grammarian a question, and if he answers it as a grammarian, your problem will inevitably be reduced by him to a mere question of words.
若你問文法學家問題，若他以文法學家身分回你，你底難題將不可避免地被他還原成祇是語詞上的問題。
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The true greatness of a philosopher is always proportional to his intellectual honesty.
一位真正的哲學家底偉大永遠與他對理性的忠誠度成正比。
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But since man does not designate any man in particular, it can still less designate a collection of such individuals. Hence Abailard’s conclusion that “in the common name which is man, not Socrates himself, nor any other man, nor the entire collection of men is reasonably understood from the import of the word.”
人，並不指稱任何個別的人，更別說指稱了一群人。因此，Abailard下結論『人這個共同名稱，非指蘇格拉底，亦非其它人，更非全部人之集合，可被合理地瞭解這個詞』。
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Abailard...To his own mind, "to be man" was not nothing, and yet it was not a thing, it was a state or a condition; let us say that, rather than a being, it was a certain way of being. In his own words, "we call it the status itself of man to be man, which is not a thing, and which we also call the common cause of imposition of the word on individuals, according as they themselves agree with each other."
Abailard...就他自己而言，『成為人』並非虛空的話，祇不過，它不是一個東西，它是一個狀態或一個條件；這麼說吧，不是一個存有，而是存有底某種方式。以他自己底話說，『我們稱人底狀態本身為成為人，它不是一個東西，我們依據它們本身彼此一致，也稱這個強加給個別者之語詞為共同原因。
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As he could not find in things any objective ground for the imposition of common names, Abailard looked for it in the mind. This meant nothing less than substituting psychology for both logic and philosophy. He therefore asked himself, what is the nature of those mental presentations.
當他不能為共同名稱在事物中找到任何客觀基礎時，Abailard轉向心智去找。這意謂著以心理學取代邏輯與哲學。因此，他問道，心理呈現之本性為何？
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In answering the question, Abailard could not forget his former conclusion, that the universals are not things. He accordingly described our concepts as being but imaginary and fictive likenesses of their real objects...what we call a concept has no more reality than the reflexion of some object in a looking glass.
為回答這個問題，Abailard並沒忘了他先前的結論，共相不是東西。因此，他把我們底概念描述成對真實對象之想象的、虛構的相似性。...我們所稱之概念並沒比杯中倒影更為實在。
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In the first place, since human nature does not exist by itself, it is clear that those ideas have no object. In the second place, it is not even certain that we have such ideas at all.
首先，因為人性自身並不存在，很明顯地，這些觀念並無對象。再者，若說我們擁有這些觀念也不對。
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Abailard himself very soon reached the conclusion that he had no general ideas. God alone has them, and that to him is the reason why God could create, and can still keep in existence...As a creator, He is like an artist about to compose something, who preconceives in his mind the exemplary form of the thing to be composed...we cannot create any natural and general order, but can only make things that are both artificial and particular.
Abailard自己很快地獲致了這個結論，他並無普遍觀念。祇有神有這些觀念，對他而言，這正是神能創造之原因，且能保持存在...做為一個創造者，他像一位藝術家，能組合事物，在他心中預想了事物範形...我們不能創造任何本性的與普遍的秩序，祇能製造人工的與個別的東西。
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Hence Abailard's ultimate conclusion, that men can have a true understanding of what comes to the senses, whereas for all those general forms that cannot be perceived by sense, we have much less understanding than opinion.
因此，Abailard底最終結論是，人對來自感官的東西能真正的瞭解，而對不能被感官所知覺到的普遍形式，我們則祇有意見上的理解而已。
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What is truly remarkable about Abailard's epistemology is that...he begins by interpreting logic in terms of grammar; then he proceeds to interpret philosophy in terms of logic, and as he fails to find a positive answer to his question we see him ultimately reduced to a psychological solution. But was it a solution?...if sameness is not something real in things, how can likeness possibly be found in our ideas of them?
關於Abailard底知識論，真正值得注意的是...他以文法來詮釋邏輯著手；再以邏輯來詮釋哲學，當他無法找到問題之正面解法時，我們看到他終將還原成心理解答。然而，那算是一個解答嗎？...倘若在事物中並無相同性，我們又怎能在觀念中找到其相似性？
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The ultimate results of Abailard's error was...scepticism. If our concepts are but words, without any other contents than more or less vague images, all universal knowledge becomes a mere set of arbitrary opinions. What we usually call science ceases to be a system of general and necessary relations and finds itself reduced to a loose string of empirically connected facts.
Abailard底錯誤所造成的最終結果是...懷疑論。倘若我們底概念僅是語詞，除了一些模糊影象外沒有任何其它內容，所有的普遍知識祇是一些任意的意見。我們日常所稱的科學就不再是普遍的、必然關係之系統，它與經驗上的聯結被還元成一鬆散的聯繫。
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The upshot of Abailard's experiment is that philosophy cannot be obtained from pure logic...So experience taught me a manifest conclusion, that while logic furthers other studies, it is by itself lifeless and barren, nor can it cause the mind to yield the fruit of philosophy.
Abailard實驗之結果是，哲學不能由純邏輯來達成。...因此經驗教了我一個明顯的結論，當邏輯助長其它的研究，它自身就會是毫無生氣的，它也不能使心智產生豐富的哲學。
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Unaware of any dividing line between logic and philosophy, any twelfth-century professor of logic, who had never learned or taught anything but grammar and logic, would naturally call himself a philosopher.
未能察覺邏輯與哲學間之分隔線，任何十二世紀的邏輯教授，除了文法與邏輯之外什麼都不懂，很自然地都自稱為哲學家。
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As theologians, their task was not to save philosophy from logicism, but, through faith and grace, to save mankind from eternal perdition...An obvious way to deal with the difficulty was to eradicate philosophy and philosophical problems from the human mind...pious souls have no use for philosophical knowledge, and that philosophical speculation is basically inconsistent with a sincere religious life.
做為神學家，他們底工作並非是從邏輯學家手中救出哲學，而是透過信仰與恩典，要從永恆毀滅中拯救人類...要處理這種難題，一個明確的方式是從人底心智根除哲學與哲學問題...虔誠的靈魂對哲學知識而言並沒有用，而且，哲學思辯基本上與真誠的宗教生活也不一致。
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In the first place, when religion tries to establish itself on the ruins of philosophy, there usually arises a philosopher to found philosophy on the ruins of religion...In the second place, philosophy has as little to gain by such conflicts as has religion itself, for the easiest way for theologians to hold their ground is to show that philosophy is unable to reach rationally valid conclusions on any question related to the nature of man and his destiny.
首先，當宗教企圖將自身建立在哲學之毀滅上，這經常會讓哲學家將哲學建立在宗教之毀滅上...其次，哲學與宗教對抗並沒有獲得什麼好處，就神學家而言，穩固神學基礎最簡單的方式就是在有關人底本性與命運上要顯出哲學依理性無力於獲致有效的結論。
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The God, whom reason cannot know, can be grasped by the soul's experience; the world which human reason cannot understand, can be transcended and, as it were, flown over by the spirit of Prophecy. Needless to say, the philosopher, as such, has nothing against mysticism; what he does not like is a mysticism that presupposes as its necessary condition the destruction of philosophy.
上帝，理性所不能認識的對象，能被靈魂底經驗所掌握；人類理性所無法理解的世界，能被先知底精神所超越、跨過。不用說，哲學家並不與神秘主義者對立；他所討厭的是那個將哲學毀滅做為必要條件之預設的神秘主義。
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True mysticism is never found without some theology, and sound theology always seeks the support of some philosophy; but a philosophy that does not at least make room for theology is a short-sighted philosophy.
並沒有一個不具神學的真正的神秘主義，而健全的神學總是尋求哲學之支援；然而一個不為神學留下空間之哲學是一個短視哲學。
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Let us assume, with Al Ashari, that bodies are mere heaps of atoms which are themselves devoid of size, shape and other qualities. In order to account for these sensible qualities by which bodies seem to differ, it will become necessary to suppose that all such qualities are as many accidents, really distinct from these atoms in which they are dwelling as in their substances....both atoms and qualities, or substances and accidents, are constantly created anew by an all-powerful God.
讓我們同Ashari一起想想，物體僅是原子之堆積，這些原子本身並沒有大小、形狀、與其它性質。為了要說明這些讓物體有差異之可感性質，它必須假定所有的性質是許多的偶性，這與它們所棲身的原子實體不一樣，...原子與性質、或實體與偶性，皆由全能的上帝不斷地創造新的出來。
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The consequence of this state of things is that, in a world made up of matter-atoms situated in time-atoms, what such a world is at the present moment can in no way be considered as the cause of what it will be at the next moment...In short, just as such a world is deprived of all real duration and of all real motion, so is it deprived of all efficient causality.
這樣的結果是，世界由物質原子所組成，處在時間原子之中，當下的世界絕不能被認為是下一刻將是之原因...簡言之，這樣的世界被剝奪了所有真實的緜延與所有真實的運動，意即被剝奪了所有動力因。
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In accordance with this principle [i.e., that time is composed of time-atoms] they assert that when man is perceived to move a pen, it is not he who has really moved it; the motion produced in the pen is an accident which God has created in the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which moves the pen is likewise an accident which God has created in the moving hand;...the hand does not act and is not the cause of the pen's motion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one thing to another...There does not exist any thing to which an action could be ascribed; the real agens is God.
按照這個原則「也就是，時間是由時間原子所構成」，他們主張，當人知覺到移動筆時，真正使筆動的人並不是他；筆所造成的運動是上帝在筆中所造出的偶性；那個移動筆之手底運動，同樣地，是上帝在手中所造出的偶性；...手並不實現、並不是筆能動之原因；因為，偶性並不能從一物傳到另一物...行動無法歸到任何事物上，真正的行動者是上帝。
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God is efficient cause...Will you mock at Him, as you mock at man?
神是動力因...當你在嘲笑人時，是否正在嘲笑上帝？
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the destruction of causality ultimately meant the destruction of nature, and thereby of science as well as of philosophy. Even when it has laws, a physical world whose laws are not inscribed in the very essence of things is a world without intrinsic necessity or intelligibility, and therefore unfit for rational knowledge. Scepticism always goes hand in hand with such theologies.
因果律之摧毀終究意謂著自然之摧毀，科學同哲學一樣被毀。即使有其法則，這個世界底法則並不銘刻在事物底本質中，失去了內在的必然性或可理解性，因此，不適於理性知識。懷疑論總與這種神學並肩同行。
page:49-50
man alone has been created with a knowing mind and a loving heart, in order that, by knowing and loving all things in God, he might refer them to their origin, which is at the same time their end...the ultimate meaning of our arts and techniques, of our various sciences and of philosophy itself, is to symbolize on a lower plane the perfection of the divine art and of the divine knowledge...It is the proper function of theology to bring them to a complete awareness of their proper function, which is not to know things but to know God through things...the human arts should be reduced to theology, and thereby to God.
唯有人是由認知的心智與熱愛的心靈所造成的。因此，在神之中認識與熱愛萬物，他才能參照到原初，也就是參照到他們底目的。...我們底藝術與技術、我們許多的科學與哲學、其終極意義是要在較低的層次來象徵神性藝術與知識之完美。...神學底固有功能就是要使人意識到他們底固有功能，不是要去認識事物，而是要透過事物去認識神。...人性藝術應還原到神學，也就是還原到神。
page:51-52
For St. Bonaventura maintains that “however much you ascribe to the grace of God, you will not harm piety by so doing, even though, by ascribing to the grace of God as much as you can, you may eventually wrong the natural powers and the free will of man…Even though that position were false, it would not harm piety or humility; it is therefore fitting and safe to hold it.”
Bonaventura主張，『不論你歸多少給上帝底恩典，都不會因此而有損虔誠之心，即使，你終將會寃枉了自然底力量與人底自由意志，你當儘其所能地歸給上帝底恩典。…即使這個立場是錯的，但它不會損及虔誠與謙卑；因此，這個主張是較適合與安全的。
page:52
If, on the contrary, you start on the assumption that it is safer to keep a little below the line, where are you going to stop? Why, indeed, should you stop at all? Since it is pious to lessen the efficacy of free will, it is more pious to lessen it a little more, and to make it utterly powerless should be the highest mark of piety.
反之，倘若你一開始就假定了要低於分界以保安全的話，那你的停損點又該在哪裡呢？又為何要停呢？因為削弱自由意志底效力這是虔誠的，愈削弱就愈虔誠，讓它完全無力可為該是最虔誠的了。
page:52
In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but be to right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God!
神學，如其它科學一樣，主要的問題不是虔不虔誠，而是正不正確。因為，錯誤地理解上帝，是不會有虔誠的。
page:53
In dealing with the nature of causality, for instance, two different courses were open to him. Fist, he could favour the view that where there is efficient causality, something new, which we call effect, is brought into existence by the efficacy of its cause; in this case, every effect can be rightly considered as a positive addition to the already existing order of reality. Or St. Bonaventura cold maintain, with St. Augustine, that ‘god has created all things present and future at the very instant of creation….any particular being…should be considered…as the seed of all those other beings, or events, that are to flow from it according to the laws of divine providence. It is typical of St. Bonaventura’s theologism that he always clung to this second interpretation of causality.
在處理因果律時，Bonaventura有兩種途徑可走。首先，同意有動力因，有新的東西、新的結果產生；這樣，每個效果都可視為積極地附加於已經存在的秩序上。再者，他也可同Augustine一樣，主張上帝已於現在與未來創造了一切…任何個別的東西…應視為…所有其它事物或事件之種子，依據神意之律法而流出一切。他總執著於第二種因果詮釋，而這正是典型的Bonaventura式神學主義。
page:54
Shall we say, as St. Thomas Aquinas was to answer, that since God has made man a rational animal, the natural light of reason must be able naturally to perform its proper function, which is to know things as they are, and thereby to know truth? Or shall we say with St. Augustine, that truth being necessary, unchangeable, and eternal, it cannot be the work of a contingent, mutable and impermanent human mind interpreting unnecessary, changeful and fleeting things? Even in our minds truth is a sharing of some of the highest attributes of God; consequently, even in our minds, truth is an immediate effect of the light of God.
我們是否能如Thomas一樣地說，因上帝將人造成是一個理性的動物，理性底自然之光當然可以行使它底原有功能，去認識事物本身，意即認識真理？還是說要同Augustine那樣以為，做為必然的、不變的、永恆的真理不能是偶然的、多變的、非永恆的人性心智去對不必然的、變易的、瞬間的事物所詮釋之成果？即使在我們心智中，真理仍是分享了上帝最高的屬性；結果，即使在心智中，真理也是神性之光的直接作用。
page:54
In order to give his religious intuition some philosophical backing, St. Bonaventura had therefore to build up the theory of what he called divine illumination.
為了要讓他底宗教直觀有一些哲學上的支持，因此Bonaventura必須建立他所謂的神性光照說。
page:55
the easiest way to account for the presence of that element of necessity in a contingent reason dealing with contingent things is to suppose that Eternal Truth, or God, is permanently supplying our mind with additional light, through which, and in which, it sees truth, as in a lightning-flash.
要說明偶有的理性處理偶有的事物中能有必然的要素呈現，最簡單的方式是假定永恆真理、或上帝、不斷地給予我們底心智額外的光照，藉著它、在它之中、像在閃光中看到了真理。
page:55
Here, however, a serious difficulty arises...Granted that we cannot know truth without some additional influx of the divine light, how are we to conceive the nature of that divine illumination? if we take it as a particular instance of the general action by which God creates and runs the world, it is but the natural light of reason, that is the human intellect itself, which can therefore know truth without any further illumination from God. If, on the contrary, we see that intellectual light as a further gift, superadded by God to the natural light of man, we make it to be supernatural. it then becomes a grace.
然而這裡引發一個嚴重的困難...假定若沒有額外的神性之光我們就無法認識真理，那我們如何設想神性光照底本性？倘若我們把它視為普遍行動之個別事例，上帝藉此行動而創造世界使之運行，它祇不過是理性底自然之光，是人理性本身，那無需任何從神來的光就可以認識真理了。反之，倘若我們把理性之光看作一多出的贈予，是上帝為人底自然之光所超加的，我們使它成為超自然的了。它就是一個恩典。
page:56
St. Bonaventura was not an extremist; he did not want to destroy natural knowledge if he could help it. Accordingly, he tried to steer a middle course...His final answer is that the divine illumination is neither general, nor special; that is to say, neither the common influence of God upon nature, nor a grace that was, so to speak, superimposed on it. Very will, but then what is it?
Bonaventura不是一個極端的人；若他能的話，他並不要毀掉自然知識，他試圖走一條中道...他最終答案是，神性光照既非普遍、亦非個別；也就是說，既非上帝對自然之共通影響，亦非超加給自然之恩典。非常好，但那究竟是什麼？
page:57
If the truth of my judgments comes to me from God only, and not from my own reason, there is no natural foundation for true knowledge; the proper place for epistemology is not in philosophy, but in theology.
若我所判斷之真理祇來自於上帝而非來自我底理智，那真的知識就少了自然的根基；知識論就不該放在哲學，而該在神學的範圍。
page:61
for men are most anxious to find truth, but very reluctant to accept it. We do not like to be cornered by rational evidence, and even when truth is there, in its impersonal and commanding objectivity, our greatest difficulty still remains…In short, finding out truth is not so hard; what is hard is not to run away from truth once we have found it…The greatest among philosophers are those who do not flinch in the presence of truth, but welcome it with the simple words: yes, Amen.
人最是渴求找到真理的，但十分不情願去接受它。我們並不想被理性的明證受困於角落，甚至就算真理以它底非人性的、威嚴的客觀性在那兒，我們接受它之最大的困難仍然存在。…簡言之，找出真理並不困難，難的是在於我們找到真理後能不離它而去。…最偉大的哲學家是那些在真理出現後並不逃避的人，反是以簡單的話：是的，就這樣吧，來歡迎它。
page:62
Himself a theologian, St. Thomas had asked the professors of theology never to prove an article of faith by rational demonstration, for faith is not based on reason, but on the word of God, and if you try to prove it, you destroy it. He had likewise asked the professors of philosophy never to prove a philosophical truth by resorting to the words of God, for philosophy is not based on Revelation, but on reason, and if you try to base it on authority, you destroy it. In other words, theology is the science of those things which are received by faith from divine revelation, and philosophy is the knowledge of those things which flow from the principles of natural reason.
Thomas自己做為一位神學家時，要求神學教師絕不要用理性論證來證明信仰問題，因為信仰底基礎不是建立在理智上，而是建立在神底話語上，倘若你試圖證明它，你就毀了它。同樣地，他也要求哲學教師絕不要訴諸於神底話來證明哲學真理，因為哲學不是基於啓示，而是基於理性，假若你試圖以權威為基礎，你就毀了它。換言之，神學是因著信仰從神底啓示那兒獲得之學問，哲學則是來自於自然理性底原則所獲得之知識。
page:62
Since their common source is God, the creator of both reason and revelation, these two sciences are bound ultimately to agree; but if you really want them to agree, you must first be careful not to forget their essential difference. Only distinct things can be united; if you attempt to blend them, you inevitably lose them in what is not union, but confusion.
因為它們共同的來源是上帝，理性與啓示之創造者，兩門科學終歸一致；但若你真地要它們一致，你首先就必須小心不要忘了它們本質上的差異。不同的事物才能被統一；若你想混合它們，你不可避免地會失去了它們，那不是統一、而是混淆。
page:63
Ockham gives great weight to the first article of the Christian creed: I believe in God Almighty. Since it is an article of faith, it is needless to say that it cannot be proved. Yet, not only did Ockham use it as a principle in theology, which was a very proper thing to do, but he also resorted to it in discussing various philosophical problems, as if any theological dogma, held by faith alone, could become the source of philosophical and purely rational conclusions.
奧坎非常重視基督教義第一條：『我信上帝之全能』。因為這是信仰問題，它當然不能被證明。然而，奧坎不僅視它為神學原則，這樣做是非常適當的，但他也用它來討論不同的哲學問題。好像任何由信仰所支持的神學教義皆可成為哲學與純理智結論之來源。
page:63
What can be more Aristotelian…than the thesis so frequently restated by Ockham, that nothing exists except that which is individual? As a matter of fact, St. Thomas himself had spent a large part of his time in trying to teach that fundamental truth to the Augustinians and Neo-platonists of his day. I would be the last one to gainsay such statements.
有什麼比奧坎一再重申的這個論點：『祇有個別的東西才存在』更是亞理斯多德式的？事實上，多瑪斯本身也花了大量的時間試著要教導奧古斯丁派與新柏拉圖主義者這個基礎真理。我將是駁斥這種說法之最後一人。
page:64-65
what is the object of abstract knowledge; what are the so-called universals?...how can we draw from singular things a concept that is general?
抽象知識之對象為何；所謂共相又是什麼？…我們怎能從單一事物抽出普遍概念？
page:66
Duns Scotus, that the universals were real entities apart from their existence in individuals;…St. Thomas Aquinas, that the universals are virtually present in individuals, from which they are abstracted by our intellect.
Scotus主張，共相是脫離個別存在者之實存之物，…Thomas認為，共相是內存於個別物之中，由我們底理智從中抽象而得。
page:67
What Ockham wants us to realize is that, since everything that really exists is individual, our general ideas cannot correspond to anything in reality.
奧坎要我們認知的是，因為真正存在的是個別的，我們底普遍觀念就不能與實在界中底任何東西相符應。
page:68
Ockham’s master stroke was to perceive that the problem could not be solved unless a new classification of the various types of knowledge was first substituted for the old one. Hence his division of knowledge into abstractive and intuitive.
奧坎底主要影響是知覺到除非各種知識要重新分類，否則不能解決問題。因此，他把知識區分為抽象的與直觀的知識。
page:69
In Ockham’s doctrine, an intuitive cognition is the immediate perception of a really existing thing. It can be the perception of a material object: I see Socrates; or of a complex of material objects given together with their actual relations: I see that Socrates is sitting on a stone…it can equally well be the mere awareness of some psychological fact, such as a feeling of pleasure or pain, a knowledge, an act of reasoning or a decision of the will.
以奧坎學說，直觀認知是對實存物之立即知覺。可以是對物質對象之知覺：我看到蘇格拉底；或複雜的對象共同組成的實際關係：我看到蘇格拉底正坐在石頭上…它同樣也可以僅是心理上的認知，譬如歡愉或痛苦的感覺、知識、推理活動或意志決定。
page:69
It is a common character of all so-called intuitive knowledge, to be attended by a feeling of absolute certitude. In other words, knowledge of this kind is self-evident.
所謂直觀知識之獲得，都會有一種絕對確定的感受。換言之，這種知識是自明的。
page:69
Every knowledge that is not an intuition is an abstraction. Such, for instance, are not only what we usually call abstract ideas, an animal, or man, which stand for a whole class of individuals, but even our mental representations of mere individuals.
凡不是直觀的知識就是抽象的知識。比如，不僅我們平常所稱的抽象觀念，動物、人，象徵個別者之整個類別，甚至我們對個別者之心理再現，也算是抽象知識。
page:69
Were the thing there, we would not imagine it or remember it; we would see it; such knowledge would not be an abstraction, but an intuition.
若有一物，我們無法想像亦無法回憶；我們能看到它；這種知識不能是抽象的，祇能是直觀的知識。
page:69-70
abstractive knowledge…from which nothing can be concluded concerning the existence, or non-existence, of its object…the only kind of knowledge which enables us to ascertain whether or not a certain thing exists is intuitive knowledge; that is to say, the immediate apprehension of some object by an internal or external perception.
抽象知識…無法決定它底對象是否存在…能讓我們確定某物存在之唯一知識即直觀知識；也就是說，由內在或外在知覺對某物做立即的掌握。
page:70
Intuition then is the only possible foundation of what Ockham calls experimental knowledge, or scientific knowledge…In short, intuition alone enables us to perceive the existence or non-existence of things.
直觀是奧坎所稱為實驗知識或科學知識之唯一可能的基礎…簡言之，唯有直觀能使我們知覺事物之存在與否。
page:71
universals…are mere signs. Our idea of man…is something that points to any one of those individuals which we call men. Now, a sign is always something real in itself, it is a thing; but its signification is nothing real in itself, it is nothing…no intrinsic reality should be ascribed to their signification…What Ockham called a sign was really an image, or mental picture, whose function it was to signify any given individual belonging to a certain class.
共相…祇是符號。人這個觀念…指向所有我們稱做人的東西。現在，符號本身永遠是真實的，它是一個東西；但是，它所指向的，本身卻毫不真實，它是空的…沒有內在的真實可歸於它們底指義…奧坎所謂的符號的確是一個影像，或心像，它底功能是指向屬於某一類別的個別事物。
page:72
there is no natural relation between the spoken word and its meaning…we learn foreign languages by relating different sets of words to a single set of concepts…In other words, the natural signs, or concepts, used to designate concrete things are naturally comparable…Why are there natural signs or concepts which correspond to the same things in the same way in all possible human minds?
話語與它底意義之間並沒有自然關聯…我們學習外語是將不同的語詞關聯到同一組概念…換言之，指出具體事物的自然記號或概念，是可相互比較的…為什麼會有自然記號或概念，在所有人底心智中以相同的方式指向相同的東西？
page:72
there are such natural signs. Not only men, but even beasts, naturally utter some sounds to express their feelings.
有自然記號，不僅人，就連動物也很自然地發出某些聲音來表達它們底感覺。
page:73
Intuitive knowledge, Ockham says, is caused in us by things; now natural effects always resemble their causes…even physical phenomena are the natural signs of their causes. For instance, fire can cause heat, and for that reason, heat is a natural sign of the presence of fire.
奧坎說，直觀知識是由事物在我們之內所引起的；現在，自然結果總類似於它底原因…即使是物理現象也是它原因底自然記號。譬如，火能引起熱，因此，熱是火出現之自然記號。
page:73
Ockham…he achieved it by doing pioneer work in the field of psychology; but, however far he might have been able to advance along that line, the philosophical problems at stake would always have remained untouched.
奧坎…他在心理學領域上做了先鋒的工作；但是，不論他延著這條路走了多遠，懸而未決的哲學問題仍未被觸及。
page:73-74
How is it that different individuals cause comparable impressions in our minds? Abailard’s answer to that question had been that, if not in ourselves, then at least in God, there is for each class of individuals an idea, or archetype, which accounts for the characteristic features of that class. Ockham was too clever not to perceive that such a position would unavoidably bring him back to the Platonic problem of participation, and to some sort of metaphysical realism.
不同的人怎能可能在我們心智中引發出可相互比較的印象？Abailard對此問題之回答一直是，如果不在我們、至少在上帝心中會有每一個類別之概念或原型，以便說明該類底特性。奧坎機伶地知覺到這種立場不可避免地會將他帶回到柏拉圖的分受問題，與某種形上學的實在論。
page:74
If the universals are nothing real, God Himself can no more conceive them than we can. A divine idea is always an idea of this and that particular individual which God wishes to create…We could still ask Ockham many other questions as to what makes general ideas possible, but his answers would always be the same. Things are just what they are; Nature is performing its operations in an occult way, and the will of God is the ultimate cause of both its existence and its operations.
如果共相並不真實，那麼上帝自己也不會比我們更能設想。神性觀念永遠是這個或那個上帝想要創造的個別的觀念。…我們仍然可以追問奧坎許多問題，是什麼讓普遍觀念成為可能，但他底回答將總是一樣的。事情就是如此；自然以超自然的方式在運行著，上帝底意志是事物存在與運行之終極原因。
page:74
…the philosophical consequences of Ockham’s attitude. A pure empiricist in philosophy, he considered the will of his all-powerful God as the last argument in theology. From such a point of view, it remains both possible and desirable to describe things as they are…a positive knowledge of what is still remains possible…But why science, or human knowledge, is possible at all, we cannot know, because the will of God is the ultimate cause of all things.
…奧坎底態度所形成哲學的結果是，哲學上採純經驗主義者，神學上則以全能上帝底意志做為最後論證。依這種觀點看，要去描述事物本身是可能的…本質上之積極知識仍是可行的…然而，為何科學或人類知識成為可能，我們無法得知，因上帝底意志是所有事物之終極原因。
page:75
how is it possible for things which are material to cause impressions in a soul, which is immaterial?...what we have to know first, before discussing that problem, is whether or not the human soul is immaterial.
物質的東西如何能在非物質的靈魂中引起印象？…在討論這個問題之前，我們得先知道的是：人類靈魂是否是非物質的。
page:75
It was commonly accepted among Ockham’s predecessors, that the human soul is an immaterial, and therefore an immortal substance, which is not begotten by another similar substance, but is immediately created by God. Such a substance…is a knowing power precisely because it is not material, and yet, through the particular body which it animates, it is able to establish relations with material things, and thereby to know them.
奧坎前輩們普遍認為，人類靈魂是非物質的，因此是不朽的實體，這不是由其它類似的實體所生的，而是由上帝直接創生的。這樣的實體…是一個認知的力量，正因為它不是物質的，然而，藉由它所鼓舞的個別的身體，它才能與物質事物建立關係，並且認識它們。
page:75
Ockham’s objection to this was that…Even granting the real existence of such a knowing power, it would still remain to be proven that its nature is not material…what we call the human soul is a material and extended principle, like that of the other animals.
奧坎對此所反對的是…既使假設這種認知力量真地存在，那仍要去證明它底本性不是物質的…我們所謂的人類靈魂是一個物質的、擴延的原理，像其它動物底魂一樣。
page:76
how could the soul of an extended body act as its animating principle or…be its form, if it has no extension of its own? In other words, how could the form of an extended substance be itself unextended?
擴延身體底靈魂，倘若並沒有屬於自己底擴延性，它如何能做為身體底激勵原則而行動、或成為身體底形式？換言之，擴延實體底形式如何能成為非擴延的？
page:76-77
beings should not be multiplied without necessity. “Ockham’s razor,”…means first of all that one should not account for the existence of an empirically given thing by imagining, behind and beyond it, another thing whose hypothetical existence cannot be verified.
若非必要，存在不須增加。『奧坎剃刀』…首先意謂著我們不該在事物之後或之外去想像那不能被檢證的假設性存在來說明經驗與料的存在。
page:77
Unfortunately, that very simple and, as I think, very sound methodological principle was connected in Ockham’s mind with his theological conception of God as an essentially almighty God…Hence his firm conviction that no philosopher should waste his time in speculating on the hypothetical causes of actually existing things. If we believe that God can do anything that does not involve contradiction, all non-contradictory explanations of a given fact become equally valid.
不幸的是，我所認為這簡潔又建全的方法論原則，在奧坎心中，與他底全能的上帝之神學概念有所關聯…因此，他堅決相信，哲學家不須花時間去想實存事物之假設性原因。倘若我們相信上帝能做任何不含矛盾的事情，所有對既定事實非矛盾的解釋都同樣是有效的。
page:77-78
In order to account for the possibility of abstract knowledge, Aristotle and St. Thomas had conceived an elaborate scheme, according to which things themselves were credited with virtually intelligible forms, which the human soul was supposed to abstract from things by its active intellect, and to know by its possible intellect. The self-expression of an intellect thus made pregnant with a natural form was the concept: that which is conceived by, and is born of, a human intellect, when it is impregnated with things.
為了要說明抽象知識之可能，亞理斯多德與多瑪斯構想一巧妙計劃，事物具有可理解的形式，它可由人類靈魂藉著主動理智從事物中抽象出來，由被動理智去認識它。理智蘊育著自然形式，其自我表達即是概念：由理智所想所生，並不蘊含著事物。
page:78
From Ockham’s point of view, since we can perceive the existence neither of such natural forms, nor of these alleged active and possible intellects, such speculations were perfectly empty. But the worst thing about them was that they utterly disregarded the innumerable possibilities which lay open to the free will of an almighty God.
依奧坎觀點，我們既不能知覺到自然形式之存在，也不能知覺到主動與被動理智之存在，這樣的思辨完全是空洞的。然而最糟的是，他們完全忽視全能上帝底自由意志有其無數的可能性。
page:79
That a thing does not exist can well account for our having no intuition of its existence, but not for our having an intuition of its non-existence. There is a serious difference between not knowing that a thing is, and knowing that it is not. How could that which is not make us know that it is not?
不存在的東西可以說明我們對它底存在並無直觀，但卻不能說明我們對它有不存在之直觀。不知道它是什麼與知道它不是什麼，兩者間有很大的差別。不在之物如何能讓我們知道它不在？
page:79
In order to account for negative intuitions…every intuition of a really existing thing was the joint effect of two separate causes: the thing itself and our knowledge of it…In Ockham’s own words: When the thing is there, the intuitive knowledge of the thing, plus the thing itself, cause the judgment that the thing is there; but when the thing is not there, the intuitive knowledge minus the thing must cause an opposite judgment.
為了要說明消極直觀…每一個實存物之直觀是由兩個分開的因素所結合之結果：事物本身與我們對它之知識。…以奧坎底話說：當事物在這，對此物之直觀知識，加上事物本身，導致該物在此之判斷；但若該物不在那兒，去掉事物之直觀知識導致了相反的判斷。
page:80
God alone can conserve in us the intuitions of absent things, and thereby enable us to judge that they are not there…each intuition of non-existence would entail the supernatural conservation in us, by God, of a natural intuition…a logical answer to the question was impossible.
祗有上帝能在我們中保存不在事物之直觀，讓我們能判斷它們不在那兒。…每次對不在事物之直觀，上帝都在我們中引出對自然直觀有一超自然的保存。…邏輯無法解決這個問題。
page:80
if this is for us the only way to account for the possibility of negative intuitions, why should we not resort to theology when we need it?
若這是為我們說明消極直觀唯一可能的方式，當我們有需要時，為何我們不能訴諸於神學呢？
page:80-81
If God can conserve in us the intuition of something that is not actually existing, how shall we ever be sure that what we are perceiving as real is an actually existing thing? In other words, if it is possible for God to make us perceive as real an object that does not really exist, have we any proof that this world of ours is not a vast phantasmagoria behind which there is no reality to be found?
若上帝能在我們中保留對不實存事物之直觀，我們如何能保證我們所知覺到真實的是真正實存的東西？換言之，假若上帝能讓我們把不在之物以為是真實的，那我們如何證明這個世界不是一個巨大的變化多端的幻影，背後根本找不到任何實在。
page:81
My intuition of the star is one thing, its object is another thing; why could not an almighty God produce the one without the other?
我對星星之直觀是一件事，直觀底對象是另一件事；全能的上帝為何不能祇產生出一個而沒有另一個?
page:82
nothing is necessarily required to make knowledge possible, but the mind and God.
知識所能成立之必要條件，祇有人底心智與上帝。
page:83
When the presence of a certain fact is regularly attended by the presence of another fact, we call the first one a cause and the second an effect. And beyond that we know nothing…causality is nothing.
當某事實之呈現總是伴隨著另一個事實之呈現，我們稱前者為因，後者為果。除此之外，我們一無所知。…因果律是空的。
page:84
Ockham himself had no intention of advocating such a conception of the physical world. Even while he was proving that God could create the knowledge of a thing without that thing, his mind remained as far as possible from the idealism of Berkeley…Ockham’s criticism of the notion of causality was…inspired by…his desire to account for the possibility of miracles.
奧坎自己並無意願提倡物理世界之概念。既使當他證明上帝能為不在的事物創造出知識，奧坎底心智仍與柏克萊觀念論有相當的距離。…奧坎對因果律之批判…是為了要說明奇蹟之可能性。
page:85
As a matter of fact, an inarticulate world such as the English agnostic’s was most suitable to the arbitrary will of the English Franciscan’s God; no wonder then if we find them both in the doctrine of William of Ockham.
事實上，一個如英國不可知論者底不清不楚的世界，最適合英國芳濟會上帝底自由意志；如果我們在奧坎底學說中發現了它們兩者也不必奇怪。
page:85
Having expelled from the mind of God the intelligible world of Plato, Ockham was satisfied that no intelligibility could be found in any one of God’s works. How could there be order in nature, when there is no nature? And how could there be a nature when each singular being thing, or event, can claim no other justification for its existence then that of being one among the elect of an all-powerful God?
上帝底心智已將柏拉圖底可理解的世界逐出，奧坎對於在上帝底作品中找不到可理解性十分滿意。當沒有自然時，如何能在自然中有秩序？當每一個別事物不能為自己底存在辯護，而祇是全能上帝所揀選的對象，那如何能有自然？
page:86
Ockham's God was expressly intended to relieve the world of the necessity of having any meaning of its own. The God of theology always vouches for nature; the jealous God of theologism usually prefers to abolish it.
奧坎底上帝，很明顯地，打算把世界本身所擁有底意義之必然性給消解掉。神學底上帝總是擔保著自然；而神學主義底忌妒的上帝則常想要廢了它。
page:86
Ockham would have left us nothing more than a brilliant example of theologism, but he was at the same time a shrewd logician and a clear-headed philosopher, whose mind could not entertain a philosophy at variance with his theology.
奧坎留給我們的僅是一位神學主義之典型，然而他同時也是位伶俐的邏輯學家與頭腦清醒的哲學家，他底心智不會去想與他底神學相左的哲學。
page:87
Ockham...He was convinced that to give a psychological analysis of human knowledge was to give a philosophical analysis of reality. For instance, each intuition is radically distinct from every other intuition, hence, each particular thing is radically distinct from every other particular thing. Again, since no intuition of a thing can cause in us the intuition of another thing, it follows that no thing can cause another thing.
奧坎...他堅信對人類知識做心理學分析就等於是對實在做哲學分析。譬如，每個直觀與其它直觀都完全不同，因此，每個事物與其它事物也完全不同。又來了，因為對事物之直觀不能引發對另一事物之直觀，所以，沒有事物能引發另一事物。
page:87
the psychological relations between our ideas are a true picture of the real relations between things, that we are indebted for Ockham's interpretation of causality. Since the origin of causality cannot possibly be found in the thing itself, or in the intuition of the thing by the intellect, it must be explained by some other reason; and there is but one: it is what Ockham called habitualis notitia, and what Hume will simply called habit.
我們借由奧坎對因果律之詮釋可知，觀念間之心理關係正是事物間關係真實的圖像。因為，因果律不可能在事物本身找到，也非來自理性對事物之直觀，它必然得以其它理由來說明；有一個：即奧坎所稱的認知習慣，或休謨所稱的習慣。
page:89
nothing was left but empirical sequences of facts outside the mind, and habitual associations within the mind, the mere external frame of a world order carefully emptied of its intelligibility.
心外祇有經驗繼起的事實，心內祇有習慣性的聯結，世界秩序之外在框架使它底可理解性空洞化了。
page:89-90
Ockham was quite right in attempting to describe the psychological process which enables us to form general ideas, or to conceive the notion of causality; but he should have stopped there and given to his psychological analysis a merely psychological conclusion.
奧坎打算描述使我們構想出普遍觀念之心理過程、及因果看法，這完全正確；但他應就此打住，而給予他底心理分析一個心理學上的結論。
page:90
Psychologism consists in demanding that psychology answer philosophical questions. Psychology is a science, psychologism is a sophism; it substitutes the definition for the defined, the description for the described, the map for the country…Scientists themselves can afford such blunders; faith in science being what they live by, they have no need of reality…They are all on the straight road to skepticism.
心理主義在於要求以心理學回答哲學問題。心理學是一門科學，心理主義則是一詭辯主義；它以定義取代了被定義者，以描述取代了被描述者，以地圖取代了國家…科學家本身就足以鑄成大錯；信仰科學是他們生活之所依，他們並不需要實在…這些都直接導向懷疑論之路。
page:90-91
Scholastic philosophers then began to mistrust their own principles, and mediaeval philosophy broke down;…the best minds were surprised to find reason empty and began to despise it.
士林哲學家開始不信賴自己底原則，中世哲學毀了；…最佳的心智因發現理性是空洞的而感驚訝，且開始輕視它。
page:92
when they did begin to resent their alliance as a suspicious promiscuity, the breakdown of mediaeval culture was at hand.
當他們對神學哲學混雜而處感到憎恨時，中世文化隨時準備結束了。
page:93-94
If theology is the science of the word of God, it is unlikely that the solving of such highly intricate problems be required in order to achieve one’s own salvation. In short, the Gospel is both so simple and so safe…Therefore, from that time on, the slogan of many theologians was to be: Back to the Gospel!
若神學是一門上帝話語之科學，它不應是為了達成救贖而要去解決高度複雜的問題。簡言之，福音既簡易又安全。…因此，那時的許多神學家底口號是：回到福音！
page:95
After the disruption of scholasticism, a simple return to the Bible and to the study of ethical problems was one of the few experiments that could still be attempted.
在士林哲學瓦解之後，回到聖經與倫理問題研究，是少數可達成的嘗試。
page:95
Averroes…had supported the view that philosophy, when it is given the liberty to follow its own methods, reaches necessary conclusions that are contradictory to the teachings of the theologians.
Averroes…支持這個看法，當哲學獲得自由可依自己底方法時，那它必然會得出與神學家底教導發生矛盾之結論。
page:96
Averroes had proved that the world is eternal and that there is no personal immortality. All the Christian theologians protested against his conclusions and attacked his demonstrations, but not all in the same way. St. Bonaventura attempted to prove by philosophical arguments that the world is not eternal and that the soul of each man is immortal.
Averroes證明了世界是永恆的，人卻沒有不朽性。基督神學家皆以不同的方式群起而攻之。Bonaventura以哲學論證證明世界非永恆，而每個人底靈魂則是不朽的。
page:96
St. Thomas Aquinas was of the opinion that Averroes had failed to prove the eternity of the world, but that St. Bonaventura had also failed to prove that the world is not eternal; in short, philosophy cannot prove anything on that point, but it can prove the immortality of the soul.
多瑪斯認為Averroes並沒能證明世界之永恆性，Bonaventura亦未能證明世界不是永恆的；簡言之，哲學在這件事上不能證明什麼，但卻能證明靈魂底不朽性。
page:96
Duns Scotus’s position was that neither the creation of the world in time, nor the immortality of the soul could be proved by philosophers, but that both could be proved by theologians.
Scotus底立場是，哲學家既不能證明世界在時間之創造、亦不能證明靈魂之不朽性，祇有神學可為。
page:96
As to Ockham himself, he was willing to hold such conclusions as philosophical probabilities, but not as conclusively proved truths; to which he added that what cannot be proved by philosophy can still less be proved by theology, where certitude is not grounded on reason, but on faith.
關於奧坎自己，則願把這些結論視為哲學上的可能性，而非已證之定見；若有不能被哲學所證明的東西，它同樣也不能被神學證明，因這種確定性不是基於理性，而是基於信仰。
page:97
I do not think that there ever was a single man whose mental attitude could correctly be described as pure skepticism.
我並不認為曾有一個人他底心態可正確地解讀為純懷疑論者。
page:100-101
who has ever perceived a substance?...we cannot infer their existence from what we call their properties, or accidents…there is no reason whatsoever to posit unperceived substances behind their perceived accidents. If we go thus far…after the notion of substance, we have to dismiss the notion of causality. For the same reason it is impossible to prove that a certain thing is the final cause of another thing.
誰曾知覺到實體？…我們無法從我們所謂的屬性或偶性推出實體之存在…怎麼說都沒有理由去假定在可知覺的偶性背後有一不可知覺的實體。倘若我們再進一步…在實體觀點之後，我們必得解消因果律觀點。同樣的理由，證明某物是某物底目的因也是不可能的。
page:101
We cannot live without ascribing some meaning to our existence, or act without ascribing some goal to our activity; when philosophy no longer provides men with satisfactory answers to those questions, the only means they still have to escape skepticism and despair are moralism, or mysticism, or some combination of both.
我們不能沒有存在意義而生活著，也不能沒有活動目標而行動著；當哲學不再能為人們對這些問題提供滿意的答案，他們仍必須避開懷疑論與絕望，其唯一方法就是倫理主義或神秘主義或兩者之組合。
page:102
the best among the members of the political community could devote their whole care to the highest interest of morals and religion. Were they to do so, they would keep peace and charity…Fully aware of how little they can know by the natural light of reason, such men would not sin by pride, but rather would purify both their hearts and their minds from the vices that breed ignorance, such as envy, avarice, cupidity.
政治圈中那些最好的傢伙會全神貫注於道德與宗教。若他們真這麼做，將會保有和平與慈愛…他們完全瞭解靠著理性自然之光所知有限，這樣，人就不會犯下驕傲之罪，而是從無知、忌妒、貪婪之惡行中淨化他們底心靈與心智。
page:102
Aristotle is cold, and he leaves us cold, whereas it is impossible to read Cicero, or for that matter Seneca, without falling in love with the beauty of virtue and feeling a bitter hatred against vice. If true philosophers are masters of virtue, Cicero and Seneca are the true philosophers.
亞理斯多德是冰冷的，他也讓我們冰冷，然而，若不與德行之美相戀、嫉惡如仇，就不可能讀通Cicero與Seneca。倘若真的哲學家是德行大師，Cicero與Seneca就是真哲學家。
page:106
Socrates modestly confessed: “There is but one thing I know, and it is that I know nothing”; and still he was bragging, for he could not even be sure of that…”for my own part I would not dare to affirm that it can be affirmed that we know nothing.”
蘇格拉底謙卑地承認：『我祇知道一件事，那就是我什麼都不知道』；他仍是太自誇了，因為他甚至不能確定…『就我而言，我不能冒然地肯定我們什麼都不知道』。
page:108
That God is infinitely above anything we can think and say about Him, was a universally accepted doctrine in mediaeval theology. St. Thomas Aquinas had made it the very foundation of his doctrine. We do not know what God is, but only what He is not, so that we know Him the better as we more clearly see that He is infinitely different from everything else.
上帝永遠比我們對祂之所思、所說還要高超，這在中世神學是普遍接受的學說。多瑪斯以此為他底學說之基礎。我們不能知道上帝是什麼，祇知道祂不是什麼。因此，當我們愈清楚地明白祂不是這個也不是那個，也就愈能認識祂。
page:109
God is, strictly speaking, unknowable, and his ultimate endeavour to experience by love that which surpasses human understanding, St. Thomas Aquinas never forgets, that if we do not know God, the reason is not that God is obscure, but rather that He is a blinding light. The whole theology of St. Thomas points to the supreme intelligibility of what lies hidden in the mystery of God.
嚴格地說，上帝是不可知的，所要努力的是以愛來經驗上帝，愛超出了人的理解，多瑪斯絕不會忘記，若我們不能認識上帝，不是因上帝不夠清楚，而是因祂是盲目之光。多瑪斯整個神學指出了藏在神秘上帝背後底超級可理解性。
page:109
philosophy has nothing else to do in Eckhart’s doctrine but to throw darkness upon God and so surround Him with the cloud of unknowingness.
在Eckhart底學說，哲學所做的祇是在上帝四周佈滿黑暗與未知的烏雲。
page:110
God is eternally expressing Himself in an act of self-knowledge, the fact remains that God’s infinite essence is unfathomable, even to God, for He could not know Himself without turning His infinite essence into a definite object of knowledge…God as knowing and God as known are two…The only way to reach God, insofar at least as it is possible for us to do so, is therefore to transcend all mutual limitations and all distinctions;…It is only when man reaches that silent wilderness where there is neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Ghost, that His mystical flight comes to an end…in the fullness of the Divinity.
上帝永遠地在自我認識之行動中表達自己，上帝底無限本質是深不可測的，即便是上帝，祂也不能不把祂底無限本質轉成明確的知識對象來認識自己。…做為認知之上帝與被認知之上帝是不同的…祇要對我們而言是可能的，接近上帝唯一的方法是超越相互的限制與區分；…祇有當人觸及那無聲的荒野，那兒沒有聖父、聖子、聖靈，祂神秘的飛翔到達終點…充滿著神性。
page:115
God is a being than which no greater can be conceived, but if He is the Absolute, He must needs be at the same time, and for the same reason, a being than which no smaller can be conceived. God is the coincidence of opposites, and therefore He is above both the principle of identity and the principle of contradiction. In short, God is unthinkable.
無法想像有一個存有能比上帝更大，然而祂若是絕對者，因著相同的理由，祂同時也必須是無法設想有一個存有能比祂更小。上帝是對立面之一致，因此祂處在同一律與矛盾律之上。簡言之，上帝是無法想像的。
page:116
This is the very reason why it is a Universe, that is to say, not a mere plurality of unrelated things, but a universality of many-related things. The trouble is that…things are not only many-related, but universally related. Taken as a whole…since every one of the divine ideas is but a particular expression of God as a whole, so also must every particular thing be considered as a restricted but global expression of the Universe…in a word, the Universe is identical with itself in each particular aspect of its diversity…The old principle of Anaxagoras still holds true: everything is in everything.
這就是為什麼稱做Universe，它不單是指許多毫無關聯的事物，而是許多關聯在一起的事物之統合。麻煩是…事物不僅是許多關聯，而是普遍關聯。視作一個全體…因為每一個神性觀念皆是做為全體之上帝底個別表現，所以每一個別事物也必須是宇宙全面的表達…一句話，宇宙在它各個多樣性的面向皆是等同的…Anaxagoras底古老原理仍然有效：一切在一切之中。
page:116-117
God is in the Universe as the cause is in its effect…the Universe is in every one of its parts, for every one of its parts is the Universe.
上帝在宇宙中正如因在果之中…宇宙在它每一個部分，因它底每一個部分皆是宇宙。
page:118
as soon as the scholastics gave up all hope of answering philosophical problems in the light of pure reason, the long and brilliant career of mediaeval philosophy came to a close.
一旦士林哲學放棄了所有要以純理性之光去回答哲學問題之希望，這漫長且輝煌的中世哲學就結束了。
page:125
Descartes…he was the first to build up a new system of ideas and to open formally a new philosophical era. His predecessors had done little more than to distrust scholastic philosophy, and, as they knew no other one, to extend their distrust to philosophy itself. Descartes brought to the world the unexpected revelation that…constructive philosophical thinking was still possible. Ever since the fourteenth century there had been men to criticize Aristotle, but Descartes’ ambition was quite different: it was to replace him.
笛卡兒…他乃是建立新的觀念系統、正式開啟新的哲學領域之第一人。他的前輩們祇是不滿於士林哲學，卻不知如何將此對哲學之不滿加以擴充。笛卡兒為這世界帶來令人想不到的啟示…建構哲學思維仍是可能的。十四世紀以來批評亞理斯多德的不乏其人，但笛卡兒底野心相當不同：他要取代亞氏。
page:126-127
Cartesianism was a direct answer to the challenge of Montaigne’s skepticism…was a desperate struggle to emerge from Montaigne’s skepticism.
笛卡兒主義是對蒙田懷疑論之挑戰做直接的回應…竭盡所能地要從蒙田懷疑論走出來。
page:127
What was the last conclusion of Montaigne?...Deeply perturbed by the religious and political dissensions of his time, and above all by the disruption of moral unity resulting from the Reformation, Montaigne had traced back the common source of those evils to dogmatism. Man are so cocksure of what they say that they do not hesitate to eliminate each other, as if killing an opponent were killing his objections.
蒙田最後的結論是什麼？...他那個時代的政教紛爭深深困擾著他，尤其是宗教改革所造成道德的瓦解，蒙田將這些罪惡之源歸為教條主義。人們堅持著他們自己所說的而毫不遲疑地相互攻伐，好像毀滅敵人就是消除異己。
page:127
the only thing we can learn from him is the art of unlearning...As Montaigne sees it, wisdom is a laborious training of the mind, whose only result is an acquired habit not to judge. "I can maintain a position," says Montaigne, "I cannot choose one." Hence his practical conservatism.
我們從他那兒唯一能學到的是革除之藝術...如蒙田所見，智慧是心智勞動的練習，是不妄下判斷之後天的習慣。蒙田說『我底一貫立場就是我不能做任何選擇』。因此，他是實際地保守主義者。
page:128
A well-made mind is never fully convinced of its own opinions, and therefore doubting is the highest mark of wisdom. Not "I know," or even "I don't know," but "What do I know?" This is doubting. Such it is as Descartes describes...that Montaigne was right...but what had been their ultimate conclusion was only a starting point for Descartes.
一個建全的心智絕不會完全相信自己底意見，因此，懷疑是智慧最高之表徵。不是『我知道』亦非『我不知道』，而是『我知道什麼？』這才是可疑的。這正如笛卡兒描述的...蒙田是對的。...然而那個一直是他們最終的結論僅是做為笛卡兒之起點。
page:129
The purely negative wisdom of Montaigne could not possibly be complete wisdom, but it was the first step to a complete one. True wisdom should be positive, not made up of what we do not know, but grounded on the fullness of what we do know...at least would be an unshakable certainty. But was it possible to find it?
蒙田底純粹消極的智慧不可能是完整的智慧，但那是成為完整智慧的第一步。真智慧應是積極的，不是由我們所不知道的東西所組成，而是立基在我們全然所知道的東西。...至少應是不可動搖的確定性。但真有這種東西嗎？
page:130-132
Descartes inherited from Clavius something much more valuable - the spirit of mathematical learning. Let us only read the introduction of Clavius...Since, therefore, mathematical disciplines are so exclusively dedicated to the love and cultivation of truth, that nothing is received there of what is false, nor even of that which is merely probable...there is no doubt that the first place among sciences should be conceded to Mathematics...There are innumerable sects in philosophy, there are no sects in mathematics; philosophers are always dealing with mere probabilities, mathematicians alone can reach demonstrated conclusions.
笛卡兒從Clavius身上學到更有價值的東西是-數學研究之精神。讓我們僅讀讀他底導論...因此，正因數學訓練特別是獻給真理之愛與栽培，凡是錯的都不予接受，既使僅具犯錯之可能亦不接受...無疑地，各種科學之首座應讓位給數學。...有數不盡的哲學派別，數學則沒有派別；哲學家總在處理可能性，唯有數學家能達到論證性的結論。
page:132
If we need a philosophy whose certitude is equal to that of mathematics, our first principle will have to be the I think; but do we need such a philosophy? And supposing we do, can we have it? In other words, are we sure that everything that is is susceptible of a mathematically evident interpretation?
倘若我們需要一種哲學，它底確定性等同於數學底確定性，我們底第一原理將必是我思；但我們真地需要這樣的哲學嗎？假設要吧，我們能獲得它嗎？換言之，我們是否確定任何存在之物皆足以用數學來清楚的詮釋？
page:137
Fully convinced that he had virtually completed geometry by combining it with algebra, Descartes proceeded on the spot to another and still bolder generalization. After all, his only merit had been to realize that two sciences...were but one; why not go at once to the limit and say that all sciences are one? Such was Descartes's final illumination...All sciences were one; all problems had to be solved by the same method.
毫無疑問地，笛卡兒成功地將幾何學與代數結合在一起了，他立即地繼續更大膽的概括。必竟，他唯一的優點就是了解到兩種科學...其實僅是一種；那為何不立刻推向極限，說所有的科學皆是一種？這就是笛卡兒最終的想法...科學祇有一種；所有的問題必需能以同樣的方法予以解決。
page:139
the next move had to be obviously the further combination of both with logic...a method, says Descartes, which, "comprising the advantages of the three, is yet exempt from their faults.
下一個行動，很明顯地必是將幾何與代數再跟邏輯結合。...笛卡兒說，一個方法包含了幾何、代數、邏輯三個學科之優點，即可免除了他們底缺失。
page:140
true knowledge is necessary; mathematical knowledge alone is necessary; hence all knowledge has to be mathematical...Descartes was thereby eliminating from knowledge all that was mere probability.
真的知識是必然的；唯數學知識是必然的；因此，所有的知識必須是數學的。...笛卡兒因此就把所有僅具可能性的東西從知識中刪除了。
page:142
It had been a great idea to substitute algebraic signs for geometrical lines and figures, but algebraic signs would never do in metaphysics, not always in physics, still less in biology, in medicine and in ethics.
以代數符號取代幾何線條與特徵，這一直是偉大的構想；但代數符號決不能用在形上學，也不永遠可用在物理學，更不用說生物學、醫學與倫理學。
page:142-143
Having succeeded in eliminating figures from geometry, he felt inclined to believe that quantity itself could be eliminated from mathematics. It was necessary for him to do that, at least if he wished to extend the mathematical method even to such problems as metaphysics and ethics, where no quantity is involved...."Method," says Descartes, "consists entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards which our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any truth." Let us, with Descartes himself, call that method "Universal Mathematics"; it certainly was universal, but could it still be called mathematics?...or is it logic?
在成功地從幾何學刪除了數目之後，他進而相信可從數學中將量給排除。對他而言這是必然地做法，至少，如果他想把數學方法伸延到沒有量化的學科之問題上，如形上學、倫理學。...笛卡兒說『方法完全在於事物之秩序與安排上，若我們要發現真理，那我們底心靈視域就必得朝此而去』。這就是笛卡兒所聲稱的『普遍數學』。它當然是普遍的，但它仍算是數學嗎？...還是邏輯？
page:145
In order to make the objects of philosophical knowledge as similar as possible to those of mathematics, he reduced their number to three: thought, extension, and God...Descartes decreed that the whole content of each of them was such as can be exhausted by a simple intuition.
為了要使哲學知識的對象儘可能地與數學對象一樣，他把哲學數目還原為三個：思維、擴延與上帝。...笛卡兒宣稱這些內容可由簡單直觀即可掌握。
page:146
our clear and distinct concepts are...as many "simple natures," each of them endowed with a definite essence of its own, and wholly independent from the minds in which they dwell. From that time on, philosophy was to be the mathematical knowledge of the necessary order there is between the so-called simple natures, or fundamental ideas of the human mind.
我們底清晰明瞭的概念是...許多『簡單本性』，它們每個都賦予自身明確的本質，完全獨立於所居住的心智。從此，哲學是必然秩序的數學知識，有所謂的簡單本性，或人心智底根本觀念。
page:218
Thus, according to Hume, causality could no longer be considered as the transportation of a thing by another thing, or as the transportation of a thing by the power of God, but as a transportation of our own mind from an idea, which we call cause, to another idea, which we call effect.
根據休謨，因果律不再能視為事物間之傳遞或上帝底力量對事物之運送，而是我們自己底心智中，因觀念與果觀念之轉換。
page:219
Owing to Hume's philosophical insight, the Cartesian cycle had thus been brought to a close; and it really was a cycle, because its end was in its very beginning - scepticism. Montaigne's scepticism at the beginning; Hume's scepticism at the end...What do I know apart from what I am being taught by custom? Montaigne had asked. The mind, God, and the world, as evidently as mathematics, if not more so, was Descartes' answer...Hume had to write as its ultimate conclusion: "that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom."
由於休謨底洞見，笛卡兒學派就此結束了；它真是一個循環，因它底結束是處在它底開始-懷疑主義。始於蒙田底懷疑主義；終於休謨底懷疑主義。...蒙田曾問道，除了習慣底教導外，我還能知道什麼？笛卡兒回道，可認識如數學般明顯之心智、上帝、與世界。...休謨底最後結論是：『所有我們對因和果之推理皆來自於習慣』。
page:300-301
the biography of a philosopher is of great help in understanding his philosophy; but that is the history of a philosopher, not of his philosophy
哲學家傳記對其哲學之瞭解有很大的助益；但那是哲學家史，非哲學史。
...
it is the literary history of philosophical writings, not the history of philosophy.
哲學著作之文學史亦非哲學史。
...
We may wholly disagree with Hegel, or with Comte, but nobody can read their encyclopedias without finding there an inexhaustible source of partial truths and of acute observations...but this is the history of a philosophy, it is not yet the history of philosophy itself.
我們可以全然地不同意黑格爾或孔德，但沒有人在讀有關他們的百科全書時而不會發現有部分真理之無盡泉源和敏銳的觀察。...但這僅是某一個哲學之史，而非哲學史本身。
page:302
Philosophy consists in the concepts of philosophers, taken in the naked, impersonal necessity of both their contents and their relations. The history of these concepts and of their relationships is the history of philosophy itself.
哲學在於哲學家底概念， 在它們底內容與關係皆視為坦率、無關個人之必然性。這種概念史與它們底關係史正是哲學史本身。
page:304-305
Granted that there is no such thing as an historical determinism, it still remains true that history contains a metaphysical determinism...Now the most striking of the recurrences which we have been observing together is the revival of philosophical speculation by which every sceptical crisis was regularly attended...If there is a metaphysical necessity behind this, what is it?
假定根本沒有歷史決定論這種東西，歷史仍然會有形上決定論。...目前我們所觀察到最顯著的重現是哲學思辨之甦醒，藉此，懷疑論之危機經常伴隨在側。...倘若在背後真有形上必然性，那它倒底是什麼？
page:305
Plato's idealism comes first; Aristotle warns everybody that Platonism is heading for scepticism; then Greek scepticism arises, more or less redeemed by the moralism of the Stoics and Epicureans, or by the mysticism of Plotinus.
柏拉圖觀念論先來；亞理斯多德警告大家柏拉圖主義會導向懷疑論；然後，希臘懷疑論冒出，多多少少，可讓Stoic與Epicurus底道德主義、或Plotinus神秘主義得以救贖。
page:305
St. Thomas Aquinas restores philosophical knowledge, but Ockham cuts its very root, and ushers in the late mediaeval and Renaissance scepticism, itself redeemed by the moralism of the humanists or by the pseudo-mysticism of Nicolaus Cusanus and of his successors.
多瑪斯恢復了哲學知識，但奧坎又斷其根並引入中世晚期與文藝復興懷疑論，靠著人文主義底道德或Nicola Cusa底神秘主義獲得救贖。
page:305-306
Then come Descartes and Locke, but their philosophies disintegrate into Berkeley and Hume, with the moralism of Rousseau...Kant...his own philosophical restoration ultimately degenerated into the various forms of contemporary agnosticism, with all sorts of moralisms and of would-be mysticisms as ready shelters against spiritual despair.
接著來的是笛卡兒與洛克，但他們底哲學分裂到柏克萊與休謨，盧梭底道德主義...康德...他自己底哲學修復終究墮落為各式各樣當代的不可知論。各種道德主義與神秘主義正是對精神絕望之避難所。
page:306
The so-called death of philosophy being regularly attended by his revival,...In short, the first law to be inferred from philosophical experience is: Philosophy always buries its undertakers.
所謂的哲學之死，經常伴隨著它底復甦，...簡言之，從哲學經驗所推導而來的第一條律則是：哲學總是埋藏它底理藏者。
page:306
Hume had destroyed both metaphysics and science; in order to save science, Kant decided to sacrifice metaphysics. Now, it is the upshot of the Kantian experiment that, if metaphysics is arbitrary knowledge, science also is arbitrary knowledge; hence it follows that our belief in the objective validity of science itself stands or falls with our belief in the objective validity of metaphysics. The new question, then is no longer, Why is metaphysics a necessary illusion, but rather, Why is metaphysics necessary, and how is it that it has given rise to so many illusions?
休謨已毀了形上學與科學；為了要救科學，康德決定犧牲形上學。康德這樣做的結果是，若形上學是任意的知識，那麼科學也是；因此，我們所相信科學底客觀有效性基於形上學底客觀有效性。不再是去問為什麼形上學一定是幻覺，而是問為什麼形上學是必要的，它如何能引出這麼多幻覺？
page:306-307
It is observable character of all metaphysical doctrines that...they agree on the necessity of finding out the first cause of all that is. Call it matter with Democritos, the Good with Plato, the self-thinking Thought with Aristotle, the One with Plotinus, Being with all Christian philosophers, Moral Law with Kant, the Will with Schopenhauer, or let it be the absolute idea of Hegel, the Creative Duration of Bergson, and whatever else you may cite, in all cases the metaphysician is a man who looks behind and beyond experience for an ultimate ground of all real and possible experience.
所有形上學學說有一可觀察的性格...他們同意必須找到萬物之第一因。Democritos稱它為物質，柏拉圖稱為至善，亞理斯多德稱自我思想之絕對思維，Plotinus稱為太一，基督哲學家稱絕對存有，康德稱絕對道德律，叔本華稱絕對意志，或黑格爾底絕對觀念，柏格森底創造的綿延，任何你能舉的，任何事例，形上學家皆是在經驗背後與之外，尋求一個在所有實在的與可能的經驗底終極基礎。
page:307-308
Let this, therefore, be our second law: by his very nature, man is a metaphysical animal. The law does more than state a fact, it points to its cause. Since man is essentially rational, the constant recurrence of metaphysics in the history of human knowledge must have its explanation in the very structure of reason itself. In other words, the reason why man is a metaphysical animal must lie somewhere in the nature of rationality.
我們第二個律則：人天生就是形上學的動物。此律不僅陳述一件事實，它指出了它底原因。因著人本質上是理性的，在人類知識史，形上學不斷地重現，對此該有一個理性結構本身之解釋。換句話說，人為何是形上學的動物，其理由多少在於理智底本性。
page:308
The typical attributes of scientific knowledge, that is universality and necessity, are not to be found in sensible reality and one of the most generally received explanations is that they come to us from our very power of knowing.
科學知識底性質，即普遍與必然，不能在感官實在界中找到，最廣為接受的解釋是它們來自於我們認知能力。
page:308
As Kant was the first both to distrust metaphysics and to hold it to be unavoidable, so was he also the first to give a name to human reason's remarkable power to overstep all sensible experience. He called it the transcendent use of reason and denounced it as the permanent source of our metaphysical illusions.
康德是第一位既不信賴形上學又主張它不可避免，他也是第一位為人底理性逾越了感官經驗這種能力命名。他叫此為理性底超越使用，並以它做為我們形上幻覺之永恆源頭予以譴責。
page:308
whether such knowledge be illusory or not, there is, in human reason, a natural aptness, and consequently a natural urge, to transcend the limits of experience and to form transcendental notions by which the unity of knowledge may be completed.
不論這樣的知識是否為幻覺，在人底理性總有一自然傾向與衝動，要超越經驗上的限制，建構先驗的想法，藉此使知識底統一得以完備。
page:308-309
Let us, therefore, state as our third law, that metaphysics is the knowledge gathered by a naturally transcendent reason in its search for the first principles, or first causes, of what is given in sensible experience. This is, in fact, what metaphysics is, but what about its validity?
我們第三條律則是：形上學是由超越理性很自然地得出的，它從感覺經驗與料中找尋第一原理或第一因。事實上，這正是形上學之所是，但它是有效的嗎？
page:309
should the repeated failures of metaphysics be ascribed to metaphysics itself, or to metaphysicians?...For indeed that experience itself exhibits a remarkable unity...metaphysical adventures are doomed to fail when their authors substitute the fundamental concepts of any particular science for those of metaphysics.
形上學重覆地失敗該歸給形上學本身還是歸給形上學家？...的確，經驗本身展現著顯著的統一...當形上學家把個別科學底基本概念取代形上學底概念，這種形上冒險注定失敗。
page:309-310
this must be our fourth conclusion: as metaphysics aims at transcending all particular knowledge, no particular science is competent either to solve metaphysical problems, or to judge their metaphysical solutions.
我們第四個結論是：當形上學底目標在於超越所有個別知識時，沒有一個個別科學足以解決形上學的難題，也不能對形上學的解答做出判斷。
page:310
Kant busied himself with questions about metaphysics, but he had no metaphysical interests of his own...To him, nature was in the books of Newton, and metaphysics in the books of Wolff...there are three metaphysical principles, or transcendental ideas of pure reason: an immortal soul to unify psychology; freedom to unify the laws of cosmology; and God to unify natural theology.
康德理首於形上學問題，但他對形上學並無興趣...對他而言，自然是牛頓書中所寫的，形上學是Wolff的...有三個形上原理或純粹理性底先驗觀念：能統一心理學之不朽靈魂；能統一宇宙論法則之自由；能統一自然神學之上帝。
page:310-311
In fact, what Kant considered as the three principles of metaphysics were not principles, but conclusions. The real principles of metaphysics are the first notions through which all the subsequent metaphysical knowledge has to be gathered.
事實上，康德所視為形上學底三原理並不能算是原理，而是結論。真的形上學原理是首要的想法，其它所有隨後的形上學知識皆由此推導出。
page:311
the principles of metaphysics are very different from the three transcendental ideas of Kant. The average metaphysician usually overlooks them because, though he aims at the discovery of the ultimate ground of reality as a whole, he attempts to explain the whole by one of its parts, or to reduce his knowledge of the whole to his knowledge of one of its parts. Then he fails and he ascribes his failure to metaphysics.
形上學原理與康德底三個先驗觀念是相當不同的。一般的形上學家通常忽略了這些，因為雖然他打算發現全部實在界底終極基礎，他卻以部分去解釋全體，或將全體的知識化約為其中一部分的知識。然後他失敗了，就歸咎於形上學。
page:312
the human mind must be possessed of a natural aptitude to conceive all things as the same...In short, the failures of the metaphysicians flow from their unguarded use of a principle of unity present in the human mind.
人類心智有一自然傾向，把萬物設想為同一...簡言之，形上學家底失敗來自於對心中呈現的統一原理之濫用。
page:312
the last and truly crucial problem: what is it which the mind is bound to conceive both as belonging to all things and as not belonging to any two things in the same way?...The word is - Being...Absolute nothingness is strictly unthinkable.
最後也是真正重要的問題是：有個東西，心智既視它為隸屬萬物且又不能以同一種方式歸到兩個事物，那個倒底是什麼？...那是-存有...絕對的虛無完全是不可想像的。
page:313
human thought is always about being;...the understanding of being is the first to be attained, the last into which all knowledge is ultimately resolved and the only one to be included in all our apprehensions. What is first, last and always in human knowledge is its first principle, and its constant point of reference.
人類總是思維著存有；...對存有之瞭解既是最先獲得的，也是最後所有知識融入的，也是唯一包含在所有我們底理解中。那從最先到最後一直處在知識中的即是第一原理，是恆常的參考點。
page:313
Now if metaphysics is knowledge dealing with the first principles and the first causes themselves, we can safely conclude that since being is the first principle of all human knowledge, it is a fortiori the first principle of metaphysics.
現在，形上學若是處理第一原理與第一因本身之知識，我們就可以安心地說，因為存有是所有知識底第一原理，它更加是形上學底第一原理。
page:313
To describe being as the "principle of knowledge," does not mean that all subsequent knowledge can be analytically deduced from it, but rather that being is the first knowledge, through which all subsequent knowledge can be progressively acquired.
把存有說成是知識原理，並不表示接下來的知識皆得從它那兒推論而來，而是說存有是第一個知識，其後的知識逐步地會獲得。
page:313
As soon as it comes into touch with sensible experience, the human intellect elicits the immediate intuition of being: X is, or exists; but from the intuition that something is, the knowledge of what it is, beyond the fact that it is something, cannot possibly be deduced.
一旦接觸到感官經驗，理智就引出了對存有之直觀：某物存在；從某物存在之直觀，問道那是什麼之知識，除了那是某物之外，別無所獲。
page:313-314
The intellect does not deduce, it intuits, it sees, and, in the light of intellectual intuition, the discursive power of reason slowly builds up from experience a determinate knowledge of concrete reality.
理智並不推論，它直觀，它看，在理智直觀之光中，理性散亂底力量慢慢地從經驗中建立確定的具體實在界底知識。
page:314
Reason has not to prove any one of these principles, otherwise they would not be principles, but conclusions; but it is by them that reason proves all the rest. Patiently weaving the threads of concrete knowledge, reason adds to the intellectual evidence of being and of its properties the science of what it is.
理性並不證明任何原理，否則就不能算是原理，而是結論；但也由於此，理性要證明其它的一切。有耐心地編織具體知識，在存有與其屬性底理智明證上，理性會加入那是什麼之科學。
page:314
The first principle brings with it, therefore, both the certitude that metaphysics is the science of being as being, and the abstract laws according to which that science has to be constructed...the first principle of human knowledge does not bring us a ready-made science of metaphysics, but its principle and its object. The twofold character of the intellectual intuition of being, to be given in any sensible experience, and yet to transcend all particular experience, is both the origin of metaphysics and the permanent occasion of its failures.
因此，第一原理帶來兩個東西，一是確定了形上學是一門研究存有做為存有之科學，一是建構科學之抽象法則。...人類知識底第一原理並不帶給我們現成的形上學知識，而是形上學底原理與對象。存有之理智直觀底這雙重性格，可由感官經驗獲得，並超越了個別經驗，既是形上學之源，也是形上學長久以來失敗的起因。
page:314-315
If being is included in all my representations, no analysis of reality will ever be complete unless it culminates in a science of being, that is in metaphysics.
若存有包含在所有我底表現中，除非能登上存有之學，即形上學，否則對實在界之分析就不會完整。
page:315
Such is the first principle, both universally applicable,and never applicable twice in the same way. When philosophers fail to perceive either its presence or its true nature, their initial error will pervade the whole science of being, and bring about the ruin of philosophy.
第一原理可被普遍地應用，但不能以同樣的方式應用兩次。當哲學家不能察覺它底在場或真實本性，他們開始的錯誤將漫延到整個存有科學，導致哲學之毀滅。
page:316
In short, and this will be our last conclusion: all the failures of metaphysics should be traced to the fact, that the first principle of human knowledge has been either overlooked or misused by the metaphysicians.
簡言之，我們最終的結論是：所有形上學底失敗該指向於－人類知識底第一原理被形上學家給忽視或誤用了。
page:316-317
The most tempting of all the false first principles is: that thought, not being, is involved in all my representations. Here lies the initial option between idealism and realism, which will settle once and for all the future course of our philosophy, and make it a failure or a success. Are we to encompass being with thought, or thought with being? In other words, are we to include the whole in one of its parts, or one of the parts in its whole?
最誘人犯錯的第一原理是：在我底表述中所帶到的不是存有而是思維。這得看一開始所選的是觀念論或實在論，這將決定以後哲學之進程、決定失敗或成功。我們是以思維包圍存有還是以存有包圍思維？換言之，是將全體納入部分亦或是將部分納入全體？
page:317
Man is not a mind that thinks, but a being who knows other beings as true, who loves them as good, and who enjoys them as beautiful. For all that which is…exhibits the inseparable privileges of being, which are truth, goodness and beauty.
人並非是思維之心智，而是那位去認識真理的、熱愛善的、享受美的存有。因為所有存在的事物…展現著存有不可分的特權，即是真，善與美。
page:318-319
The world of knowledge and action to which the first principles apply is a changing world, but there should be no history of the first principles themselves, because the metaphysical structure of reality itself does not change. Perennis philosohpia is not an honorary title for any particular form of philosophical thinking, but a necessary designation for philosophy itself, almost a tautology. That which is philosophical is also perennial in its own right. It is so because all philosophical knowledge ultimately depends on metaphysics.
知識的世界與以第一原理所應用的世界是一個變動的世界，但並沒有第一原理本身的歷史，因為實在界底形上結構不會改變。永恆哲學並非是為個別的哲學思維形式而有的名譽上的頭銜，而是哲學本身必要的指稱，幾乎是同義詞。凡是哲學的其本身就也是永恆的。會這樣乃是因為所有的哲學知識終究得靠形上學。
page:152-153
Philosophy had to become a department of universal mathematics; now mathematicians deal with nothing but ideas, and ideas can be dealt with much more rapidly than concrete facts. The first important point was precisely to realize that the new philosophy, unlike the old one, but like mathematics, would always go, not from things to ideas, but from ideas to things.
哲學必須成為一門普遍數學；目前，數學家處理的祇是觀念，而觀念可以比具體事實處理得更快。最重要的正是覺察到新的哲學，不像舊的哲學，應像數學，總是從觀念走向事物，而非從事物走向觀念。
It has often been said by historians, and not without good reasons, that the whole philosophy of the Middle Ages was little more than an obstinate endeavour to solve one problem – the problem of the Universals. Universals are but another name for what we call concepts, or general ideas.
經常被歷史學家提及的，且並非無的放矢，整個中世哲學祇不過是全力在解決一個問題－共相。共相即我們所稱的概念，或普遍觀念。
page:4
The great significance of Peter Abailard in the history of mediaeval philosophy is due to the fact that he was the first to deal at length with that central problem: what is a class of things, or in other words, what is the essence of universality?
Abailard在中世哲學史中之所以那麼重要就是由於他是第一位處理這個核心問題：事物是怎麼分類的？換言之，普遍底本質為何？
page:4
To such a question the easiest answer obviously was that, since things by themselves are essentially particular, the generality which belongs to our concepts cannot have any other origin but the mind….our knowledge by general ideas is without an object; it is not a science, but a mere logic.
對於這樣的問題，很明顯地，最簡單的回答是，因為事物本身是個別的，那麼，我們底概念之普遍性就祇能來自於心智…我們對於普遍觀念底知識是不具對象的；那不是科學，而是邏輯。
page:5
even if it were to be said that our so-called concepts, or general ideas, are mere words, the same problem would still remain: how is it that we can give the same name to several different things? Perhaps we do no more than name them, but they must at least be such things as can be named. In short, the generality which belongs to our concepts cannot possibly come from the mind alone; it must also, in some way or other, be found in things. What then is the nature of generality?
既使把我們所謂的概念或普遍觀念說成祇是語詞，問題同樣依舊存在：我們如何能賦予許多不同的事物同樣的名稱？也許我們真地祇是為它們命名，但它們至少有些什麼東西能被我們命名吧。簡言之，我們概念之普遍性不可能僅靠心智；它必以某種方式居於事物中。那麼，普遍性底本性是什麼？
page:6
Abailard’s greatness lay in his acute feeling for philosophical problems; his weakness was always to deal with them as though they were logical problems. Seeking, as he did, to mould the philosophical order into conformity with purely logical principles, he was bound ultimately to fail in his undertaking and to entangle his successors in hopeless difficulties.
Abailard底偉大之處在於他對哲學問題之敏銳感覺；他底不足之處在於總是把這些哲學問題當作邏輯問題看待。他企圖將哲學秩序符合於純邏輯原理，他底努力終將注定失敗，他底後繼者亦捲入無望的困難中。
page:11
what is the nature of our ideas and their relation to things? This was exactly the kind of philosophical question that would naturally arise in the mind of a logician, because it arises on the borderline that divides logic from philosophy. An almost invisible line indeed; yet as soon as you cross it, you find yourself in an entirely different country, and if you do not notice it, you get lost. It was Abailard’s misfortune to cross it, quite unaware of what he was doing.
我們底觀念之本性是什麼？它與事物之關係又為何？這正是邏輯學家心中自然會浮現的哲學問題，因它正處於分隔邏輯與哲學之交界處。一個幾乎看不見的線，然而一旦你跨越了，你就發現處在完全不同的國度，倘若你稍不留意，就會失足。這也就是Abailard的不幸。他跨越了邊界，且毫無知覺自己做了什麼。
page:12
What is a universal? It is, Abailard answers, that which can be predicated of several individual things taken one by one. Man, for instance, is a universal because the term can be applied to every individual man. This was a logical definition.
何謂共相？Abailard回答，那是能指稱許多個別事物的東西。比如，人是共相，因這個詞能應用在每一個個人。這是邏輯定義。
page:12
but philosophy stepped in as soon as Abailard asked this other question: what is the nature of that which can be predicted of many? Has it even got a nature of its own? Is it a thing?
然而Abailard提出了另一個哲學問題：那個能指稱許多東西的，其本性是什麼？它有其自身底本性嗎？它是一個事物嗎？
page:12
Abailard’s own professor of Logic at Paris, William of Champeaux, had always favoured the view that the genera and species were not mere conceptions of our mind, but real things actually existing outside the mind. In short, he was what mediaeval philosophers would call a realist.
Abailard在巴黎的邏輯老師總認為，種與類不僅是我們心中底概念而已，也是心外實存之物。簡言之，他就是中世哲學家所謂的實在論者。
page:13
Abailard was not slow to detect a fallacy in his master’s reasoning. If human nature is but partly present in Plato and in Socrates, neither Socrates nor Plato can truly be said to be a man. If, on the other hand, human nature is entirely present in one of them, it cannot be present at all in the other. Since it can be found in them neither partly, nor entirely, it cannot possibly be something, it is nothing.
Abailard很快地就發現他老師推論上的謬誤。如果人性祇是部分地出現在柏拉圖與蘇格拉底中，那他們兩人皆不能算是真的人。反之，若人性全部呈現在兩人之一，那另外一個就根本不可能成為人。因此，人性既非部分又非全部存在於他們之中，它不能是什麼東西，它是虛無。
page:14
William and Abailard were equally convinced that a purely logical method would ultimately bring forth an adequate answer to the question. Now logic, and quite especially mediaeval logic, is ruled by the principle of contradiction, which always works when it is applied to concepts, but not always when it is applied to things…both were logically right and philosophically wrong.
Abailard師生皆相信，以純邏輯方法終能足以為共相問題提出解答。邏輯，尤其是中世邏輯，是由矛盾律決定的，它運用在概念上是夠的，但若用在事物上則會有問題。…兩人是邏輯上對，哲學上錯。
page:15
William hoped to elude Abailard’s criticism by substituting a simple lack of difference between two things for the presence of a common element in those things. The reason why Plato and Socrates are men is this: not in the least that the same human nature is present in both, but that they do not differ in the nature of humanity. In short, the only reason why Socrates and Plato are the same, is that they are not different.
威廉為了要避開Abailard底批評，以兩者間之缺少差異來取代兩者共同的要素。柏拉圖與蘇格拉底是人，並非因為兩者有著相同的人性，而是兩者在人性上沒有什麼不同。簡言之，兩人相同之唯一理由是他們沒有不同。
page:16
a mere lack of difference between two things is not enough to account for their resemblance.
兩物間之缺少差異並不足以說明它們底相似性。
page:16-17
Abailard had clearly proved that William was wrong, but not in the least that he himself was right…both he and his pupil were asking the right question in the wrong way.
Abailard很清楚地證明老師錯了，但也不見得他自己就是對的…他們師生倆是以錯的方式去問一個對的問題。
page:17
Abailard…having clearly proved that human nature cannot be considered as a real thing, actually existing outside the mind, the problem for him was to say on what ground our mind is justified in ascribing the same nature to different individuals.
Abailard…清楚地證明了人性不能被視為真實事物，實存於心之外，他的難題是要說明，在什麼基礎上，我們底心智能把相同的本性歸給不同的個別者。
page:17
Abailard was just as tempted to mistake grammar for logic as he was to mistake logic for philosophy.
Abailard誤把文法視為邏輯，如他誤把邏輯視作哲學。
page:18
If you ask a grammarian a question, and if he answers it as a grammarian, your problem will inevitably be reduced by him to a mere question of words.
若你問文法學家問題，若他以文法學家身分回你，你底難題將不可避免地被他還原成祇是語詞上的問題。
page:20
The true greatness of a philosopher is always proportional to his intellectual honesty.
一位真正的哲學家底偉大永遠與他對理性的忠誠度成正比。
page:21
But since man does not designate any man in particular, it can still less designate a collection of such individuals. Hence Abailard’s conclusion that “in the common name which is man, not Socrates himself, nor any other man, nor the entire collection of men is reasonably understood from the import of the word.”
人，並不指稱任何個別的人，更別說指稱了一群人。因此，Abailard下結論『人這個共同名稱，非指蘇格拉底，亦非其它人，更非全部人之集合，可被合理地瞭解這個詞』。
page:23
Abailard...To his own mind, "to be man" was not nothing, and yet it was not a thing, it was a state or a condition; let us say that, rather than a being, it was a certain way of being. In his own words, "we call it the status itself of man to be man, which is not a thing, and which we also call the common cause of imposition of the word on individuals, according as they themselves agree with each other."
Abailard...就他自己而言，『成為人』並非虛空的話，祇不過，它不是一個東西，它是一個狀態或一個條件；這麼說吧，不是一個存有，而是存有底某種方式。以他自己底話說，『我們稱人底狀態本身為成為人，它不是一個東西，我們依據它們本身彼此一致，也稱這個強加給個別者之語詞為共同原因。
page:25
As he could not find in things any objective ground for the imposition of common names, Abailard looked for it in the mind. This meant nothing less than substituting psychology for both logic and philosophy. He therefore asked himself, what is the nature of those mental presentations.
當他不能為共同名稱在事物中找到任何客觀基礎時，Abailard轉向心智去找。這意謂著以心理學取代邏輯與哲學。因此，他問道，心理呈現之本性為何？
page:25
In answering the question, Abailard could not forget his former conclusion, that the universals are not things. He accordingly described our concepts as being but imaginary and fictive likenesses of their real objects...what we call a concept has no more reality than the reflexion of some object in a looking glass.
為回答這個問題，Abailard並沒忘了他先前的結論，共相不是東西。因此，他把我們底概念描述成對真實對象之想象的、虛構的相似性。...我們所稱之概念並沒比杯中倒影更為實在。
page:26
In the first place, since human nature does not exist by itself, it is clear that those ideas have no object. In the second place, it is not even certain that we have such ideas at all.
首先，因為人性自身並不存在，很明顯地，這些觀念並無對象。再者，若說我們擁有這些觀念也不對。
page:27
Abailard himself very soon reached the conclusion that he had no general ideas. God alone has them, and that to him is the reason why God could create, and can still keep in existence...As a creator, He is like an artist about to compose something, who preconceives in his mind the exemplary form of the thing to be composed...we cannot create any natural and general order, but can only make things that are both artificial and particular.
Abailard自己很快地獲致了這個結論，他並無普遍觀念。祇有神有這些觀念，對他而言，這正是神能創造之原因，且能保持存在...做為一個創造者，他像一位藝術家，能組合事物，在他心中預想了事物範形...我們不能創造任何本性的與普遍的秩序，祇能製造人工的與個別的東西。
page:27-28
Hence Abailard's ultimate conclusion, that men can have a true understanding of what comes to the senses, whereas for all those general forms that cannot be perceived by sense, we have much less understanding than opinion.
因此，Abailard底最終結論是，人對來自感官的東西能真正的瞭解，而對不能被感官所知覺到的普遍形式，我們則祇有意見上的理解而已。
page:28
What is truly remarkable about Abailard's epistemology is that...he begins by interpreting logic in terms of grammar; then he proceeds to interpret philosophy in terms of logic, and as he fails to find a positive answer to his question we see him ultimately reduced to a psychological solution. But was it a solution?...if sameness is not something real in things, how can likeness possibly be found in our ideas of them?
關於Abailard底知識論，真正值得注意的是...他以文法來詮釋邏輯著手；再以邏輯來詮釋哲學，當他無法找到問題之正面解法時，我們看到他終將還原成心理解答。然而，那算是一個解答嗎？...倘若在事物中並無相同性，我們又怎能在觀念中找到其相似性？
page:29
The ultimate results of Abailard's error was...scepticism. If our concepts are but words, without any other contents than more or less vague images, all universal knowledge becomes a mere set of arbitrary opinions. What we usually call science ceases to be a system of general and necessary relations and finds itself reduced to a loose string of empirically connected facts.
Abailard底錯誤所造成的最終結果是...懷疑論。倘若我們底概念僅是語詞，除了一些模糊影象外沒有任何其它內容，所有的普遍知識祇是一些任意的意見。我們日常所稱的科學就不再是普遍的、必然關係之系統，它與經驗上的聯結被還元成一鬆散的聯繫。
page:29-30
The upshot of Abailard's experiment is that philosophy cannot be obtained from pure logic...So experience taught me a manifest conclusion, that while logic furthers other studies, it is by itself lifeless and barren, nor can it cause the mind to yield the fruit of philosophy.
Abailard實驗之結果是，哲學不能由純邏輯來達成。...因此經驗教了我一個明顯的結論，當邏輯助長其它的研究，它自身就會是毫無生氣的，它也不能使心智產生豐富的哲學。
page:32
Unaware of any dividing line between logic and philosophy, any twelfth-century professor of logic, who had never learned or taught anything but grammar and logic, would naturally call himself a philosopher.
未能察覺邏輯與哲學間之分隔線，任何十二世紀的邏輯教授，除了文法與邏輯之外什麼都不懂，很自然地都自稱為哲學家。
page:32-33
As theologians, their task was not to save philosophy from logicism, but, through faith and grace, to save mankind from eternal perdition...An obvious way to deal with the difficulty was to eradicate philosophy and philosophical problems from the human mind...pious souls have no use for philosophical knowledge, and that philosophical speculation is basically inconsistent with a sincere religious life.
做為神學家，他們底工作並非是從邏輯學家手中救出哲學，而是透過信仰與恩典，要從永恆毀滅中拯救人類...要處理這種難題，一個明確的方式是從人底心智根除哲學與哲學問題...虔誠的靈魂對哲學知識而言並沒有用，而且，哲學思辯基本上與真誠的宗教生活也不一致。
page:35
In the first place, when religion tries to establish itself on the ruins of philosophy, there usually arises a philosopher to found philosophy on the ruins of religion...In the second place, philosophy has as little to gain by such conflicts as has religion itself, for the easiest way for theologians to hold their ground is to show that philosophy is unable to reach rationally valid conclusions on any question related to the nature of man and his destiny.
首先，當宗教企圖將自身建立在哲學之毀滅上，這經常會讓哲學家將哲學建立在宗教之毀滅上...其次，哲學與宗教對抗並沒有獲得什麼好處，就神學家而言，穩固神學基礎最簡單的方式就是在有關人底本性與命運上要顯出哲學依理性無力於獲致有效的結論。
page:35
The God, whom reason cannot know, can be grasped by the soul's experience; the world which human reason cannot understand, can be transcended and, as it were, flown over by the spirit of Prophecy. Needless to say, the philosopher, as such, has nothing against mysticism; what he does not like is a mysticism that presupposes as its necessary condition the destruction of philosophy.
上帝，理性所不能認識的對象，能被靈魂底經驗所掌握；人類理性所無法理解的世界，能被先知底精神所超越、跨過。不用說，哲學家並不與神秘主義者對立；他所討厭的是那個將哲學毀滅做為必要條件之預設的神秘主義。
page:36
True mysticism is never found without some theology, and sound theology always seeks the support of some philosophy; but a philosophy that does not at least make room for theology is a short-sighted philosophy.
並沒有一個不具神學的真正的神秘主義，而健全的神學總是尋求哲學之支援；然而一個不為神學留下空間之哲學是一個短視哲學。
page:45
Let us assume, with Al Ashari, that bodies are mere heaps of atoms which are themselves devoid of size, shape and other qualities. In order to account for these sensible qualities by which bodies seem to differ, it will become necessary to suppose that all such qualities are as many accidents, really distinct from these atoms in which they are dwelling as in their substances....both atoms and qualities, or substances and accidents, are constantly created anew by an all-powerful God.
讓我們同Ashari一起想想，物體僅是原子之堆積，這些原子本身並沒有大小、形狀、與其它性質。為了要說明這些讓物體有差異之可感性質，它必須假定所有的性質是許多的偶性，這與它們所棲身的原子實體不一樣，...原子與性質、或實體與偶性，皆由全能的上帝不斷地創造新的出來。
page:45-46
The consequence of this state of things is that, in a world made up of matter-atoms situated in time-atoms, what such a world is at the present moment can in no way be considered as the cause of what it will be at the next moment...In short, just as such a world is deprived of all real duration and of all real motion, so is it deprived of all efficient causality.
這樣的結果是，世界由物質原子所組成，處在時間原子之中，當下的世界絕不能被認為是下一刻將是之原因...簡言之，這樣的世界被剝奪了所有真實的緜延與所有真實的運動，意即被剝奪了所有動力因。
page:46
In accordance with this principle [i.e., that time is composed of time-atoms] they assert that when man is perceived to move a pen, it is not he who has really moved it; the motion produced in the pen is an accident which God has created in the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which moves the pen is likewise an accident which God has created in the moving hand;...the hand does not act and is not the cause of the pen's motion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one thing to another...There does not exist any thing to which an action could be ascribed; the real agens is God.
按照這個原則「也就是，時間是由時間原子所構成」，他們主張，當人知覺到移動筆時，真正使筆動的人並不是他；筆所造成的運動是上帝在筆中所造出的偶性；那個移動筆之手底運動，同樣地，是上帝在手中所造出的偶性；...手並不實現、並不是筆能動之原因；因為，偶性並不能從一物傳到另一物...行動無法歸到任何事物上，真正的行動者是上帝。
page:47
God is efficient cause...Will you mock at Him, as you mock at man?
神是動力因...當你在嘲笑人時，是否正在嘲笑上帝？
page:48
the destruction of causality ultimately meant the destruction of nature, and thereby of science as well as of philosophy. Even when it has laws, a physical world whose laws are not inscribed in the very essence of things is a world without intrinsic necessity or intelligibility, and therefore unfit for rational knowledge. Scepticism always goes hand in hand with such theologies.
因果律之摧毀終究意謂著自然之摧毀，科學同哲學一樣被毀。即使有其法則，這個世界底法則並不銘刻在事物底本質中，失去了內在的必然性或可理解性，因此，不適於理性知識。懷疑論總與這種神學並肩同行。
page:49-50
man alone has been created with a knowing mind and a loving heart, in order that, by knowing and loving all things in God, he might refer them to their origin, which is at the same time their end...the ultimate meaning of our arts and techniques, of our various sciences and of philosophy itself, is to symbolize on a lower plane the perfection of the divine art and of the divine knowledge...It is the proper function of theology to bring them to a complete awareness of their proper function, which is not to know things but to know God through things...the human arts should be reduced to theology, and thereby to God.
唯有人是由認知的心智與熱愛的心靈所造成的。因此，在神之中認識與熱愛萬物，他才能參照到原初，也就是參照到他們底目的。...我們底藝術與技術、我們許多的科學與哲學、其終極意義是要在較低的層次來象徵神性藝術與知識之完美。...神學底固有功能就是要使人意識到他們底固有功能，不是要去認識事物，而是要透過事物去認識神。...人性藝術應還原到神學，也就是還原到神。
page:51-52
For St. Bonaventura maintains that “however much you ascribe to the grace of God, you will not harm piety by so doing, even though, by ascribing to the grace of God as much as you can, you may eventually wrong the natural powers and the free will of man…Even though that position were false, it would not harm piety or humility; it is therefore fitting and safe to hold it.”
Bonaventura主張，『不論你歸多少給上帝底恩典，都不會因此而有損虔誠之心，即使，你終將會寃枉了自然底力量與人底自由意志，你當儘其所能地歸給上帝底恩典。…即使這個立場是錯的，但它不會損及虔誠與謙卑；因此，這個主張是較適合與安全的。
page:52
If, on the contrary, you start on the assumption that it is safer to keep a little below the line, where are you going to stop? Why, indeed, should you stop at all? Since it is pious to lessen the efficacy of free will, it is more pious to lessen it a little more, and to make it utterly powerless should be the highest mark of piety.
反之，倘若你一開始就假定了要低於分界以保安全的話，那你的停損點又該在哪裡呢？又為何要停呢？因為削弱自由意志底效力這是虔誠的，愈削弱就愈虔誠，讓它完全無力可為該是最虔誠的了。
page:52
In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but be to right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God!
神學，如其它科學一樣，主要的問題不是虔不虔誠，而是正不正確。因為，錯誤地理解上帝，是不會有虔誠的。
page:53
In dealing with the nature of causality, for instance, two different courses were open to him. Fist, he could favour the view that where there is efficient causality, something new, which we call effect, is brought into existence by the efficacy of its cause; in this case, every effect can be rightly considered as a positive addition to the already existing order of reality. Or St. Bonaventura cold maintain, with St. Augustine, that ‘god has created all things present and future at the very instant of creation….any particular being…should be considered…as the seed of all those other beings, or events, that are to flow from it according to the laws of divine providence. It is typical of St. Bonaventura’s theologism that he always clung to this second interpretation of causality.
在處理因果律時，Bonaventura有兩種途徑可走。首先，同意有動力因，有新的東西、新的結果產生；這樣，每個效果都可視為積極地附加於已經存在的秩序上。再者，他也可同Augustine一樣，主張上帝已於現在與未來創造了一切…任何個別的東西…應視為…所有其它事物或事件之種子，依據神意之律法而流出一切。他總執著於第二種因果詮釋，而這正是典型的Bonaventura式神學主義。
page:54
Shall we say, as St. Thomas Aquinas was to answer, that since God has made man a rational animal, the natural light of reason must be able naturally to perform its proper function, which is to know things as they are, and thereby to know truth? Or shall we say with St. Augustine, that truth being necessary, unchangeable, and eternal, it cannot be the work of a contingent, mutable and impermanent human mind interpreting unnecessary, changeful and fleeting things? Even in our minds truth is a sharing of some of the highest attributes of God; consequently, even in our minds, truth is an immediate effect of the light of God.
我們是否能如Thomas一樣地說，因上帝將人造成是一個理性的動物，理性底自然之光當然可以行使它底原有功能，去認識事物本身，意即認識真理？還是說要同Augustine那樣以為，做為必然的、不變的、永恆的真理不能是偶然的、多變的、非永恆的人性心智去對不必然的、變易的、瞬間的事物所詮釋之成果？即使在我們心智中，真理仍是分享了上帝最高的屬性；結果，即使在心智中，真理也是神性之光的直接作用。
page:54
In order to give his religious intuition some philosophical backing, St. Bonaventura had therefore to build up the theory of what he called divine illumination.
為了要讓他底宗教直觀有一些哲學上的支持，因此Bonaventura必須建立他所謂的神性光照說。
page:55
the easiest way to account for the presence of that element of necessity in a contingent reason dealing with contingent things is to suppose that Eternal Truth, or God, is permanently supplying our mind with additional light, through which, and in which, it sees truth, as in a lightning-flash.
要說明偶有的理性處理偶有的事物中能有必然的要素呈現，最簡單的方式是假定永恆真理、或上帝、不斷地給予我們底心智額外的光照，藉著它、在它之中、像在閃光中看到了真理。
page:55
Here, however, a serious difficulty arises...Granted that we cannot know truth without some additional influx of the divine light, how are we to conceive the nature of that divine illumination? if we take it as a particular instance of the general action by which God creates and runs the world, it is but the natural light of reason, that is the human intellect itself, which can therefore know truth without any further illumination from God. If, on the contrary, we see that intellectual light as a further gift, superadded by God to the natural light of man, we make it to be supernatural. it then becomes a grace.
然而這裡引發一個嚴重的困難...假定若沒有額外的神性之光我們就無法認識真理，那我們如何設想神性光照底本性？倘若我們把它視為普遍行動之個別事例，上帝藉此行動而創造世界使之運行，它祇不過是理性底自然之光，是人理性本身，那無需任何從神來的光就可以認識真理了。反之，倘若我們把理性之光看作一多出的贈予，是上帝為人底自然之光所超加的，我們使它成為超自然的了。它就是一個恩典。
page:56
St. Bonaventura was not an extremist; he did not want to destroy natural knowledge if he could help it. Accordingly, he tried to steer a middle course...His final answer is that the divine illumination is neither general, nor special; that is to say, neither the common influence of God upon nature, nor a grace that was, so to speak, superimposed on it. Very will, but then what is it?
Bonaventura不是一個極端的人；若他能的話，他並不要毀掉自然知識，他試圖走一條中道...他最終答案是，神性光照既非普遍、亦非個別；也就是說，既非上帝對自然之共通影響，亦非超加給自然之恩典。非常好，但那究竟是什麼？
page:57
If the truth of my judgments comes to me from God only, and not from my own reason, there is no natural foundation for true knowledge; the proper place for epistemology is not in philosophy, but in theology.
若我所判斷之真理祇來自於上帝而非來自我底理智，那真的知識就少了自然的根基；知識論就不該放在哲學，而該在神學的範圍。
page:61
for men are most anxious to find truth, but very reluctant to accept it. We do not like to be cornered by rational evidence, and even when truth is there, in its impersonal and commanding objectivity, our greatest difficulty still remains…In short, finding out truth is not so hard; what is hard is not to run away from truth once we have found it…The greatest among philosophers are those who do not flinch in the presence of truth, but welcome it with the simple words: yes, Amen.
人最是渴求找到真理的，但十分不情願去接受它。我們並不想被理性的明證受困於角落，甚至就算真理以它底非人性的、威嚴的客觀性在那兒，我們接受它之最大的困難仍然存在。…簡言之，找出真理並不困難，難的是在於我們找到真理後能不離它而去。…最偉大的哲學家是那些在真理出現後並不逃避的人，反是以簡單的話：是的，就這樣吧，來歡迎它。
page:62
Himself a theologian, St. Thomas had asked the professors of theology never to prove an article of faith by rational demonstration, for faith is not based on reason, but on the word of God, and if you try to prove it, you destroy it. He had likewise asked the professors of philosophy never to prove a philosophical truth by resorting to the words of God, for philosophy is not based on Revelation, but on reason, and if you try to base it on authority, you destroy it. In other words, theology is the science of those things which are received by faith from divine revelation, and philosophy is the knowledge of those things which flow from the principles of natural reason.
Thomas自己做為一位神學家時，要求神學教師絕不要用理性論證來證明信仰問題，因為信仰底基礎不是建立在理智上，而是建立在神底話語上，倘若你試圖證明它，你就毀了它。同樣地，他也要求哲學教師絕不要訴諸於神底話來證明哲學真理，因為哲學不是基於啓示，而是基於理性，假若你試圖以權威為基礎，你就毀了它。換言之，神學是因著信仰從神底啓示那兒獲得之學問，哲學則是來自於自然理性底原則所獲得之知識。
page:62
Since their common source is God, the creator of both reason and revelation, these two sciences are bound ultimately to agree; but if you really want them to agree, you must first be careful not to forget their essential difference. Only distinct things can be united; if you attempt to blend them, you inevitably lose them in what is not union, but confusion.
因為它們共同的來源是上帝，理性與啓示之創造者，兩門科學終歸一致；但若你真地要它們一致，你首先就必須小心不要忘了它們本質上的差異。不同的事物才能被統一；若你想混合它們，你不可避免地會失去了它們，那不是統一、而是混淆。
page:63
Ockham gives great weight to the first article of the Christian creed: I believe in God Almighty. Since it is an article of faith, it is needless to say that it cannot be proved. Yet, not only did Ockham use it as a principle in theology, which was a very proper thing to do, but he also resorted to it in discussing various philosophical problems, as if any theological dogma, held by faith alone, could become the source of philosophical and purely rational conclusions.
奧坎非常重視基督教義第一條：『我信上帝之全能』。因為這是信仰問題，它當然不能被證明。然而，奧坎不僅視它為神學原則，這樣做是非常適當的，但他也用它來討論不同的哲學問題。好像任何由信仰所支持的神學教義皆可成為哲學與純理智結論之來源。
page:63
What can be more Aristotelian…than the thesis so frequently restated by Ockham, that nothing exists except that which is individual? As a matter of fact, St. Thomas himself had spent a large part of his time in trying to teach that fundamental truth to the Augustinians and Neo-platonists of his day. I would be the last one to gainsay such statements.
有什麼比奧坎一再重申的這個論點：『祇有個別的東西才存在』更是亞理斯多德式的？事實上，多瑪斯本身也花了大量的時間試著要教導奧古斯丁派與新柏拉圖主義者這個基礎真理。我將是駁斥這種說法之最後一人。
page:64-65
what is the object of abstract knowledge; what are the so-called universals?...how can we draw from singular things a concept that is general?
抽象知識之對象為何；所謂共相又是什麼？…我們怎能從單一事物抽出普遍概念？
page:66
Duns Scotus, that the universals were real entities apart from their existence in individuals;…St. Thomas Aquinas, that the universals are virtually present in individuals, from which they are abstracted by our intellect.
Scotus主張，共相是脫離個別存在者之實存之物，…Thomas認為，共相是內存於個別物之中，由我們底理智從中抽象而得。
page:67
What Ockham wants us to realize is that, since everything that really exists is individual, our general ideas cannot correspond to anything in reality.
奧坎要我們認知的是，因為真正存在的是個別的，我們底普遍觀念就不能與實在界中底任何東西相符應。
page:68
Ockham’s master stroke was to perceive that the problem could not be solved unless a new classification of the various types of knowledge was first substituted for the old one. Hence his division of knowledge into abstractive and intuitive.
奧坎底主要影響是知覺到除非各種知識要重新分類，否則不能解決問題。因此，他把知識區分為抽象的與直觀的知識。
page:69
In Ockham’s doctrine, an intuitive cognition is the immediate perception of a really existing thing. It can be the perception of a material object: I see Socrates; or of a complex of material objects given together with their actual relations: I see that Socrates is sitting on a stone…it can equally well be the mere awareness of some psychological fact, such as a feeling of pleasure or pain, a knowledge, an act of reasoning or a decision of the will.
以奧坎學說，直觀認知是對實存物之立即知覺。可以是對物質對象之知覺：我看到蘇格拉底；或複雜的對象共同組成的實際關係：我看到蘇格拉底正坐在石頭上…它同樣也可以僅是心理上的認知，譬如歡愉或痛苦的感覺、知識、推理活動或意志決定。
page:69
It is a common character of all so-called intuitive knowledge, to be attended by a feeling of absolute certitude. In other words, knowledge of this kind is self-evident.
所謂直觀知識之獲得，都會有一種絕對確定的感受。換言之，這種知識是自明的。
page:69
Every knowledge that is not an intuition is an abstraction. Such, for instance, are not only what we usually call abstract ideas, an animal, or man, which stand for a whole class of individuals, but even our mental representations of mere individuals.
凡不是直觀的知識就是抽象的知識。比如，不僅我們平常所稱的抽象觀念，動物、人，象徵個別者之整個類別，甚至我們對個別者之心理再現，也算是抽象知識。
page:69
Were the thing there, we would not imagine it or remember it; we would see it; such knowledge would not be an abstraction, but an intuition.
若有一物，我們無法想像亦無法回憶；我們能看到它；這種知識不能是抽象的，祇能是直觀的知識。
page:69-70
abstractive knowledge…from which nothing can be concluded concerning the existence, or non-existence, of its object…the only kind of knowledge which enables us to ascertain whether or not a certain thing exists is intuitive knowledge; that is to say, the immediate apprehension of some object by an internal or external perception.
抽象知識…無法決定它底對象是否存在…能讓我們確定某物存在之唯一知識即直觀知識；也就是說，由內在或外在知覺對某物做立即的掌握。
page:70
Intuition then is the only possible foundation of what Ockham calls experimental knowledge, or scientific knowledge…In short, intuition alone enables us to perceive the existence or non-existence of things.
直觀是奧坎所稱為實驗知識或科學知識之唯一可能的基礎…簡言之，唯有直觀能使我們知覺事物之存在與否。
page:71
universals…are mere signs. Our idea of man…is something that points to any one of those individuals which we call men. Now, a sign is always something real in itself, it is a thing; but its signification is nothing real in itself, it is nothing…no intrinsic reality should be ascribed to their signification…What Ockham called a sign was really an image, or mental picture, whose function it was to signify any given individual belonging to a certain class.
共相…祇是符號。人這個觀念…指向所有我們稱做人的東西。現在，符號本身永遠是真實的，它是一個東西；但是，它所指向的，本身卻毫不真實，它是空的…沒有內在的真實可歸於它們底指義…奧坎所謂的符號的確是一個影像，或心像，它底功能是指向屬於某一類別的個別事物。
page:72
there is no natural relation between the spoken word and its meaning…we learn foreign languages by relating different sets of words to a single set of concepts…In other words, the natural signs, or concepts, used to designate concrete things are naturally comparable…Why are there natural signs or concepts which correspond to the same things in the same way in all possible human minds?
話語與它底意義之間並沒有自然關聯…我們學習外語是將不同的語詞關聯到同一組概念…換言之，指出具體事物的自然記號或概念，是可相互比較的…為什麼會有自然記號或概念，在所有人底心智中以相同的方式指向相同的東西？
page:72
there are such natural signs. Not only men, but even beasts, naturally utter some sounds to express their feelings.
有自然記號，不僅人，就連動物也很自然地發出某些聲音來表達它們底感覺。
page:73
Intuitive knowledge, Ockham says, is caused in us by things; now natural effects always resemble their causes…even physical phenomena are the natural signs of their causes. For instance, fire can cause heat, and for that reason, heat is a natural sign of the presence of fire.
奧坎說，直觀知識是由事物在我們之內所引起的；現在，自然結果總類似於它底原因…即使是物理現象也是它原因底自然記號。譬如，火能引起熱，因此，熱是火出現之自然記號。
page:73
Ockham…he achieved it by doing pioneer work in the field of psychology; but, however far he might have been able to advance along that line, the philosophical problems at stake would always have remained untouched.
奧坎…他在心理學領域上做了先鋒的工作；但是，不論他延著這條路走了多遠，懸而未決的哲學問題仍未被觸及。
page:73-74
How is it that different individuals cause comparable impressions in our minds? Abailard’s answer to that question had been that, if not in ourselves, then at least in God, there is for each class of individuals an idea, or archetype, which accounts for the characteristic features of that class. Ockham was too clever not to perceive that such a position would unavoidably bring him back to the Platonic problem of participation, and to some sort of metaphysical realism.
不同的人怎能可能在我們心智中引發出可相互比較的印象？Abailard對此問題之回答一直是，如果不在我們、至少在上帝心中會有每一個類別之概念或原型，以便說明該類底特性。奧坎機伶地知覺到這種立場不可避免地會將他帶回到柏拉圖的分受問題，與某種形上學的實在論。
page:74
If the universals are nothing real, God Himself can no more conceive them than we can. A divine idea is always an idea of this and that particular individual which God wishes to create…We could still ask Ockham many other questions as to what makes general ideas possible, but his answers would always be the same. Things are just what they are; Nature is performing its operations in an occult way, and the will of God is the ultimate cause of both its existence and its operations.
如果共相並不真實，那麼上帝自己也不會比我們更能設想。神性觀念永遠是這個或那個上帝想要創造的個別的觀念。…我們仍然可以追問奧坎許多問題，是什麼讓普遍觀念成為可能，但他底回答將總是一樣的。事情就是如此；自然以超自然的方式在運行著，上帝底意志是事物存在與運行之終極原因。
page:74
…the philosophical consequences of Ockham’s attitude. A pure empiricist in philosophy, he considered the will of his all-powerful God as the last argument in theology. From such a point of view, it remains both possible and desirable to describe things as they are…a positive knowledge of what is still remains possible…But why science, or human knowledge, is possible at all, we cannot know, because the will of God is the ultimate cause of all things.
…奧坎底態度所形成哲學的結果是，哲學上採純經驗主義者，神學上則以全能上帝底意志做為最後論證。依這種觀點看，要去描述事物本身是可能的…本質上之積極知識仍是可行的…然而，為何科學或人類知識成為可能，我們無法得知，因上帝底意志是所有事物之終極原因。
page:75
how is it possible for things which are material to cause impressions in a soul, which is immaterial?...what we have to know first, before discussing that problem, is whether or not the human soul is immaterial.
物質的東西如何能在非物質的靈魂中引起印象？…在討論這個問題之前，我們得先知道的是：人類靈魂是否是非物質的。
page:75
It was commonly accepted among Ockham’s predecessors, that the human soul is an immaterial, and therefore an immortal substance, which is not begotten by another similar substance, but is immediately created by God. Such a substance…is a knowing power precisely because it is not material, and yet, through the particular body which it animates, it is able to establish relations with material things, and thereby to know them.
奧坎前輩們普遍認為，人類靈魂是非物質的，因此是不朽的實體，這不是由其它類似的實體所生的，而是由上帝直接創生的。這樣的實體…是一個認知的力量，正因為它不是物質的，然而，藉由它所鼓舞的個別的身體，它才能與物質事物建立關係，並且認識它們。
page:75
Ockham’s objection to this was that…Even granting the real existence of such a knowing power, it would still remain to be proven that its nature is not material…what we call the human soul is a material and extended principle, like that of the other animals.
奧坎對此所反對的是…既使假設這種認知力量真地存在，那仍要去證明它底本性不是物質的…我們所謂的人類靈魂是一個物質的、擴延的原理，像其它動物底魂一樣。
page:76
how could the soul of an extended body act as its animating principle or…be its form, if it has no extension of its own? In other words, how could the form of an extended substance be itself unextended?
擴延身體底靈魂，倘若並沒有屬於自己底擴延性，它如何能做為身體底激勵原則而行動、或成為身體底形式？換言之，擴延實體底形式如何能成為非擴延的？
page:76-77
beings should not be multiplied without necessity. “Ockham’s razor,”…means first of all that one should not account for the existence of an empirically given thing by imagining, behind and beyond it, another thing whose hypothetical existence cannot be verified.
若非必要，存在不須增加。『奧坎剃刀』…首先意謂著我們不該在事物之後或之外去想像那不能被檢證的假設性存在來說明經驗與料的存在。
page:77
Unfortunately, that very simple and, as I think, very sound methodological principle was connected in Ockham’s mind with his theological conception of God as an essentially almighty God…Hence his firm conviction that no philosopher should waste his time in speculating on the hypothetical causes of actually existing things. If we believe that God can do anything that does not involve contradiction, all non-contradictory explanations of a given fact become equally valid.
不幸的是，我所認為這簡潔又建全的方法論原則，在奧坎心中，與他底全能的上帝之神學概念有所關聯…因此，他堅決相信，哲學家不須花時間去想實存事物之假設性原因。倘若我們相信上帝能做任何不含矛盾的事情，所有對既定事實非矛盾的解釋都同樣是有效的。
page:77-78
In order to account for the possibility of abstract knowledge, Aristotle and St. Thomas had conceived an elaborate scheme, according to which things themselves were credited with virtually intelligible forms, which the human soul was supposed to abstract from things by its active intellect, and to know by its possible intellect. The self-expression of an intellect thus made pregnant with a natural form was the concept: that which is conceived by, and is born of, a human intellect, when it is impregnated with things.
為了要說明抽象知識之可能，亞理斯多德與多瑪斯構想一巧妙計劃，事物具有可理解的形式，它可由人類靈魂藉著主動理智從事物中抽象出來，由被動理智去認識它。理智蘊育著自然形式，其自我表達即是概念：由理智所想所生，並不蘊含著事物。
page:78
From Ockham’s point of view, since we can perceive the existence neither of such natural forms, nor of these alleged active and possible intellects, such speculations were perfectly empty. But the worst thing about them was that they utterly disregarded the innumerable possibilities which lay open to the free will of an almighty God.
依奧坎觀點，我們既不能知覺到自然形式之存在，也不能知覺到主動與被動理智之存在，這樣的思辨完全是空洞的。然而最糟的是，他們完全忽視全能上帝底自由意志有其無數的可能性。
page:79
That a thing does not exist can well account for our having no intuition of its existence, but not for our having an intuition of its non-existence. There is a serious difference between not knowing that a thing is, and knowing that it is not. How could that which is not make us know that it is not?
不存在的東西可以說明我們對它底存在並無直觀，但卻不能說明我們對它有不存在之直觀。不知道它是什麼與知道它不是什麼，兩者間有很大的差別。不在之物如何能讓我們知道它不在？
page:79
In order to account for negative intuitions…every intuition of a really existing thing was the joint effect of two separate causes: the thing itself and our knowledge of it…In Ockham’s own words: When the thing is there, the intuitive knowledge of the thing, plus the thing itself, cause the judgment that the thing is there; but when the thing is not there, the intuitive knowledge minus the thing must cause an opposite judgment.
為了要說明消極直觀…每一個實存物之直觀是由兩個分開的因素所結合之結果：事物本身與我們對它之知識。…以奧坎底話說：當事物在這，對此物之直觀知識，加上事物本身，導致該物在此之判斷；但若該物不在那兒，去掉事物之直觀知識導致了相反的判斷。
page:80
God alone can conserve in us the intuitions of absent things, and thereby enable us to judge that they are not there…each intuition of non-existence would entail the supernatural conservation in us, by God, of a natural intuition…a logical answer to the question was impossible.
祗有上帝能在我們中保存不在事物之直觀，讓我們能判斷它們不在那兒。…每次對不在事物之直觀，上帝都在我們中引出對自然直觀有一超自然的保存。…邏輯無法解決這個問題。
page:80
if this is for us the only way to account for the possibility of negative intuitions, why should we not resort to theology when we need it?
若這是為我們說明消極直觀唯一可能的方式，當我們有需要時，為何我們不能訴諸於神學呢？
page:80-81
If God can conserve in us the intuition of something that is not actually existing, how shall we ever be sure that what we are perceiving as real is an actually existing thing? In other words, if it is possible for God to make us perceive as real an object that does not really exist, have we any proof that this world of ours is not a vast phantasmagoria behind which there is no reality to be found?
若上帝能在我們中保留對不實存事物之直觀，我們如何能保證我們所知覺到真實的是真正實存的東西？換言之，假若上帝能讓我們把不在之物以為是真實的，那我們如何證明這個世界不是一個巨大的變化多端的幻影，背後根本找不到任何實在。
page:81
My intuition of the star is one thing, its object is another thing; why could not an almighty God produce the one without the other?
我對星星之直觀是一件事，直觀底對象是另一件事；全能的上帝為何不能祇產生出一個而沒有另一個?
page:82
nothing is necessarily required to make knowledge possible, but the mind and God.
知識所能成立之必要條件，祇有人底心智與上帝。
page:83
When the presence of a certain fact is regularly attended by the presence of another fact, we call the first one a cause and the second an effect. And beyond that we know nothing…causality is nothing.
當某事實之呈現總是伴隨著另一個事實之呈現，我們稱前者為因，後者為果。除此之外，我們一無所知。…因果律是空的。
page:84
Ockham himself had no intention of advocating such a conception of the physical world. Even while he was proving that God could create the knowledge of a thing without that thing, his mind remained as far as possible from the idealism of Berkeley…Ockham’s criticism of the notion of causality was…inspired by…his desire to account for the possibility of miracles.
奧坎自己並無意願提倡物理世界之概念。既使當他證明上帝能為不在的事物創造出知識，奧坎底心智仍與柏克萊觀念論有相當的距離。…奧坎對因果律之批判…是為了要說明奇蹟之可能性。
page:85
As a matter of fact, an inarticulate world such as the English agnostic’s was most suitable to the arbitrary will of the English Franciscan’s God; no wonder then if we find them both in the doctrine of William of Ockham.
事實上，一個如英國不可知論者底不清不楚的世界，最適合英國芳濟會上帝底自由意志；如果我們在奧坎底學說中發現了它們兩者也不必奇怪。
page:85
Having expelled from the mind of God the intelligible world of Plato, Ockham was satisfied that no intelligibility could be found in any one of God’s works. How could there be order in nature, when there is no nature? And how could there be a nature when each singular being thing, or event, can claim no other justification for its existence then that of being one among the elect of an all-powerful God?
上帝底心智已將柏拉圖底可理解的世界逐出，奧坎對於在上帝底作品中找不到可理解性十分滿意。當沒有自然時，如何能在自然中有秩序？當每一個別事物不能為自己底存在辯護，而祇是全能上帝所揀選的對象，那如何能有自然？
page:86
Ockham's God was expressly intended to relieve the world of the necessity of having any meaning of its own. The God of theology always vouches for nature; the jealous God of theologism usually prefers to abolish it.
奧坎底上帝，很明顯地，打算把世界本身所擁有底意義之必然性給消解掉。神學底上帝總是擔保著自然；而神學主義底忌妒的上帝則常想要廢了它。
page:86
Ockham would have left us nothing more than a brilliant example of theologism, but he was at the same time a shrewd logician and a clear-headed philosopher, whose mind could not entertain a philosophy at variance with his theology.
奧坎留給我們的僅是一位神學主義之典型，然而他同時也是位伶俐的邏輯學家與頭腦清醒的哲學家，他底心智不會去想與他底神學相左的哲學。
page:87
Ockham...He was convinced that to give a psychological analysis of human knowledge was to give a philosophical analysis of reality. For instance, each intuition is radically distinct from every other intuition, hence, each particular thing is radically distinct from every other particular thing. Again, since no intuition of a thing can cause in us the intuition of another thing, it follows that no thing can cause another thing.
奧坎...他堅信對人類知識做心理學分析就等於是對實在做哲學分析。譬如，每個直觀與其它直觀都完全不同，因此，每個事物與其它事物也完全不同。又來了，因為對事物之直觀不能引發對另一事物之直觀，所以，沒有事物能引發另一事物。
page:87
the psychological relations between our ideas are a true picture of the real relations between things, that we are indebted for Ockham's interpretation of causality. Since the origin of causality cannot possibly be found in the thing itself, or in the intuition of the thing by the intellect, it must be explained by some other reason; and there is but one: it is what Ockham called habitualis notitia, and what Hume will simply called habit.
我們借由奧坎對因果律之詮釋可知，觀念間之心理關係正是事物間關係真實的圖像。因為，因果律不可能在事物本身找到，也非來自理性對事物之直觀，它必然得以其它理由來說明；有一個：即奧坎所稱的認知習慣，或休謨所稱的習慣。
page:89
nothing was left but empirical sequences of facts outside the mind, and habitual associations within the mind, the mere external frame of a world order carefully emptied of its intelligibility.
心外祇有經驗繼起的事實，心內祇有習慣性的聯結，世界秩序之外在框架使它底可理解性空洞化了。
page:89-90
Ockham was quite right in attempting to describe the psychological process which enables us to form general ideas, or to conceive the notion of causality; but he should have stopped there and given to his psychological analysis a merely psychological conclusion.
奧坎打算描述使我們構想出普遍觀念之心理過程、及因果看法，這完全正確；但他應就此打住，而給予他底心理分析一個心理學上的結論。
page:90
Psychologism consists in demanding that psychology answer philosophical questions. Psychology is a science, psychologism is a sophism; it substitutes the definition for the defined, the description for the described, the map for the country…Scientists themselves can afford such blunders; faith in science being what they live by, they have no need of reality…They are all on the straight road to skepticism.
心理主義在於要求以心理學回答哲學問題。心理學是一門科學，心理主義則是一詭辯主義；它以定義取代了被定義者，以描述取代了被描述者，以地圖取代了國家…科學家本身就足以鑄成大錯；信仰科學是他們生活之所依，他們並不需要實在…這些都直接導向懷疑論之路。
page:90-91
Scholastic philosophers then began to mistrust their own principles, and mediaeval philosophy broke down;…the best minds were surprised to find reason empty and began to despise it.
士林哲學家開始不信賴自己底原則，中世哲學毀了；…最佳的心智因發現理性是空洞的而感驚訝，且開始輕視它。
page:92
when they did begin to resent their alliance as a suspicious promiscuity, the breakdown of mediaeval culture was at hand.
當他們對神學哲學混雜而處感到憎恨時，中世文化隨時準備結束了。
page:93-94
If theology is the science of the word of God, it is unlikely that the solving of such highly intricate problems be required in order to achieve one’s own salvation. In short, the Gospel is both so simple and so safe…Therefore, from that time on, the slogan of many theologians was to be: Back to the Gospel!
若神學是一門上帝話語之科學，它不應是為了達成救贖而要去解決高度複雜的問題。簡言之，福音既簡易又安全。…因此，那時的許多神學家底口號是：回到福音！
page:95
After the disruption of scholasticism, a simple return to the Bible and to the study of ethical problems was one of the few experiments that could still be attempted.
在士林哲學瓦解之後，回到聖經與倫理問題研究，是少數可達成的嘗試。
page:95
Averroes…had supported the view that philosophy, when it is given the liberty to follow its own methods, reaches necessary conclusions that are contradictory to the teachings of the theologians.
Averroes…支持這個看法，當哲學獲得自由可依自己底方法時，那它必然會得出與神學家底教導發生矛盾之結論。
page:96
Averroes had proved that the world is eternal and that there is no personal immortality. All the Christian theologians protested against his conclusions and attacked his demonstrations, but not all in the same way. St. Bonaventura attempted to prove by philosophical arguments that the world is not eternal and that the soul of each man is immortal.
Averroes證明了世界是永恆的，人卻沒有不朽性。基督神學家皆以不同的方式群起而攻之。Bonaventura以哲學論證證明世界非永恆，而每個人底靈魂則是不朽的。
page:96
St. Thomas Aquinas was of the opinion that Averroes had failed to prove the eternity of the world, but that St. Bonaventura had also failed to prove that the world is not eternal; in short, philosophy cannot prove anything on that point, but it can prove the immortality of the soul.
多瑪斯認為Averroes並沒能證明世界之永恆性，Bonaventura亦未能證明世界不是永恆的；簡言之，哲學在這件事上不能證明什麼，但卻能證明靈魂底不朽性。
page:96
Duns Scotus’s position was that neither the creation of the world in time, nor the immortality of the soul could be proved by philosophers, but that both could be proved by theologians.
Scotus底立場是，哲學家既不能證明世界在時間之創造、亦不能證明靈魂之不朽性，祇有神學可為。
page:96
As to Ockham himself, he was willing to hold such conclusions as philosophical probabilities, but not as conclusively proved truths; to which he added that what cannot be proved by philosophy can still less be proved by theology, where certitude is not grounded on reason, but on faith.
關於奧坎自己，則願把這些結論視為哲學上的可能性，而非已證之定見；若有不能被哲學所證明的東西，它同樣也不能被神學證明，因這種確定性不是基於理性，而是基於信仰。
page:97
I do not think that there ever was a single man whose mental attitude could correctly be described as pure skepticism.
我並不認為曾有一個人他底心態可正確地解讀為純懷疑論者。
page:100-101
who has ever perceived a substance?...we cannot infer their existence from what we call their properties, or accidents…there is no reason whatsoever to posit unperceived substances behind their perceived accidents. If we go thus far…after the notion of substance, we have to dismiss the notion of causality. For the same reason it is impossible to prove that a certain thing is the final cause of another thing.
誰曾知覺到實體？…我們無法從我們所謂的屬性或偶性推出實體之存在…怎麼說都沒有理由去假定在可知覺的偶性背後有一不可知覺的實體。倘若我們再進一步…在實體觀點之後，我們必得解消因果律觀點。同樣的理由，證明某物是某物底目的因也是不可能的。
page:101
We cannot live without ascribing some meaning to our existence, or act without ascribing some goal to our activity; when philosophy no longer provides men with satisfactory answers to those questions, the only means they still have to escape skepticism and despair are moralism, or mysticism, or some combination of both.
我們不能沒有存在意義而生活著，也不能沒有活動目標而行動著；當哲學不再能為人們對這些問題提供滿意的答案，他們仍必須避開懷疑論與絕望，其唯一方法就是倫理主義或神秘主義或兩者之組合。
page:102
the best among the members of the political community could devote their whole care to the highest interest of morals and religion. Were they to do so, they would keep peace and charity…Fully aware of how little they can know by the natural light of reason, such men would not sin by pride, but rather would purify both their hearts and their minds from the vices that breed ignorance, such as envy, avarice, cupidity.
政治圈中那些最好的傢伙會全神貫注於道德與宗教。若他們真這麼做，將會保有和平與慈愛…他們完全瞭解靠著理性自然之光所知有限，這樣，人就不會犯下驕傲之罪，而是從無知、忌妒、貪婪之惡行中淨化他們底心靈與心智。
page:102
Aristotle is cold, and he leaves us cold, whereas it is impossible to read Cicero, or for that matter Seneca, without falling in love with the beauty of virtue and feeling a bitter hatred against vice. If true philosophers are masters of virtue, Cicero and Seneca are the true philosophers.
亞理斯多德是冰冷的，他也讓我們冰冷，然而，若不與德行之美相戀、嫉惡如仇，就不可能讀通Cicero與Seneca。倘若真的哲學家是德行大師，Cicero與Seneca就是真哲學家。
page:106
Socrates modestly confessed: “There is but one thing I know, and it is that I know nothing”; and still he was bragging, for he could not even be sure of that…”for my own part I would not dare to affirm that it can be affirmed that we know nothing.”
蘇格拉底謙卑地承認：『我祇知道一件事，那就是我什麼都不知道』；他仍是太自誇了，因為他甚至不能確定…『就我而言，我不能冒然地肯定我們什麼都不知道』。
page:108
That God is infinitely above anything we can think and say about Him, was a universally accepted doctrine in mediaeval theology. St. Thomas Aquinas had made it the very foundation of his doctrine. We do not know what God is, but only what He is not, so that we know Him the better as we more clearly see that He is infinitely different from everything else.
上帝永遠比我們對祂之所思、所說還要高超，這在中世神學是普遍接受的學說。多瑪斯以此為他底學說之基礎。我們不能知道上帝是什麼，祇知道祂不是什麼。因此，當我們愈清楚地明白祂不是這個也不是那個，也就愈能認識祂。
page:109
God is, strictly speaking, unknowable, and his ultimate endeavour to experience by love that which surpasses human understanding, St. Thomas Aquinas never forgets, that if we do not know God, the reason is not that God is obscure, but rather that He is a blinding light. The whole theology of St. Thomas points to the supreme intelligibility of what lies hidden in the mystery of God.
嚴格地說，上帝是不可知的，所要努力的是以愛來經驗上帝，愛超出了人的理解，多瑪斯絕不會忘記，若我們不能認識上帝，不是因上帝不夠清楚，而是因祂是盲目之光。多瑪斯整個神學指出了藏在神秘上帝背後底超級可理解性。
page:109
philosophy has nothing else to do in Eckhart’s doctrine but to throw darkness upon God and so surround Him with the cloud of unknowingness.
在Eckhart底學說，哲學所做的祇是在上帝四周佈滿黑暗與未知的烏雲。
page:110
God is eternally expressing Himself in an act of self-knowledge, the fact remains that God’s infinite essence is unfathomable, even to God, for He could not know Himself without turning His infinite essence into a definite object of knowledge…God as knowing and God as known are two…The only way to reach God, insofar at least as it is possible for us to do so, is therefore to transcend all mutual limitations and all distinctions;…It is only when man reaches that silent wilderness where there is neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Ghost, that His mystical flight comes to an end…in the fullness of the Divinity.
上帝永遠地在自我認識之行動中表達自己，上帝底無限本質是深不可測的，即便是上帝，祂也不能不把祂底無限本質轉成明確的知識對象來認識自己。…做為認知之上帝與被認知之上帝是不同的…祇要對我們而言是可能的，接近上帝唯一的方法是超越相互的限制與區分；…祇有當人觸及那無聲的荒野，那兒沒有聖父、聖子、聖靈，祂神秘的飛翔到達終點…充滿著神性。
page:115
God is a being than which no greater can be conceived, but if He is the Absolute, He must needs be at the same time, and for the same reason, a being than which no smaller can be conceived. God is the coincidence of opposites, and therefore He is above both the principle of identity and the principle of contradiction. In short, God is unthinkable.
無法想像有一個存有能比上帝更大，然而祂若是絕對者，因著相同的理由，祂同時也必須是無法設想有一個存有能比祂更小。上帝是對立面之一致，因此祂處在同一律與矛盾律之上。簡言之，上帝是無法想像的。
page:116
This is the very reason why it is a Universe, that is to say, not a mere plurality of unrelated things, but a universality of many-related things. The trouble is that…things are not only many-related, but universally related. Taken as a whole…since every one of the divine ideas is but a particular expression of God as a whole, so also must every particular thing be considered as a restricted but global expression of the Universe…in a word, the Universe is identical with itself in each particular aspect of its diversity…The old principle of Anaxagoras still holds true: everything is in everything.
這就是為什麼稱做Universe，它不單是指許多毫無關聯的事物，而是許多關聯在一起的事物之統合。麻煩是…事物不僅是許多關聯，而是普遍關聯。視作一個全體…因為每一個神性觀念皆是做為全體之上帝底個別表現，所以每一個別事物也必須是宇宙全面的表達…一句話，宇宙在它各個多樣性的面向皆是等同的…Anaxagoras底古老原理仍然有效：一切在一切之中。
page:116-117
God is in the Universe as the cause is in its effect…the Universe is in every one of its parts, for every one of its parts is the Universe.
上帝在宇宙中正如因在果之中…宇宙在它每一個部分，因它底每一個部分皆是宇宙。
page:118
as soon as the scholastics gave up all hope of answering philosophical problems in the light of pure reason, the long and brilliant career of mediaeval philosophy came to a close.
一旦士林哲學放棄了所有要以純理性之光去回答哲學問題之希望，這漫長且輝煌的中世哲學就結束了。
page:125
Descartes…he was the first to build up a new system of ideas and to open formally a new philosophical era. His predecessors had done little more than to distrust scholastic philosophy, and, as they knew no other one, to extend their distrust to philosophy itself. Descartes brought to the world the unexpected revelation that…constructive philosophical thinking was still possible. Ever since the fourteenth century there had been men to criticize Aristotle, but Descartes’ ambition was quite different: it was to replace him.
笛卡兒…他乃是建立新的觀念系統、正式開啟新的哲學領域之第一人。他的前輩們祇是不滿於士林哲學，卻不知如何將此對哲學之不滿加以擴充。笛卡兒為這世界帶來令人想不到的啟示…建構哲學思維仍是可能的。十四世紀以來批評亞理斯多德的不乏其人，但笛卡兒底野心相當不同：他要取代亞氏。
page:126-127
Cartesianism was a direct answer to the challenge of Montaigne’s skepticism…was a desperate struggle to emerge from Montaigne’s skepticism.
笛卡兒主義是對蒙田懷疑論之挑戰做直接的回應…竭盡所能地要從蒙田懷疑論走出來。
page:127
What was the last conclusion of Montaigne?...Deeply perturbed by the religious and political dissensions of his time, and above all by the disruption of moral unity resulting from the Reformation, Montaigne had traced back the common source of those evils to dogmatism. Man are so cocksure of what they say that they do not hesitate to eliminate each other, as if killing an opponent were killing his objections.
蒙田最後的結論是什麼？...他那個時代的政教紛爭深深困擾著他，尤其是宗教改革所造成道德的瓦解，蒙田將這些罪惡之源歸為教條主義。人們堅持著他們自己所說的而毫不遲疑地相互攻伐，好像毀滅敵人就是消除異己。
page:127
the only thing we can learn from him is the art of unlearning...As Montaigne sees it, wisdom is a laborious training of the mind, whose only result is an acquired habit not to judge. "I can maintain a position," says Montaigne, "I cannot choose one." Hence his practical conservatism.
我們從他那兒唯一能學到的是革除之藝術...如蒙田所見，智慧是心智勞動的練習，是不妄下判斷之後天的習慣。蒙田說『我底一貫立場就是我不能做任何選擇』。因此，他是實際地保守主義者。
page:128
A well-made mind is never fully convinced of its own opinions, and therefore doubting is the highest mark of wisdom. Not "I know," or even "I don't know," but "What do I know?" This is doubting. Such it is as Descartes describes...that Montaigne was right...but what had been their ultimate conclusion was only a starting point for Descartes.
一個建全的心智絕不會完全相信自己底意見，因此，懷疑是智慧最高之表徵。不是『我知道』亦非『我不知道』，而是『我知道什麼？』這才是可疑的。這正如笛卡兒描述的...蒙田是對的。...然而那個一直是他們最終的結論僅是做為笛卡兒之起點。
page:129
The purely negative wisdom of Montaigne could not possibly be complete wisdom, but it was the first step to a complete one. True wisdom should be positive, not made up of what we do not know, but grounded on the fullness of what we do know...at least would be an unshakable certainty. But was it possible to find it?
蒙田底純粹消極的智慧不可能是完整的智慧，但那是成為完整智慧的第一步。真智慧應是積極的，不是由我們所不知道的東西所組成，而是立基在我們全然所知道的東西。...至少應是不可動搖的確定性。但真有這種東西嗎？
page:130-132
Descartes inherited from Clavius something much more valuable - the spirit of mathematical learning. Let us only read the introduction of Clavius...Since, therefore, mathematical disciplines are so exclusively dedicated to the love and cultivation of truth, that nothing is received there of what is false, nor even of that which is merely probable...there is no doubt that the first place among sciences should be conceded to Mathematics...There are innumerable sects in philosophy, there are no sects in mathematics; philosophers are always dealing with mere probabilities, mathematicians alone can reach demonstrated conclusions.
笛卡兒從Clavius身上學到更有價值的東西是-數學研究之精神。讓我們僅讀讀他底導論...因此，正因數學訓練特別是獻給真理之愛與栽培，凡是錯的都不予接受，既使僅具犯錯之可能亦不接受...無疑地，各種科學之首座應讓位給數學。...有數不盡的哲學派別，數學則沒有派別；哲學家總在處理可能性，唯有數學家能達到論證性的結論。
page:132
If we need a philosophy whose certitude is equal to that of mathematics, our first principle will have to be the I think; but do we need such a philosophy? And supposing we do, can we have it? In other words, are we sure that everything that is is susceptible of a mathematically evident interpretation?
倘若我們需要一種哲學，它底確定性等同於數學底確定性，我們底第一原理將必是我思；但我們真地需要這樣的哲學嗎？假設要吧，我們能獲得它嗎？換言之，我們是否確定任何存在之物皆足以用數學來清楚的詮釋？
page:137
Fully convinced that he had virtually completed geometry by combining it with algebra, Descartes proceeded on the spot to another and still bolder generalization. After all, his only merit had been to realize that two sciences...were but one; why not go at once to the limit and say that all sciences are one? Such was Descartes's final illumination...All sciences were one; all problems had to be solved by the same method.
毫無疑問地，笛卡兒成功地將幾何學與代數結合在一起了，他立即地繼續更大膽的概括。必竟，他唯一的優點就是了解到兩種科學...其實僅是一種；那為何不立刻推向極限，說所有的科學皆是一種？這就是笛卡兒最終的想法...科學祇有一種；所有的問題必需能以同樣的方法予以解決。
page:139
the next move had to be obviously the further combination of both with logic...a method, says Descartes, which, "comprising the advantages of the three, is yet exempt from their faults.
下一個行動，很明顯地必是將幾何與代數再跟邏輯結合。...笛卡兒說，一個方法包含了幾何、代數、邏輯三個學科之優點，即可免除了他們底缺失。
page:140
true knowledge is necessary; mathematical knowledge alone is necessary; hence all knowledge has to be mathematical...Descartes was thereby eliminating from knowledge all that was mere probability.
真的知識是必然的；唯數學知識是必然的；因此，所有的知識必須是數學的。...笛卡兒因此就把所有僅具可能性的東西從知識中刪除了。
page:142
It had been a great idea to substitute algebraic signs for geometrical lines and figures, but algebraic signs would never do in metaphysics, not always in physics, still less in biology, in medicine and in ethics.
以代數符號取代幾何線條與特徵，這一直是偉大的構想；但代數符號決不能用在形上學，也不永遠可用在物理學，更不用說生物學、醫學與倫理學。
page:142-143
Having succeeded in eliminating figures from geometry, he felt inclined to believe that quantity itself could be eliminated from mathematics. It was necessary for him to do that, at least if he wished to extend the mathematical method even to such problems as metaphysics and ethics, where no quantity is involved...."Method," says Descartes, "consists entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards which our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any truth." Let us, with Descartes himself, call that method "Universal Mathematics"; it certainly was universal, but could it still be called mathematics?...or is it logic?
在成功地從幾何學刪除了數目之後，他進而相信可從數學中將量給排除。對他而言這是必然地做法，至少，如果他想把數學方法伸延到沒有量化的學科之問題上，如形上學、倫理學。...笛卡兒說『方法完全在於事物之秩序與安排上，若我們要發現真理，那我們底心靈視域就必得朝此而去』。這就是笛卡兒所聲稱的『普遍數學』。它當然是普遍的，但它仍算是數學嗎？...還是邏輯？
page:145
In order to make the objects of philosophical knowledge as similar as possible to those of mathematics, he reduced their number to three: thought, extension, and God...Descartes decreed that the whole content of each of them was such as can be exhausted by a simple intuition.
為了要使哲學知識的對象儘可能地與數學對象一樣，他把哲學數目還原為三個：思維、擴延與上帝。...笛卡兒宣稱這些內容可由簡單直觀即可掌握。
page:146
our clear and distinct concepts are...as many "simple natures," each of them endowed with a definite essence of its own, and wholly independent from the minds in which they dwell. From that time on, philosophy was to be the mathematical knowledge of the necessary order there is between the so-called simple natures, or fundamental ideas of the human mind.
我們底清晰明瞭的概念是...許多『簡單本性』，它們每個都賦予自身明確的本質，完全獨立於所居住的心智。從此，哲學是必然秩序的數學知識，有所謂的簡單本性，或人心智底根本觀念。
page:218
Thus, according to Hume, causality could no longer be considered as the transportation of a thing by another thing, or as the transportation of a thing by the power of God, but as a transportation of our own mind from an idea, which we call cause, to another idea, which we call effect.
根據休謨，因果律不再能視為事物間之傳遞或上帝底力量對事物之運送，而是我們自己底心智中，因觀念與果觀念之轉換。
page:219
Owing to Hume's philosophical insight, the Cartesian cycle had thus been brought to a close; and it really was a cycle, because its end was in its very beginning - scepticism. Montaigne's scepticism at the beginning; Hume's scepticism at the end...What do I know apart from what I am being taught by custom? Montaigne had asked. The mind, God, and the world, as evidently as mathematics, if not more so, was Descartes' answer...Hume had to write as its ultimate conclusion: "that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom."
由於休謨底洞見，笛卡兒學派就此結束了；它真是一個循環，因它底結束是處在它底開始-懷疑主義。始於蒙田底懷疑主義；終於休謨底懷疑主義。...蒙田曾問道，除了習慣底教導外，我還能知道什麼？笛卡兒回道，可認識如數學般明顯之心智、上帝、與世界。...休謨底最後結論是：『所有我們對因和果之推理皆來自於習慣』。
page:300-301
the biography of a philosopher is of great help in understanding his philosophy; but that is the history of a philosopher, not of his philosophy
哲學家傳記對其哲學之瞭解有很大的助益；但那是哲學家史，非哲學史。
...
it is the literary history of philosophical writings, not the history of philosophy.
哲學著作之文學史亦非哲學史。
...
We may wholly disagree with Hegel, or with Comte, but nobody can read their encyclopedias without finding there an inexhaustible source of partial truths and of acute observations...but this is the history of a philosophy, it is not yet the history of philosophy itself.
我們可以全然地不同意黑格爾或孔德，但沒有人在讀有關他們的百科全書時而不會發現有部分真理之無盡泉源和敏銳的觀察。...但這僅是某一個哲學之史，而非哲學史本身。
page:302
Philosophy consists in the concepts of philosophers, taken in the naked, impersonal necessity of both their contents and their relations. The history of these concepts and of their relationships is the history of philosophy itself.
哲學在於哲學家底概念， 在它們底內容與關係皆視為坦率、無關個人之必然性。這種概念史與它們底關係史正是哲學史本身。
page:304-305
Granted that there is no such thing as an historical determinism, it still remains true that history contains a metaphysical determinism...Now the most striking of the recurrences which we have been observing together is the revival of philosophical speculation by which every sceptical crisis was regularly attended...If there is a metaphysical necessity behind this, what is it?
假定根本沒有歷史決定論這種東西，歷史仍然會有形上決定論。...目前我們所觀察到最顯著的重現是哲學思辨之甦醒，藉此，懷疑論之危機經常伴隨在側。...倘若在背後真有形上必然性，那它倒底是什麼？
page:305
Plato's idealism comes first; Aristotle warns everybody that Platonism is heading for scepticism; then Greek scepticism arises, more or less redeemed by the moralism of the Stoics and Epicureans, or by the mysticism of Plotinus.
柏拉圖觀念論先來；亞理斯多德警告大家柏拉圖主義會導向懷疑論；然後，希臘懷疑論冒出，多多少少，可讓Stoic與Epicurus底道德主義、或Plotinus神秘主義得以救贖。
page:305
St. Thomas Aquinas restores philosophical knowledge, but Ockham cuts its very root, and ushers in the late mediaeval and Renaissance scepticism, itself redeemed by the moralism of the humanists or by the pseudo-mysticism of Nicolaus Cusanus and of his successors.
多瑪斯恢復了哲學知識，但奧坎又斷其根並引入中世晚期與文藝復興懷疑論，靠著人文主義底道德或Nicola Cusa底神秘主義獲得救贖。
page:305-306
Then come Descartes and Locke, but their philosophies disintegrate into Berkeley and Hume, with the moralism of Rousseau...Kant...his own philosophical restoration ultimately degenerated into the various forms of contemporary agnosticism, with all sorts of moralisms and of would-be mysticisms as ready shelters against spiritual despair.
接著來的是笛卡兒與洛克，但他們底哲學分裂到柏克萊與休謨，盧梭底道德主義...康德...他自己底哲學修復終究墮落為各式各樣當代的不可知論。各種道德主義與神秘主義正是對精神絕望之避難所。
page:306
The so-called death of philosophy being regularly attended by his revival,...In short, the first law to be inferred from philosophical experience is: Philosophy always buries its undertakers.
所謂的哲學之死，經常伴隨著它底復甦，...簡言之，從哲學經驗所推導而來的第一條律則是：哲學總是埋藏它底理藏者。
page:306
Hume had destroyed both metaphysics and science; in order to save science, Kant decided to sacrifice metaphysics. Now, it is the upshot of the Kantian experiment that, if metaphysics is arbitrary knowledge, science also is arbitrary knowledge; hence it follows that our belief in the objective validity of science itself stands or falls with our belief in the objective validity of metaphysics. The new question, then is no longer, Why is metaphysics a necessary illusion, but rather, Why is metaphysics necessary, and how is it that it has given rise to so many illusions?
休謨已毀了形上學與科學；為了要救科學，康德決定犧牲形上學。康德這樣做的結果是，若形上學是任意的知識，那麼科學也是；因此，我們所相信科學底客觀有效性基於形上學底客觀有效性。不再是去問為什麼形上學一定是幻覺，而是問為什麼形上學是必要的，它如何能引出這麼多幻覺？
page:306-307
It is observable character of all metaphysical doctrines that...they agree on the necessity of finding out the first cause of all that is. Call it matter with Democritos, the Good with Plato, the self-thinking Thought with Aristotle, the One with Plotinus, Being with all Christian philosophers, Moral Law with Kant, the Will with Schopenhauer, or let it be the absolute idea of Hegel, the Creative Duration of Bergson, and whatever else you may cite, in all cases the metaphysician is a man who looks behind and beyond experience for an ultimate ground of all real and possible experience.
所有形上學學說有一可觀察的性格...他們同意必須找到萬物之第一因。Democritos稱它為物質，柏拉圖稱為至善，亞理斯多德稱自我思想之絕對思維，Plotinus稱為太一，基督哲學家稱絕對存有，康德稱絕對道德律，叔本華稱絕對意志，或黑格爾底絕對觀念，柏格森底創造的綿延，任何你能舉的，任何事例，形上學家皆是在經驗背後與之外，尋求一個在所有實在的與可能的經驗底終極基礎。
page:307-308
Let this, therefore, be our second law: by his very nature, man is a metaphysical animal. The law does more than state a fact, it points to its cause. Since man is essentially rational, the constant recurrence of metaphysics in the history of human knowledge must have its explanation in the very structure of reason itself. In other words, the reason why man is a metaphysical animal must lie somewhere in the nature of rationality.
我們第二個律則：人天生就是形上學的動物。此律不僅陳述一件事實，它指出了它底原因。因著人本質上是理性的，在人類知識史，形上學不斷地重現，對此該有一個理性結構本身之解釋。換句話說，人為何是形上學的動物，其理由多少在於理智底本性。
page:308
The typical attributes of scientific knowledge, that is universality and necessity, are not to be found in sensible reality and one of the most generally received explanations is that they come to us from our very power of knowing.
科學知識底性質，即普遍與必然，不能在感官實在界中找到，最廣為接受的解釋是它們來自於我們認知能力。
page:308
As Kant was the first both to distrust metaphysics and to hold it to be unavoidable, so was he also the first to give a name to human reason's remarkable power to overstep all sensible experience. He called it the transcendent use of reason and denounced it as the permanent source of our metaphysical illusions.
康德是第一位既不信賴形上學又主張它不可避免，他也是第一位為人底理性逾越了感官經驗這種能力命名。他叫此為理性底超越使用，並以它做為我們形上幻覺之永恆源頭予以譴責。
page:308
whether such knowledge be illusory or not, there is, in human reason, a natural aptness, and consequently a natural urge, to transcend the limits of experience and to form transcendental notions by which the unity of knowledge may be completed.
不論這樣的知識是否為幻覺，在人底理性總有一自然傾向與衝動，要超越經驗上的限制，建構先驗的想法，藉此使知識底統一得以完備。
page:308-309
Let us, therefore, state as our third law, that metaphysics is the knowledge gathered by a naturally transcendent reason in its search for the first principles, or first causes, of what is given in sensible experience. This is, in fact, what metaphysics is, but what about its validity?
我們第三條律則是：形上學是由超越理性很自然地得出的，它從感覺經驗與料中找尋第一原理或第一因。事實上，這正是形上學之所是，但它是有效的嗎？
page:309
should the repeated failures of metaphysics be ascribed to metaphysics itself, or to metaphysicians?...For indeed that experience itself exhibits a remarkable unity...metaphysical adventures are doomed to fail when their authors substitute the fundamental concepts of any particular science for those of metaphysics.
形上學重覆地失敗該歸給形上學本身還是歸給形上學家？...的確，經驗本身展現著顯著的統一...當形上學家把個別科學底基本概念取代形上學底概念，這種形上冒險注定失敗。
page:309-310
this must be our fourth conclusion: as metaphysics aims at transcending all particular knowledge, no particular science is competent either to solve metaphysical problems, or to judge their metaphysical solutions.
我們第四個結論是：當形上學底目標在於超越所有個別知識時，沒有一個個別科學足以解決形上學的難題，也不能對形上學的解答做出判斷。
page:310
Kant busied himself with questions about metaphysics, but he had no metaphysical interests of his own...To him, nature was in the books of Newton, and metaphysics in the books of Wolff...there are three metaphysical principles, or transcendental ideas of pure reason: an immortal soul to unify psychology; freedom to unify the laws of cosmology; and God to unify natural theology.
康德理首於形上學問題，但他對形上學並無興趣...對他而言，自然是牛頓書中所寫的，形上學是Wolff的...有三個形上原理或純粹理性底先驗觀念：能統一心理學之不朽靈魂；能統一宇宙論法則之自由；能統一自然神學之上帝。
page:310-311
In fact, what Kant considered as the three principles of metaphysics were not principles, but conclusions. The real principles of metaphysics are the first notions through which all the subsequent metaphysical knowledge has to be gathered.
事實上，康德所視為形上學底三原理並不能算是原理，而是結論。真的形上學原理是首要的想法，其它所有隨後的形上學知識皆由此推導出。
page:311
the principles of metaphysics are very different from the three transcendental ideas of Kant. The average metaphysician usually overlooks them because, though he aims at the discovery of the ultimate ground of reality as a whole, he attempts to explain the whole by one of its parts, or to reduce his knowledge of the whole to his knowledge of one of its parts. Then he fails and he ascribes his failure to metaphysics.
形上學原理與康德底三個先驗觀念是相當不同的。一般的形上學家通常忽略了這些，因為雖然他打算發現全部實在界底終極基礎，他卻以部分去解釋全體，或將全體的知識化約為其中一部分的知識。然後他失敗了，就歸咎於形上學。
page:312
the human mind must be possessed of a natural aptitude to conceive all things as the same...In short, the failures of the metaphysicians flow from their unguarded use of a principle of unity present in the human mind.
人類心智有一自然傾向，把萬物設想為同一...簡言之，形上學家底失敗來自於對心中呈現的統一原理之濫用。
page:312
the last and truly crucial problem: what is it which the mind is bound to conceive both as belonging to all things and as not belonging to any two things in the same way?...The word is - Being...Absolute nothingness is strictly unthinkable.
最後也是真正重要的問題是：有個東西，心智既視它為隸屬萬物且又不能以同一種方式歸到兩個事物，那個倒底是什麼？...那是-存有...絕對的虛無完全是不可想像的。
page:313
human thought is always about being;...the understanding of being is the first to be attained, the last into which all knowledge is ultimately resolved and the only one to be included in all our apprehensions. What is first, last and always in human knowledge is its first principle, and its constant point of reference.
人類總是思維著存有；...對存有之瞭解既是最先獲得的，也是最後所有知識融入的，也是唯一包含在所有我們底理解中。那從最先到最後一直處在知識中的即是第一原理，是恆常的參考點。
page:313
Now if metaphysics is knowledge dealing with the first principles and the first causes themselves, we can safely conclude that since being is the first principle of all human knowledge, it is a fortiori the first principle of metaphysics.
現在，形上學若是處理第一原理與第一因本身之知識，我們就可以安心地說，因為存有是所有知識底第一原理，它更加是形上學底第一原理。
page:313
To describe being as the "principle of knowledge," does not mean that all subsequent knowledge can be analytically deduced from it, but rather that being is the first knowledge, through which all subsequent knowledge can be progressively acquired.
把存有說成是知識原理，並不表示接下來的知識皆得從它那兒推論而來，而是說存有是第一個知識，其後的知識逐步地會獲得。
page:313
As soon as it comes into touch with sensible experience, the human intellect elicits the immediate intuition of being: X is, or exists; but from the intuition that something is, the knowledge of what it is, beyond the fact that it is something, cannot possibly be deduced.
一旦接觸到感官經驗，理智就引出了對存有之直觀：某物存在；從某物存在之直觀，問道那是什麼之知識，除了那是某物之外，別無所獲。
page:313-314
The intellect does not deduce, it intuits, it sees, and, in the light of intellectual intuition, the discursive power of reason slowly builds up from experience a determinate knowledge of concrete reality.
理智並不推論，它直觀，它看，在理智直觀之光中，理性散亂底力量慢慢地從經驗中建立確定的具體實在界底知識。
page:314
Reason has not to prove any one of these principles, otherwise they would not be principles, but conclusions; but it is by them that reason proves all the rest. Patiently weaving the threads of concrete knowledge, reason adds to the intellectual evidence of being and of its properties the science of what it is.
理性並不證明任何原理，否則就不能算是原理，而是結論；但也由於此，理性要證明其它的一切。有耐心地編織具體知識，在存有與其屬性底理智明證上，理性會加入那是什麼之科學。
page:314
The first principle brings with it, therefore, both the certitude that metaphysics is the science of being as being, and the abstract laws according to which that science has to be constructed...the first principle of human knowledge does not bring us a ready-made science of metaphysics, but its principle and its object. The twofold character of the intellectual intuition of being, to be given in any sensible experience, and yet to transcend all particular experience, is both the origin of metaphysics and the permanent occasion of its failures.
因此，第一原理帶來兩個東西，一是確定了形上學是一門研究存有做為存有之科學，一是建構科學之抽象法則。...人類知識底第一原理並不帶給我們現成的形上學知識，而是形上學底原理與對象。存有之理智直觀底這雙重性格，可由感官經驗獲得，並超越了個別經驗，既是形上學之源，也是形上學長久以來失敗的起因。
page:314-315
If being is included in all my representations, no analysis of reality will ever be complete unless it culminates in a science of being, that is in metaphysics.
若存有包含在所有我底表現中，除非能登上存有之學，即形上學，否則對實在界之分析就不會完整。
page:315
Such is the first principle, both universally applicable,and never applicable twice in the same way. When philosophers fail to perceive either its presence or its true nature, their initial error will pervade the whole science of being, and bring about the ruin of philosophy.
第一原理可被普遍地應用，但不能以同樣的方式應用兩次。當哲學家不能察覺它底在場或真實本性，他們開始的錯誤將漫延到整個存有科學，導致哲學之毀滅。
page:316
In short, and this will be our last conclusion: all the failures of metaphysics should be traced to the fact, that the first principle of human knowledge has been either overlooked or misused by the metaphysicians.
簡言之，我們最終的結論是：所有形上學底失敗該指向於－人類知識底第一原理被形上學家給忽視或誤用了。
page:316-317
The most tempting of all the false first principles is: that thought, not being, is involved in all my representations. Here lies the initial option between idealism and realism, which will settle once and for all the future course of our philosophy, and make it a failure or a success. Are we to encompass being with thought, or thought with being? In other words, are we to include the whole in one of its parts, or one of the parts in its whole?
最誘人犯錯的第一原理是：在我底表述中所帶到的不是存有而是思維。這得看一開始所選的是觀念論或實在論，這將決定以後哲學之進程、決定失敗或成功。我們是以思維包圍存有還是以存有包圍思維？換言之，是將全體納入部分亦或是將部分納入全體？
page:317
Man is not a mind that thinks, but a being who knows other beings as true, who loves them as good, and who enjoys them as beautiful. For all that which is…exhibits the inseparable privileges of being, which are truth, goodness and beauty.
人並非是思維之心智，而是那位去認識真理的、熱愛善的、享受美的存有。因為所有存在的事物…展現著存有不可分的特權，即是真，善與美。
page:318-319
The world of knowledge and action to which the first principles apply is a changing world, but there should be no history of the first principles themselves, because the metaphysical structure of reality itself does not change. Perennis philosohpia is not an honorary title for any particular form of philosophical thinking, but a necessary designation for philosophy itself, almost a tautology. That which is philosophical is also perennial in its own right. It is so because all philosophical knowledge ultimately depends on metaphysics.
知識的世界與以第一原理所應用的世界是一個變動的世界，但並沒有第一原理本身的歷史，因為實在界底形上結構不會改變。永恆哲學並非是為個別的哲學思維形式而有的名譽上的頭銜，而是哲學本身必要的指稱，幾乎是同義詞。凡是哲學的其本身就也是永恆的。會這樣乃是因為所有的哲學知識終究得靠形上學。
page:152-153
Philosophy had to become a department of universal mathematics; now mathematicians deal with nothing but ideas, and ideas can be dealt with much more rapidly than concrete facts. The first important point was precisely to realize that the new philosophy, unlike the old one, but like mathematics, would always go, not from things to ideas, but from ideas to things.
哲學必須成為一門普遍數學；目前，數學家處理的祇是觀念，而觀念可以比具體事實處理得更快。最重要的正是覺察到新的哲學，不像舊的哲學，應像數學，總是從觀念走向事物，而非從事物走向觀念。
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