Gaston Bachelard, Subversive Humanist by McAllester Jones, Mary , The University of Wisconsin Press , 1991
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Bachelard was the inventor of the "epistemological break," the proponent of discontinuity.
把什拉是"知識論斷裂"之發明者，不連續之提議者。
Bachelard...rejected the primacy of lived experience and the conception of the founding, sovereign subject. He did not, though, believe that "man is dead." He redefined man; he reinterpreted the relationship between subject and object, examining human creativity in both science and poetry and placing considerable emphasis on language.
巴什拉...拒絕生活經驗之優位，也拒絕基礎的、統治的主體之概念。雖然他並不相信”人已死”。他重新定義人；重新詮釋主體與客體關係，在科學與詩中檢驗人底創造性，並特別關注語言。
as he declared in La philosophie du non (1940), that "two people must first contradict each other if they really wish to understand each other. Truth is the child of argument, not of fond affinity" (134).
如同他在《否定之哲學》(1940)中所宣稱的，”兩個人倘若真想要彼此瞭解，那他們首先必須是相互對立的”。真理乃爭論之子，而非建立在肯定上。(134)
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Man who through the power of his reason and his imagination creates “a new nature.” In science and in poetry, Bachelard believes, “the world is conditioned by man’s provocation”.
人，透過理性與想像力，創造了一個新自然。巴什拉相信，在科學與詩裡，世界受制於人底招惹。
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The matrix of Bachelard’s thought is twentieth-century science, the “new scientific mind” which he dates from 1905, from Einstein’s special theory of relativity…showing how science has undermined our familiar epistemologies, so that neither rationalism nor realism, idealism nor materialism will serve as philosophies adequate to twentieth-century science. The year 1905 saw the break not just with all previous science, but with all previous philosophy.
巴什拉底思維主體是二十世紀科學，他以1905年愛因斯坦底狹義相對論訂為”新科學精神”…顯示出科學如何已削弱了我們所熟悉的知識論，以致於，理性主義與實在論、唯心論與唯物論，都將不能做為滿足二十世紀科學之哲學。1905年不僅顯示著與所有之前的科學斷裂，也與所有之前的哲學斷裂。
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Bachelard’s notion of the “epistemological break” is probably what is best known and most widely quoted from his work, yet those who borrow it – Foucault, Derrida, Althusser – fail to see that this epistemological break brings humanism in its train, a humanism which, in its turn, breaks with traditional humanism.
巴什拉底”知識論斷裂”也許是最為人所知與最廣為被引用之想法。然而曾借用此想法的這些人－福科、德希達、阿圖塞－皆未能看出這個知識論斷裂也含蓋了人文主義本身，它也與傳統斷裂了。
Both Descartes and Kant understood the rational subject in terms of this notion of reason as a priori and deductive. If …the rational subject…is not the unchanging center of all knowledge and experience.
笛卡兒與康德以先驗與演繹之看法來瞭解理性主體。然而…這理性主體…並非所有知識與經驗之中心。
Mathematics and technology together produce phenomena…these efforts of mathematization are so successful that reality crystallizes along the axes provided by human thought, and new phenomena are produced. Thus, mathematics forms the axis of discovery, and only mathematical expressions allow us to think phenomena. This mathematics…is nondeductive, non-Euclidean…so inaugurating the “new scientific mind.”
數學與科技共同產生現象…這些數學化之努力是如此成功，致使實在得沿著人性思維所刻劃的斧鑿來具體化，新的現象就此產生。這樣，數學形成了發現之軸，也祇有數學表示式能讓我們去思考現象。這數學…是非演繹的、非歐幾何的…開創了”新科學精神”。
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First,…Einstein’s theories were not deduced from Newton’s…It is the end therefore of reason as a closed system of necessity. Second, reason is no longer governed by…the ideal of identification.
首先…愛因斯坦底理論並非從牛頓理論演繹而來…因此，它是作為必然的封閉系統理性之終結。其次，理性不再受理想的同一性所管理。
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Man are made different by difference, that mathematician is changed by his mathematics: psychologically speaking, you cannot fail to note the reaction of the mathematical tool on the user of that tool…our minds growing more agile, more alert, dynamic, creative.
人藉著差異而造成不同，數學家因他底數學而改變：以心理學來講，你不能不注意到數學工具對使用工具之人的影響…我們底心靈變得更機動、靈敏、活力、創意。
He sets out a “non-Cartesian epistemology,” an epistemology that is not against but rather beyond Descartes…We can no longer say “I think therefore I am” but rather “I think difference, therefore I become different, and being different, I think new differences.” Bachelard subverts Cartesian rationalism, and consequently he subverts Kantian idealism. If our minds are changed by scientific knowledge of the world, then we can no longer argue with Kant that the laws of the world conform to the laws of man’s mind. Bachelard therefore proposes…a “discursive idealism” which he defines as “the clear reconstruction of the self in confrontation with the not-self…a sequence of essentially different constructions”. The rational subject is no longer sovereign, no longer autonomous, identical, and unchanging, but rather transcended, upheld, created and recreated by something other than itself, by the “non-self,” by the discursive, dialectical, dynamic interrelationship between reason and reality.
他提出”非笛卡兒知識論”，一種不是對立而是跨越笛卡兒之知識論…我們不能再說『我思故我在』而該說『我思維差異，因此我成為不同，做為一不同者，我思維新的差異』。巴什拉顛覆笛卡兒理性主義，然後他顛覆康德觀念論。倘若我們底心智被世界底科學知識所改變，那麼我們不能再以康德之見以為世界定律要符應人們心智底定律。因此，巴什拉提出…”散亂的觀念論”，意指自我面對非我之重建…是一系列的本質上不同的建構。理性主體不再統制、不再自律、同一與不變，而是由不同於己之物、由非我、由理性與實在之間散亂的、辨證的、動態的交互關係所超越、所支持、創造和再造。
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Mathematics is the instrument of modern science, and more than this, mathematics is a language…An equation…is a structure of difference, the equals sign in fact establishing difference between the known and unknown…every word expresses first of all a differentiation, otherwise it would be confused with all other words…The language of mathematics, like all language, is a structure of difference; its symbols and operators are arbitrary and autonomous…The mathematician like the poet is in language…Mathematics creates difference in response to a rich reality.
數學是現代科學之工具，不僅如此，數學是一種語言…恆等式是一差異之結構，等號建立了已知與未知之間的差異…每個字尤其是表達出一差異，否則它將與其它字產生混淆。數學語言，像所有語言一樣，是一差異結構；它底符號與操作元是任意與自律的…數學家，同詩人般，處在語言中。…數學創立差異以回應這豐富的實在。
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Consciousness for Bachelard is consciousness of the imbrication of subject and object. He therefore refuses Bergson’s distinction between the “superficial self” and the “deep self,” he refuses the idea of duration as continuity. Instead, consciousness is of difference.
就巴什拉而言，意識是主體與客體重疊之意體。因此，他拒絕柏格森”表層我”與”深層我”之區分，他拒絕作為連續緜延之觀念。反之，意識是有不同的。
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Because of the mental revolutions that necessarily accompany scientific inventions, mankind is turning into a mutating species, or to put it more precisely, into a species that needs to mutate, that suffers if it does not change. From an intellectual point of view, man needs to need. For Bachelard, difference is an ontological necessity. Since ordinary life is under the rule of identity, the only way we can experience and sustain this difference in ourselves is by thinking about science or, alternatively, by reading a poem.
因著心靈革命，伴隨著科學發明，人類變成一突變物種，更正確地說，變成一須要突變之物種，若它沒改變可就麻煩了。從理性觀點來看，人須要去須要。對巴什拉來說，差異是存有學的需要。因著日常生活是處在同一性之管制下，我們唯一能經驗與維持自身底差異，祇有靠對科學思維或讀詩。
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the reader is called upon to continue the writer's images, he is aware of being in a state of open imagination. Reading poetic images brings us "the experience of openness, of newness., new images, new language, new possibilities in the world and in ourselves.
讀者被召喚去繼續作者底想像，他發覺正處於開放的想像力狀態。閱讀詩的想像帶給我們開放的、嶄新的體驗，體驗到在世界與我們自身新的想像、語言、與新的可能。
What he brings to it is an attitude of mind, a willingness to accept and not reduce complexity, to take reading a poem seriously, as an aspect of our relationship with something other than ourselves.
他所帶給詩的是一種心靈上的態度，一種願意接受複雜性而不予以簡化，好好地讀一首詩，以做為我們與它者關係之一個面向。
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What Bachelard reads is images, not ideas...He reads material and dynamic images, neither perceptual nor rational, nor expressive of lived experience...he rejects psychoanalysis, preferring phenomenology. He does so because psychoanalysis is reductive; it reduces images to the unconscious, the unconscious to lived experience, to infantile social experience in particular.
巴什拉所讀的是想像，不是觀念...他讀物質的與動態的想像，不是知覺的亦非理智的，也非生活經驗的表達...他拒絕心理分析，傾向現象學。如此做是因為心理分析是還原的；將想像給還原成潛意識，將潛意識還原成生活經驗，尤其是孩提時的社會經驗。
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Bachelard's material images, in which man and matter are conjoined, spring from "the zone of material reverie that precedes contemplation". His approach is never the diagnostic approach of the psychoanalytical critic; he is really interested not in the poet but in what the poet does to him: "literary images which are correctly dynamized will dynamize the reader".
巴什拉底物質想像，人與物質結合在其中，那是從先於沈思之物質夢想區域所冒出來的。他的方法絕非心理分析批評的診斷方式；他真正在意的不是詩人而是詩人對他做了什麼：正確的充滿活力的文學想像將使讀者活力充沛。
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Bachelard turns from psychoanalysis to phenomenology precisely because this offers a better account of reading. La poetque de l'espace (1957) and La Poetique de la reverie (1960) are concerned first and foremost with reading, with the reader's consciousness of new language, of what he calls "the ecstasy of new images". However, he modifies Husserl...insisting on the dynamic relationship between subject and object, so that the reader's consciousness is changed by what he reads...."through the newness of his images, the poet is always the source of language....a poetic image...becomes a new being in our own language, it expresses us by making us what it expresses...Here, expression creates being.
巴什拉從心理分析轉向現象學正因現象學能對閱讀提供較好的說明。空間詩學(1957)與夢想詩學(1960)首要地是關注閱讀、關注讀者對新語言之意識，即他所謂"新想像之沈醉"。然而，他修正了胡塞爾...堅持主體與客體之動態關係，因此，讀者底意識會隨著他的閱讀的而改變...透過詩人想像之新穎性，詩人總是語言之源...一個詩的想像...成為在我們自己底語言中一個新的存有，它使我們成為它所要表達之物來表達出我們...在此，表達創造了存有。
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For Bachelard,...He never in fact reads a poem as a whole, as a structure of images, preferring to remain "on the level of separate images".
巴什拉從未把詩當做全體、想像的結構來讀，而傾向保持著分開想像之層次。
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Bachelard presents a poem not as a cultural or linguistic phenomenon but as a personal experience. A poem is not something that confirms a preexisting body of knowledge, a theory or a hypothesis; it is "an explosive", a shattering and shaking of our foundations. When we read, we are in language, in language which is not our own....This language...opens our own language.
巴什拉並不把詩當作文化的或語言的現象，而是個人經驗。一首詩不是要確認先在於知識之物或確認一個理論、一個假定；它是對我們根基之探險、摧毀與撼動。當我們閱讀，我們處在語言中，在一個不屬於自己底語言中...這語言...開啟了我們自己底語言。
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Poems are human realities...poems are written language...he makes this written language an experience not of "closure" but of "openness." For Bachelard, reading something that has been written is quite different from listening to someone speaking, for the simple reason that the spoken word imposes itself on us, requires our submission and our presence, whereas in the written word, read and slowly reread, "thoughts and dreams reverberate". The written word plays between the poles of subject and object; it interweaves and holds together ideas and dreams, the world and the poet, the text and the reader. In Bachelard's view, the language of poetry expresses at one and the same time both subject and object; it abolishes the frontiers of the internal and external worlds, making them reciprocal and interdependent....they exemplify our relations with the world, the imbrication of subject and object.
詩是人性實在...詩是書寫的語言...他把書寫的語言當做開放的而非封閉的經驗。對巴什拉來說，閱讀被寫下的東西與聽到某人說話是根本不一樣的。理由很簡單，說的話語會強加於我們身上，要求我們屈從與在場，然而，書寫的字，要求我們緩緩地一讀再讀，思維與夢回盪著。書寫的字處在主客兩極，將觀念與夢、世界與詩人、文本與讀者交錯在一起。廢除了內在與外在世界之藩籬，使能互惠、相互依賴...他們例證了我們與世界、主客重疊之關係。
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Man's being is an unfixed being. All expression unfixes him. This is surely important. Man is unfixed by language, not decentered. The question is not whether language is outside us or inside us.
人是不能被固定下來的存有。所有的表達都使他不固定。當然這非常重要。人藉著語言而解脫，而非去中心化。這並不是語言在我們之內或之外的問題。
Metaphysics, Bachelard declares, is bedeviled with this simple opposition, with this simple geometric intuition. It fails to see the complex human fact...Man is the being that lies half open, so that inside and outside flow together and are inseparable.
巴什拉宣稱，形上學受著這簡單對立、幾何直覺之困擾。不能看出複雜人性之事實...人是半開之存有，因此，內與外合一不可分。
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Man's being is a spiral. Here, in the spiral, there is movement...no center.
人是縲旋的。其中有一無中心之運動。
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The knowing subject...is made by his knowledge, and since scientific knowledge is always progressing and changing, dynamic and open, the subject will share these characteristics. Scientific knowledge is both polemical and poetic.
認知主體...是由他底知識所造成的，也因為科學知識永遠在進步與改變，動態的與開放的，這主體也將享有這些特性。科學知識既是爭論的也是詩性的。
The subject is modified by the "non-self," the transcendent other that engages him in endless polemics. He both creates and is created by his knowledge of an external reality.
主體被非我所修正，超越的它者在無止盡的爭論中參與之事。他既創造也受造於外在世界的知識。
idealism...cannot account for the continual movement, the continual progress of scientific knowledge, for the fundamental incompleteness of knowledge which he takes to be an epistemological postulate.
觀念論...無法說明持續運動、科學知識的不斷進步、做為知識論設準之基礎知識底不完備性。
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This epistemological break is a fact; it proves the openness of scientific knowledge and disproves idealism, along with the notion of reason as an a priori deductive system, entirely necessary and entirely closed, independent of any reality.
知識論斷裂肯定了科學知識底開放性，不贊成觀念論式的理性主張，如同先驗的演繹系統，完全地必然與封閉的、獨立於實在界的系統。
The reality that modern science describes is not a given reality, not a reality that lies waiting to be found, but rather...a reality we construct....this constructed reality is not reality-for-the-subject, but rather reality-against-the subject. His conception of the interdependence of mind and reality, of subject and object, does not imply their unity, their convergence, their merging, but on the contrary, their "minimum opposition,"...their difference.
現代科學所描述的實在界並不是那給予的世界，不是那等著去發現的世界，而是我們建構出的世界。...這個建構的實在界不是為主體而存的，而是與主體對抗的世界。他這心靈與實在、主與客相互依賴之概念並不意謂著它們之統一、集中或合併，相反地，意謂著它們最起碼的對立...與差異。
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The knower is consequently always aware of a gap between what he knows and what there is to know, always aware therefore of difference, which he constantly strives to overcome only to find it again opposing him.
認知者察覺到在認識的與該要認識的之間永遠有一段差距，有差異，他不斷地努力去克服，並再次發現到相對立的東西。
William James and pragmatism...'s notion of usefulness of profitability as the criterion of truth he regards as quite untenable in modern science....Instead of success, Bachelard emphasizes failure and error: "error...is the driving force in knowledge", "science is an enigma which is ever reborn". We succeed in understanding something only to realize all that we yet fail to understand...which through verification and rectification seeks precision and certainty, only to discover its own error as it confronts a resistant, unknowable, inexhaustible reality. Pragmatism is...a version of idealism.
William James與實證主義...將有用性與效益性視為真理之準則，這在現代科學來看是站不住腳的...巴什拉不以成功，而去強調失敗與失誤："失誤...在知識上是趨動力"。"科學是曾經再生之謎"。我們唯有認知到不能完全理解，才能成功地瞭解到某些東西...那些透過檢證、修正以求精準與確實性，僅不過是發現它自身在面對一個反抗的、未知的、無止盡的世界時之失誤。實證主義...是觀念論之另一版本而已。
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Error...is an inevitable and indeed essential part of knowledge...the phenomenon is absolutely inseparable from the conditions of its detection. According to Heisenberg's principle, scientists cannot through experiment determine with exactitude both the position and the velocity of a subatomic particle, for when one is measured, the other is disturbed.
失誤...是不可避免且是知識底本質部分...現象絕對是與其偵測條件不可分的。根據海森堡底測不準原理，科學家無法由實驗正確地決定次原粒子底位置與速度，因為當這個被量到了，那個就被干擾了。
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a reality which is not found but conquered. Consequently...we are no longer in a lived but in a thought world.
實在界不是被發現的，而是被征服的。因此...我們不再處於一生活的世界而在一思維的世界。
Bergson, in Durée et simultanéité(1922), discusses Einstein’s theory and quite explicitly equates reality with what is observed, perceived, and lived. “Real” time is for him “lived time”; it has unity, and is not in any way affected by relativity theory.
柏格森在《緜延與同時》討論到愛因斯坦底理論，把所觀察到的、知覺到的、生活上的皆等同於實在。對他而言，真實的時間即生命時間，它有統一性，不受相對論所影響。
“We do not think real time,” Bergson declares in L’Évolution créatrice, “we live it”…the time I wait for a lump of sugar to dissolve is “my impatience,” my “duration”; it is therefore “lived” not “thought” time.
柏格森在創化論宣稱，我們並不思考時間，我們活出時間…當我等待方糖融化時，是我在焦燥、我緜延；因此它是生活的、不是思維的時間。
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At the same time, Bergson seeks to ensure the possibility of objective experience through the coincidence of “my duration” with that of the universe, and of consciousness with “organic evolution”, by positing a “life force”, a “current of consciousness” in all matter.
同時，柏格森想要保證客觀經驗之可能性，他將『生命衝力』與『意識流』置於物質當中，使得『我底緜延』與這個宇宙、意識與『有機的進化』、相互一致。
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Initially, in Bergson’s Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Time and Free Will), the idea of duration, of immediate consciousness, was developed in order to prove human freedom, in opposition to thought, to the “superficial self,”.held to be determined by the requirements of social and practical life.
在柏格森底《時間與自由意志》中，根本上，緜延、直接意識等觀念，是為了證明人性自由而發展的，以便反對被社會及現實生活需要所決定的思維與『表面自我』。
Bachelard argues, thought is not determined by the need for practical action. Instead, it is characterized by contingency, by the arbitrary and the possible, that is to say by freedom. There are no longer any grounds for dividing the subject as Bergson did, and as a result, consciousness and thought, and with them the subject and the object, must be brought together.
巴什拉認為，思維並不受到現實行動之需要所決定。反之，它有著偶發性、任意與可能性，此即意謂著自由。不再有任何理由像柏格森那樣去分裂主體，如此看來，意識與思維、主體與客體、必得合一了。
There is succession without distinction, mutual penetration, solidarity…Bergson uses music as a simile for duration, as a model of consciousness: the notes of a melody may follow one another, but we hear them as a whole, one note merging into another, inseparable, changing qualities.
依次繼起而無區分，相互滲透，糾結…柏格森用音樂類比緜延、意識模型，旋律的音節彼此跟隨，我們是以全體來欣賞它們的，音符併入另一個不可分的、變動的性質。
page:43
"Transcendence," Heidegger writes, "defines the nature of the subject, it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity...being a subject means being an existent in transcendence and as transcendence". He goes on to say that "we call world that towards which man as such operates a transcendence and we define transcendence a 'being-in-the-world'". Developing this. Heidegger explains that "transcendence means project of the world, in such a way that the projecting being thus penetrated is as if traversed by the existent that he goes beyond, that "man founds (creates) the world only in so far as he founds himself in the midst of existence".
海德格寫道，"超越定義了主體底本性，它是主體性底基本結構...成為一個主體意謂著成為一個在超越中之存在者、與作為超越之存在者"。他繼續說道，"我們喚世界為人們要進行超越所朝向之處，我們把超越定義為"在世存有"。海德格解釋道，超越意謂著世界之籌劃，這樣的話，那滲入籌劃的存有如同被他跨出的存在者所跨越，人僅在存在中建立他自身來建立世界。
page:44-45
When he declares that the subject who thinks about an object acquires depth, he is going beyond Descartes, in fact, and the word "depth" is an important indicator of the non-Cartesian, Bachelardian cogito.
當巴什拉宣稱，思維客體之主體獲得深度，他就跨出了笛卡兒，事實上，"深度"這個詞是對非笛卡兒、巴什拉式我思、一個重要指標。
Reason for Bachelard is always "applied," always "transcendence" and "project." The Bachelardian cogito is therefore not solitary but dialectical: "T think about reality" because it is reality that makes me think.
理性，對巴什拉而言，總是"應用的"、"超越的"、與"籌劃的"。因此，這巴什拉式我思並非孤獨的而是辯證的: "我思維實在"因那是讓我思維之實在"。
page:45
The thinking subject's depth is proportional to the depth of the object that is thought.
思維主體底深度與被思維客體底深度是成比例的。
Matter has no "inside," no "depth" because it is not spatial but temporal and discontinuous, because it is rather than has energy. Pauli's exclusion principle is given particular importance by Bachelard because it puts an end to the idea that the "depth" of substance determines material properties...according to the exclusion principle no two electrons can have the same set of four quantum numbers, it follows that what determines one electron's individuality is other electrons, numerical difference. Difference is therefore a law of nature, an ontological necessity.
物質並無"內部"，無"深度"，因為它不是空間的而是時間的且是不連續的，因為它不是擁有能量而它就是能量。波里底排除原則對巴什拉尤為重要，因它終結了以實體底"深度"去決定物質底性質這種觀念。...根據排除原則，兩個電子不能共有同一組四個量子數，這樣的話，能決定電子底個體性的就要靠其它數量上不同的電子。因此，差異是自然法則，是存有學的必要。
page:46
Depth, where the subject is concerned has always been a metaphor, an expression of certain values - richness, diversity, possibility. However, because this "deep subject" was at the same time regarded as "pure immanence," as identity, these values could never become a fact.
深度，這個主體所關注的總是一個隱喻，表達某種價值 - 豐富生、多樣性、可能性。然而，因為"深度主體"同時也被視為"純內在"、同一性、這些不符實的價值。
Most important of all, the subject is made different by difference, "acquiring depth" through this polemical transcendence.
最重要的，主體乃由差異而變為不同，由爭論的超越而獲得深度。
page:47
Science in fact creates philosophy. The philosopher must therefore inflect his language so that it can express the supple, mobile character of contemporary thought. He must also respect that curious ambiguity which requires all scientific thinking to be translated at one and the same time into the language of realism and into that of rationalism.
事實上，是科學創造了哲學。因此，哲學家必須調整他底語言，好讓它能表達當代思維那靈活的、機動的特質。他也必須尊重那奇妙的模稜性，這要求所有的科學思維能同時被轉譯成實在論與理性主義的語言。
page:46
Science is a product of the human mind, a product which is in conformity with the laws of thought and which is also in accordance with the outside world.
科學是人類心智底產物，是與思維法則相符、亦與外在世界一致之產物。
page:50
there is now a kind of polemical generalization by virtue of which reason progresses from the question why? to the question why not? We shall make room for paralogy beside analogy; we shall show that in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of why not? has taken the place of the former philosophy of as if. In Nietzsche's words, anything that is decisive only comes into being in spite of. This is just as true in the realm of thought as it is in that of action. Every new truth comes into being in spite of the evidence, every new experiment is in spite of immediate experience.
現在有一種爭論的普遍化，藉此，理性由問為什麼？轉進到問為什麼不？我們除了類比之外也建立了形似論之可能；在科學哲學、在為何不之哲學、已取代了過去的宛似哲學。以尼采的話說，任何重要的事祇能變為不顧...之存有。在思維中的真實也如同在行動中的真實。新的真理已不管證據了，新的實驗也不顧直接經驗了。
page:53
Furthermore, it is perhaps in scientific activity that the two aspects of the ideal of objectivity are most clear, that is , the real and social value of objectivation.
很清楚地，所謂客觀性，在科學活動裡，具有兩個層面，真實的與社會的價值。
the aim of science is not simply "the assimilation of one thing and another, but first and foremost the assimilation of one mind and another." Without this assimilation, there would, in a manner of speaking, be no problem...the world would be our representation.
科學底目標不僅是要同化事物，更重要的是同化彼此的心智。"不妨說，沒有同化就沒難題...世界是我們底表象。
if, on the other hand, we were entirely dependent upon society, we should seek knowledge in the general, the useful, the accept: the world would be our convention.
另一方面，如果我們全依賴於社會，我們就會尋求普遍的、實用的、大家可接受的知識: 世界是我們底協定。
In actual fact, scientific truth is predictive...linking thought to experience in verification: the scientific world is, therefore, our verification. Modern science is founded upon the project, above the subject and beyond the immediate object.
實際上，科學真理是可預測的...思維與經驗在檢證中串起來: 因此，科學世界是我們底檢證。現代科學奠基在籌劃，高於主體，超出直接對象。
page:55
nobody untrained in Geometry may enter my house.
沒受過幾何學訓練的人不准進入我底房子。
page:56
If the wax is changing, then I am changing; I change along with my sensation, for at the moment in which I think this sensation, it constitutes my entire thinking, for feeling is thinking in the widest Cartesian sense of the cogito.
若蜂蠟正改變，那我也改變；我隨著感官而變，因那時，我思維著感官，它構成我整個思維，勍廣義地以笛卡兒我思來看，感覺就是思維。
Yet Descartes secretly believes in the reality of the soul as substance. He is dazzled by the instantaneous light of the cogito and so he does not cast doubt on the permanence of the I that is the subject of I think.
然而，笛卡兒神秘地相信靈魂實體之實在性。瞬間的我思之光把他給弄暈了，使他不會對我思主體之我底持久性加以懷疑。
page:59
Scientific action is essentially complex. The active empiricism of science develops trough complex, factitious truths, and not through those that are clear and adventitious. Innate truths have, of course, no place in science. Reason has to be formed in exactly the same way that experience has to be formed.
科學行動本質上是複雜的。主動的科學經驗論之發展是透過複雜的、人為的真理，而非清晰的、偶發的真理。當然，在科學裡，先天真理毫無立場。理性是被建構的，這與經驗被建構乃如出一轍。
page:62
Cogito implies not identity, not continuity, but discontinuity, difference. Here, we are conscious of ourselves as project, as pure project, transcended not by the world, the not-self, but by our own self, by difference latent within us, by the other that is our self.
我思並不意謂著同一、連續，反是不連續，差異。此處，我們意識自身為一籌劃，一純粹的籌劃，不是被世界或非我所超越，而是被我們自身、潛在的差異、內在自身底他者、所超越。
page:62-63
In vertical time, we are truly free, truly ourselves; in the "dialectics of duration," we pursue a dialogue with ourselves, with a self that is ever renewed, ever different. This special kind of self-reference, which is dialectical, rhythmic, coherent, and cohesive, will, he believes, bring great repose.
在垂直時間裡，我們才是真自由，真的自己；在綿延之辯證中，我們追求與一個嶄新的、不同的自己之對話。這種特別的自我參照，是辯證的、節奏的、連貫的與內聚的，帶來了巨大的安息。
page:63
Bergson regarded dreams, where we are cut off from external things, as giving us privileged access to the “deep self,” to pure consciousness. Bachelard’s own dream does not reveal duration or continuity, but instead complex layers of time, and what he calls “temporal superimposition.” The continuity of waking life, of transitive time, is disrupted when we sleep; verbal and visual time are “disengaged,” shown to be independent and discontinuous.
夢，是使我們與外界事物得以隔離之所在，柏格森認為，夢讓我們有權得以探得『深層自我』與純粹意識。巴什拉底夢則不是緜延或連續的，而是複雜的時間層次，是他所謂的『時間的加載』。醒時與時間移轉之連續性在我們入睡時中斷了；言說的與視覺的時間是散開的，各自獨立、不連續。
page:63
Bergson argues…that there can be no néant, but only being, only fullness and duration, since in trying to imagine nothing, not only do we remain conscious of ourselves but we have to imagine something in order to annihilate it. Nothingness is therefore a “pseudo-idea”;…For Bergson, nothing is new, nothing is created, reality is fullness.
柏格森認為，沒有空無這種東西，祇有存有、充實與緜延，因為當你試圖想像空無時，不僅我們仍意識到自己，也想像了要虛無化的東西。因此，空無是一『假觀念』，…就格柏森而言，沒有什麼是新的、創造的，實在即是充實的。
page:64
To think is to negate, and since both consciousness and time are for Bachelard a function of thought, nothingness is fundamental to our being, not a flaw but a fact, an ontological necessity. It is the guarantee of progress, of becoming.
思維即否定，就巴什拉來說，意識與時間皆是思維底功能，空無是我們存有底基礎，不是瑕疵而是事實，是一存有學的必須，是進步與生成之保證。
page:64
“rhythm analysis” is an form of psychotherapy, aiming to cure disturbed people by renewing their awareness of natural or biological rhythms. It differs from and goes beyond psychoanalysis by trying to establish not just a balance between consciousness and the unconscious but a “double movement,” a rhythmic interchange between the two poles of the psyche. Furthermore, “rhythm analysis” is a theory based on modern physics, where matter is energy, temporal and rhythmic. Everything is rhythmic, says Bachelard, we walk on vibrations, sit on vibrations, live in vibrations, and are ourselves vibrations.
『韻律分析』是心理治療的一個形式，讓患者重新體會對自然與生物的韻動以獲得治療。這不同於也超出了心理分析，它不僅使意識與潛意識保持平衡，也形成一雙重運動、在心理上兩極間的韻律互動。再說，韻律分析是基於現代物理之理論，物質即能量、時間與韻律。凡事皆韻律，巴什拉說，我們走在擺動上、坐在擺動上、活在擺動中，我們本身就是擺動。
page:64
Bachelard suggests that poetry can help us achieve this restful, vibrant self-reference. He is concerned not at all with the meaning of poetry, but only with the effect of poetry on the reader. Poetry is presented as a structure of ambiguity, and reading a poem as experiencing this ambiguity, superimposing images and interpretations.
巴什拉以為，詩有助於我們達到休息與擺盪的自我參照。他並不關心詩底意義，而關注於詩對於讀者之影響。詩所呈現之結構之模稜兩可的，讀詩即是去體驗這模糊性、加載的影像與詮釋。
page:65
It is the reader who chooses between the different meanings of an image, poetry also offers him the experience of creative self-reference. When we read a poem in this way, we accede to pure consciousness, to that active, vibrant repose which is pure project. The poet, like the mathematician, frees us from the prison of the conventional and the identical, so releasing us into difference, into an openness of being.
正是讀者他能在同一個影像選取不同的意義，詩也提供讀者一個創造的自我參照之體驗。當我們以這種方式閱讀一首詩，我們就加入了純粹意識、那個活動的、攞盪的、純籌劃的安息。詩人，像數學家，使我們脫離了傳統與同一的約束，使我們在差異中、存有底開放性中得到解放。
page:66-67
Reality makes what we see wait for what we say, and as a result of this we have objectively coherent thought, a simple superimposition of two terms which mutually confirm one another and usually suffice to give an impression of objectivity. We say what we see; we think what we say: time is truly vertical and yet it flows, too, along its horizontal course, bearing with it the different forms of our psychic duration, all according to the same rhythm. Dreaming is the very reverse of this, for it disengages these different kinds of superimposed time.
實在讓我們所見的去等待所說的，因此，我們客觀地有了一貫的思維，加載了兩個項目，彼此相互確認、能提供客觀性之印象。我們說出我們所看的；我們思維我們所說的：時間真的是垂直的，它也延著水平路線流動，承載著心理緜延的不同形式，全都根劇同一個韻律。夢則相當不同於此，因它將這些不同種類的加載時間給拆散了。
page:67
The most general and the most metaphysical method of approach would be to build up tiers of different kinds of cogito…which will put in the place of I think, therefore I am the affirmation that I think that I think, therefore I am.
最普遍也最形上的方法是建立不同層次的我思…把『我思故我在』替換成『我思我思之物故我在』。
page:68
Being is really and truly self-concerned, that is to say, the value of repose. Here, thought would rest upon itself alone. I think the I think would become the I think the I, this being synonymous with I am the I. This tautology is a guarantee of instantaneity.
存有真真實實地是自我關照，這就是說，安息底價值。此處，思維僅靠自己。我思我所思就成為我思這個我，意即我就是我。這樣同語反覆是瞬間性之保證。
page:69
We consider that if (cogito)1 is implied by efficient causes, then (cogito)2 can be ascribed to final causes, since if we act with an end in view, we are acting with a thought in view, while being at the same time conscious that we are thinking that thought. Only with (cogito)3 will we find formal causality in all its purity. This division into things, aims, and forms will of course seem artificial to any linear psychology that seeks to place all entities on the same level…If we take Schopenhauer’s fundamental axiom as our starting point and say that the world is my representation, then it is acceptable to attribute ends to the representation of representation, while forms that are constituted in those mental activities which imply both things and ends must be attributed to the representation of the representation of representation.
我們以為，若第一層我思意謂著動力因，那第二層我思就能歸到目的因，因為倘若我們以目的觀點來看，我們就正在以思維觀點來看，同時，存有意識到我們正在思考思維。祇有在第三層我思之淨化中，我們可發現到形式因。事物、目的、形式、這樣的區分當然對線性心理學來說太過造作了，它是要把所有的東西放在同一個層次上。…若我們拿叔本華底箴言做為起始點，說『世界是我底表象』，那麼，把目的歸給『表象之表象』就可被接受了。當心靈活動建構了蘊含事物與目的之形式，這個形式必得歸給表象之表象之表象。
page:70
We shall then no longer determine our own being by referring to things or even to thoughts, but rather by reference to the form of a thought. Mental and spiritual life will become pure aesthetics.
我們將不再以參照事物甚至思維，而是參照思維底形式，來決定我們自身底存有。心靈與精神生活將成為純美學。
page:70
What we need, then, is some kind of rational coherence to replace material cohesion. In other words, if we would like there to be a purely aesthetic kind of thought, we must transcend the dialectics of time by means of forms, by means of the attraction of one form to another. Were we to retain our ties with ordinary life and thought, this purely aesthetic activity would be entirely fortuitous, lacking any coherence or any duration.
我們所需要的是以某種理性的一貫性取代物質的一貫性。換言之，倘若我們想成為純美學式的思維，我們必須以形式間彼此之吸引為手段，以超越時間之辯證性。假若我們仍與和日常生活與思維保持聯繫，那這純美學活動將全是偶然的，缺乏任何一貫性或緜延。
page:71
We believe, however, that if human life is indeed placed in the framework of these natural rhythms, what we are determining is happiness, not thought. The mind needs a much closer pattern of reference points. If…intellectual life is to become the dominant form of life, physically speaking, with thought time prevailing over lived time, then we must devote all our efforts to the quest for an active repose that finds no satisfaction in what is freely bestowed by the hour and the season…this active, vibrant repose…he disturbs our calm and calms our disturbance, and moves from our heart to our mind, only to return at once from mind to heart.
總之我們相信，如果人底生活確是置於自然韻律底框架中，我們所決定的就是幸福而非思維。心智需要一更為貼近的參考點。若…理智生活為生活底主要形式，具體地講，就是思維時間勝過生活時間，那麼我們得盡一切努力去追求主動的安息，那個被任意安置在計時與季節中無法獲得滿足之安息…是主動的、擺盪的安息…他擾亂了我底平靜又平復了我底煩擾，從我底心靈走向心智，立刻又從心智返回心靈。
page:71
Lyricism should continue to be regarded as a purely physical charm, a myth that lulls us to sleep, a complex binding us to our past, to our youth and its impetuosity…which could well be called the Orpheus complex. This complex would correspond to our first and fundamental need to give pleasure and to offer solace; it would be revealed in the caresses of tender sympathy, and characterized by the attitude in which our being gains pleasure through the giving of pleasure, by the attitude of making some kind of offering. The Orpheus complex would be the exact antithesis of the Oedipus complex.
抒情主義應繼續被視為一個純肉體上的魅力、一篇哄我們入睡之神話、一種將我們與過去、與我們底年輕時代與衝動相繫的情結…這可謂之Orpheus情結。這個情結與我們最根本的需求相一致，去給出愉悅、提供撫慰；這將在温柔的共感生涯中顯露，藉由給出愉悅而獲得愉悅之態度、藉由能提供什麼之態度、來刻劃出來。Orpheus情結正可說是Oedipus情結之反證。
page:72
Rhythm analysis is the complete antithesis of Psychoanalysis in that it is a theory of childhood rediscovered, of childhood which remains a possibility for us always and opens a limitless future to our dreams…set out to explain the artist’s creative genius in terms of an eternal childhood. Creationism is, in fact, nothing other than the process of growing perpetually younger, and a method of systematic wonderment which helps us rediscover a pair of wondering eyes with which to look upon familiar sights. Every lyric state must originate in this truly enthusiastic knowledge. The child is our master…Childhood is the source of all our rhythms and it is in childhood that these rhythms are creative and formative. The adult must be rhythm analyzed in order that he may be restored to the discipline of that rhythmic activity to which he owes his own youth and its development.
韻律分析正是心理分析之反證，因為它是重新發現童年之理論，這個童年永遠為我們保留了可能性，為我們底夢開啟了不受限制的未來…藝術家底創造天分可解釋為永恆的童年。創造論，事實上，正是指那永遠在成長中的童年之過程，是一個使驚奇系統化之方法，幫助我們重新發現一雙驚奇的眼，用它來看待原本熟悉的景象。每一個抒情狀態必真正地原生於這熱忱的知識。孩童是我們底主人…童年是我們所有韻律之源，在童年中，這些韻律才是創造的、形式的。成人必須韻動分析，以便於他要回復到韻律活動之訓練上，在此，他欠自己一次年輕與發展。
page:73
Poetry is thus freed from the rule of habit, to become once again the model of rhythmic life and thought that it used to be, and so it offers us the best possible way of rhythm analyzing our mental life, in order that the mind may regain its mastery of the dialectics of duration.
詩脫離了習慣的規則，再次成為韻律生活與思維之模式，因此，它為我們底心靈生活進行韻律分析提供了一個最好的、可能的方式，以便心智能從緜延辯證中重新獲得主導地位。
page:79
Knowledge is won against previous knowledge – familiar ground again – but these past errors are now understood as other than purely scientific, as in fact psychological. The “three states” through which every scientist must progress – the concrete, the concrete-abstract, the abstract – may coexist, so that even the most mathematical of modern scientists can yield to “naïve curiosity” and “wonderment”. The scientist’s mind is not, Bachelard argues, tabula rasa, it is thoroughly prejudiced, marked by preconceived ideas and values.
知識是對舊知識之勝利－不能再熟悉的基礎－然而這些過去的錯誤現在並不認為是純科學的，而是心理學的。每個科學家皆經歷具體、具體－抽象、抽象、這共同存在之三態。因此，既使最數學式的現代科學家也會產生『天真的好奇』與『驚奇』。巴什拉提到，科學家底心智並非白板，它全然是帶著先前所信的觀念與價值之偏見。
page:79
Epistemological obstacles…: first…, immediate experience…; next…, ideas about the mystery of substance and of living things; then finally the most powerful epistemological obstacle of all, the libido, sexuality.
知識論障礙…：先是…立即的經驗…；再是…有關實體與生活事物之神秘觀念；最後也最夠力的知識論障礙，是力比多，性慾。
page:81
When we start looking for the psychological conditions in which scientific progress is made, we are very soon convinced that the problem of scientific knowledge must be posed in terms of obstacles…we shall see the cause of stagnation and even regression…we shall be able to discern the causes of inertia that we shall term epistemological obstacles…Whenever we look back and see the errors of our past, we discover truth through intellectual repentance.
當我們開始研究那促使科學進展之心理條件時，很快地我們相信，科學知識底問題必須以障礙之觀點來看…我們將看到造成停滯甚或倒退之原因…將能察覺到惰性的原因，我們稱之為知識論障礙…不論何時我們回顧且看到我們過去的錯誤，我們是透過理性的悔悟而發現真理的。
page:82
what we think we know very well will cast its shadow over what we ought to know. Even when it first approaches the cultural domain of science, the mind is never young. It is, in fact, rather old, as old as its prejudices. When we enter the realms of science, we grow intellectually younger, and we submit to a sudden, complete mutation that must contradict the past…
我們自認為非常瞭解的東西，它會在我們應該要去認識的東西上投下陰影。既使當它第一次接觸科學底文化領域，心智亦絕不年輕。事實上，它是老的，同它所持的偏見一樣老。當我們跨入科學領域，在理智上我們變年輕了，我們屈從於那個與過去相矛盾的、突然的、全然的靜默…
page:85
In our view, the fundamental principle of the pedagogics of the objective attitude is this: whoever is taught must teach. Any teaching that is received and not then passed on to others will produce a mind entirely devoid of dynamism and self-criticism…Most important of all, it fails to provide the psychological experience of human error.
依我們底觀點，客觀態度教育的根本原理是：被教的必須會教人。任何祇接受而不傳達給他人，這種教導將造成毫無機動力的、喪失自我批判力的心智…最重要的，它不能提供人性犯錯的心理經驗。
page:89
An objective discovery is at once a subjective rectification. If the object teaches me, then it modifies me. I ask that the chief benefit the object brings should be an intellectual modification…I wish to know for the sake of knowing, never for the sake of using…Certainly, the world will often resist, the world will always resist, and the efforts of mathematics must be ever renewed, growing ever more flexible, and constantly rectified.
一個客觀的發現即是一個主觀的修正。若客體教了我什麼，那它就修飾了我。客體對我最主要的好處該是在理智上的修飾…我是為了認知而想要認知，不是為了實用…當然，世界經常反抗，也永遠反抗，而數學之努力必得不斷地更新、更具彈性與修正。
page:92
the poetic images that interest Bachelard are to do with objects; they are…centered on objects. He describes reverie – a synonym for imagination here – as objectively specific,…The polarity of scientific reason and poetic imagination is plainly not the simple opposition of objectivity and subjectivity. Poetry…should give us both a view of the world and the secret of a soul, a being and objects at one and the same time.
巴什拉所感興趣的詩的想像，是與對象有關的，它們是以對象為中心。他把夢想－此處與想像同義－描述具有客觀性，…科學理性與詩的想像，顯然地，這兩極並非是客觀與主觀的簡單對立。詩…應同時一次既帶給我們世界觀也帶給我們一個靈魂的、存有的、對象的奧秘。
page:95
poetic images belong to the zone of material reveries that precede contemplation. The word “reveries” here points up one of the problems he faces, the problem of finding words to express his conception of imagination. He distinguishes between rêve and rêverie, making rêverie synonymous with poetic imagination. Reverie is not mere daydreaming; it is more the free play of the mind around objects, “centered” on objects, unlike le rêve, the night dream, pure subjectivity, unconsciousness of the world.
詩的想像是屬於在靜觀之前所進行物質夢想的區域。夢想這個字點出了巴什拉所面對的問題，他要找一個字來表達他底想像概念。他區分了夜夢與夢想，讓夢想同義於詩的想像。夢想不僅是白日夢而已，它更是心智繞著對象轉的自由嬉戲。不像夜夢，是純主體性、僅處在潛意識的世界裡。
page:95
Bachelard’s polemic with Freud forces him to admit, against himself, that it is not just thought that rules our being, that science is only one aspect of our relationship with matter. Freud also helps him to understand, against Bergson, that man is created by desire, not by need, by what Bachelard interprets as his desire to know, rather than, as Bergson argued, by his sense of the usefulness, the practical advantages of scientific knowledge.
巴什拉與弗洛依德之爭，迫使他也反對了自己，承認了統治我們的不僅祇有思維，科學也不是我們與物質的唯一關係。弗洛依德也幫了他對抗柏格森，瞭解到人是由欲望而非由需要所造的。這是巴什拉所指的求知欲，而非柏格森所指的，科學知識之實用性與實用的好處。
page:100-101
Primitive poetry must create its language, it must always be accompanied by the creation of a language, and thus it may well be hampered by the language that has already been learned. Poetic reverie itself will soon turn into scholarly reverie, that is to say, into the reverie learned in the schoolroom. We must rid ourselves of books and of teachers if we are to rediscover poetic primitivity.
原始詩必須創造出它底語言，它必須永遠伴隨著語言之創造，這樣，它就會受到既有語言之妨礙。詩的夢想本身很快地就會轉成學校的夢想，也就是說，轉成在學校所習的夢想。倘若我們要重新發現詩底原始性，那我們須擺脫書本與教師。
page:101
The basic theorem of projective geometry is as follows: what elements of a geometric form can , with impunity, be deformed in a projection in such a way that geometric coherence remains? The basic theorem of projective poetry is as follows: what elements of a poetic form can, with impunity, be deformed by a metaphor in such a way that poetic coherence remain? In other words, what are the limits of formal causality?
投影幾何學底基本理論是：幾何造形中，可有什麼要素在投影區可予以變形而使幾何圖形仍保有聯貫性、安然無恙？投影詩學底基本理論是：詩底形式，可有什麼要素能藉由隱喻予以變形而使詩仍保有聯貫性？換言之，形式因之極限是什麼？
page:101
Once we have thought for a while about the freedom and the limits of metaphor, we realize that certain poetic images are projected onto each other, with precision and accuracy, which means, in fact, that in projective poetry they are one and the same image. To take an example…”images” of inner fire, of hidden fire, of the fire that smolders beneath the ashes, of , in short, all unseen fire which, because it is unseen, requires metaphor, are all of them “images” of life. The projective bond is so primitive here that images of life can be easily translated into images of fire and vice versa.
祇要我們想想關於隱喻底自由與限制，就會知道某些詩的想像相互投影著，分毫不差，這意謂著在投影詩學裡，它們是相同的一個想像。舉例來說…內部的火、隱藏的火、灰下悶燒的火，簡言之，所有看不見的火之想像，因它看不見，才需要隱喻，它們皆是生活之想像。在此，投影之聯繫是那麼地原始，生活之想像能輕易地轉譯為火之想像，反之亦然。
page:102
From the union of water and earth comes a kind of soft paste, which is in fact one of materialism’s basic schemata…in which form is driven out, erased, and dissolved…since intuition has lost its preoccupation with form. The problem of form is now secondary. This soft pasty substance will give us our very first experience of matter.
從水與土之結合，形成一糊狀物，事實上，那是唯物論底基本圖示…在此，形式被排除了、刪掉了、融解了…因為直覺已失去了對形式之先佔性。形式之問題是次要的了。糊狀物底實體將帶給我們對物質之最初體驗。
page:102
It is no surprise, then, that water should be dreamed in its active ambivalence. There can be no reverie without ambivalence, and no ambivalence without reverie. Our dreams of water are centered by turns upon its power to soften and its power to agglomerate. Water unbinds and water binds.
不必奇怪，水應在它活動的雙面性格被夢想。沒有無雙面性格之夢想，也沒有無夢想之雙面性格。將水之夢置於中央，水底力量即是柔軟的亦是結塊的，是解放亦是繫結。
page:103
If it were possible to make a systemic study of these soft dreams, we should discover and come to know a mesomorphic imagination, that is to say, an imagination intermediate between formal imagination and material imagination. In a mesomorphic dream…objects take on a form and then they lose it…The soft, sticky object…is…indicative of the greatest ontological density of oneiric life.
如果有可能對柔軟夢境做系統的研究，我們應可發現並認識到一個中間形式的想像，也就是說，一個介於形式與質料之間的想像。處在中間形式夢境中…對象獲得了形式又失去了它…這既軟又黏的東西…顯示了夢境生活中存有學上最大的黏稠度。
page:103-104
The eye itself, pure vision, grows weary of solids. Its great wish is to dream deformation…then everything would be fluid in an intuition that was truly alive. Salvador Dali’s “soft watches” flow and drip over the table’s edge. They live in a sticky space-time…In Dali’s words, the soft watch is flesh, it is “brawn.”
眼睛本身，純視覺，厭倦了固體。它渴望著去夢想變形…這樣，在活生生的直覺中，凡事都成了流體。達利底軟鐘從桌緣流下。他們活在一個黏性的時空裡。…以達利的話說，軟鐘是肉體，是肌肉。
page:105
This adherence of water to matter cannot be understood if we limit ourselves to visual observation alone. To this we must add observation through touch…We shall thus be able to rectify the theory of homo faber, which is far too quick to assume an exact parallel between worker and geometer, between action and vision. We suggest, therefore, that both the remotest reverie and the harshest toil be reintegrated into the psychology of homo faber. The hand has its dreams, too, and its own hypotheses….The hand, then, helps us to dream matter.
倘若我們自限於僅以視覺觀察，就無法瞭解水對物質之黏著性。對此，我們須加入透過觸碰之觀察…我們將能修正『工作人』理論。它太快地假定了在勞動者與幾何學家、在行動與視覺之間是完全平行的。因此，我們建議，最遙遠的夢想與最粗糙的工具，兩者可整入『工作人』心理學。手有自己底夢和假設…手有助於我們去夢想物質。
page:105
This reverie…is necessarily in entire agreement with a particular kind of will to power, with the virile pleasure of penetrating substance, of touching the inward parts of substance, and coming to know what lies within the seed, conquering the earth from within, just as water conquers earth.
這個夢想…必然地完全同意那特別的一種權力意志，那陽剛性的喜悅、那滲透的實體、碰觸到實體底內部、並開始知道藏在種子裡面的是什麼，從內部來征服土地，正如水征服土一般。
page:105
A different kind of duration is now established in matter, a duration in which there is no interruption, no momentum, and no definite end in view. This duration is not therefore formed. It lacks the various stations of successive attempts at form, which we should find were we to consider work on solids.
現在，一種不同的緜延被建立在物質中，這個緜延，沒有中斷、沒有瞬間、也沒有明確的、看得見的目的。因此，這並非形式之緜延，它少了在形式中要有繼起的靜止狀態，我們才可以發現是否能以固體進行思考。
page:106
All real workers are those who have “lent a hand.” Theirs is an operative will, a manual will. This very special kind of will can be seen in the structure of our hands…If the Buddha has a hundred arms, it is because he handles and shapes matter. These soft pasty substances produce the dynamic hand which is almost the antithesis of the geometric hand of Bergson’s homo faber. This dynamic hand is no longer an organ of form but of energy. It symbolizes the imagination of force.
真正的勞動者是那些『借出一雙手』的人。他們所有的是操做意志、手工意志。這種特別的意志可從我們手底結構看出來。…若佛陀有上百雙手，那是因為他對物質有所掌握與塑造。這些軟泥實體產生了『動態手』，幾乎於柏格森工作人底『幾何手』正好對蹠。動態手不再是形式底器官，而是能量底器管。它象徵著力量之想像。
page:106
Any activity which involves handling some kind of soft paste will lead to the idea of a truly positive truly active material cause. What we have here is a natural projection…which carries all thought, all action, all reverie from man to things, from worker to his work. The theory of the Bergsonian homo faber can envisage the projection only of clear ideas. It has taken absolutely no notice of the projection of dreams. Crafts which carve and cut cannot teach us about matter in its inward, secret parts…The sculptor standing before his piece of marble is the punctilious servant of the formal cause…The modeler with his lump of clay finds form by deforming it, by the dreamy germination of the amorphous. It is the modeler who is closest to the inward, germinating dream.
任何投入在某種軟泥之活動都將導出真正積極的、主動的質料因。這裡我們所有的是自然的投射…把全部的思維、活動、夢想、從人投向事物，從勞動者投向作品。柏格森底工作人理論，可想成僅是清晰觀念之投射，它絕沒想到夢境之投射。雕刻品並不能教會我們在他內部、神秘部分底質料…雕刻家，佇立在大理石前，是位小心翼翼的、形式因底僕人…而帶著一塊黏土的塑模家，是由變形、由無形無狀的夢境成長、來發現形式。最接近內在的、成長夢境的、就是塑模家。
page:109
This is in fact the peculiar characteristic of the new literary mind...in that it changes its level of imagery, rising or falling along an axis which runs, in both directions from the organic to the mental and spiritual, and is never content with just one plane of reality. Thus, the literary image is privileged in that it acts as both an image and an idea.
事實上，這是是新文學心智之特性...因為它改變了想像的層次，從有機的、心靈的、精神的軸道，雙向的上昇又下降，它絕不會滿足於實在界底單一層面。這樣，文學心智就是不同於一般的，因為它既在想像又在觀念間活動。
page:110-111
Poetic imagination is not for Bachelard frivolous escapism, from which we must come smartly back to reality...Imagination...is a faculty of superhumanity. Man is man in proportion as he is superman. Man should be defined by the group of tendencies that drive him to go beyond the human condition.
詩的想像，對巴什拉來說，並非混吃等死的逃避主義，然後再巧妙地返回現實...想像...是超人文的能力。人某種程度上可說是超人。人藉由一群傾向而該被定義為趨使自己超出人性底條件者。
page:114
We must remember Bachelard's attitude to literary criticism. What disturbed him was...that he reduces the work to the terms of his judgment, that is to say the work has to fit into a preexisting framework of ideas; it is perceived through the grid of what is already knows, so that anything new or different is suppressed. Chief among the critic's preconceptions is that the work mirrors the life, that he must therefore in judging it reduce the work to the life.
我們必須記住巴什拉對文學批評之態度。讓他心煩的是...詩評者將作品還原成判斷語詞，意即，作品必得符合先在的觀念框架；知覺到那些早就知道的東西，因此，任何新的、不同的東西都受到壓迫。詩評者主要的想法是，作品反映了生活，因此他必須將作品還原到生活。
page:114
For Bachelard, this is illogical; it forgets the simple fact that poems - and indeed all literature, all works of art - have been created, that they imply a fundamental break with life: "the work of genius...is the antithesis of life".
對巴什拉來說，這是不合邏輯的；它忘了這個顯而易見的事實，詩-所有的文學與藝術品-已被創造出來，它們意謂著與生活根本的斷裂：『天才底作品...是生活之反證』。
page:115
poetry is language, and more especially new language...the function of poetry is to give new life to language by creating new images...Creation...always signals a break; it is not repetition but rupture.language is polyphonic and polysemic...the desire for alterity, for double meaning, for metaphor.
詩即語言，且是特殊的新語言...詩底功能是要藉由創造新的想像來為語言帶來新的生命。...創造...總是象徵著斷裂；它不是重覆而是分裂。語言是複音的，多義的...欲求著它者、雙重意義、與隱喻。
page:116
Bachelard's..."consciousness of language" is not, though, an experience of decentering; it does not lead to a denial of the reading subject. On the contrary, Bachelard always insists that the poet must create his reader, that the chief function of poetry is to transform us.
巴什拉底...『語意意識』並非是去中心之經驗；也不會導致對閱讀主體之否定。反之，巴什拉總是堅持詩人必須創造他底讀者，詩底主要功能是要讓我們變化氣質。
page:119
If we imagine Narcissus as standing in front of a mirror, then the resistance of mirror and metal will bar his way in whatever he tries to do...if he walks right round it, he will find nothing at all. The mirror is the prison of a distant world that eludes him, a world in which he can see himself without being able to grasp hold of himself, a world which is separated from him by a false distance that he can diminish but not overcome. The spring is, however, the very opposite, for it is a path that lies open before him.
假若我們設想Narcissus是站在鏡子前面，那麼，鏡子和金屬之阻抗將會阻礙任何他想去的地方。...倘若他順道而行，那他什麼都找不到。鏡子是一個遙遠世界之監獄，這個世界逃離了他、他能看到自己卻無法掌握自己，這個世界與他隔開了，他們之間存在著一能縮小卻不能克服的假距離。然而，泉水則正相反，因它在他面前，是一開放之途徑。
page:119-120
the spring's mirror offers, then, an opportunity for open imagination. Its rather imprecise and pale reflections suggest something idealized. As Narcissus gazes into the water reflecting his image, he feels that his beauty is continued, that it is not yet complete, that it must indeed be continued.
泉水之鏡為開放的想像提供了一個機會。它頗為不精準的、蒼白的倒影暗示了理想化的東西。當Narcissus凝視倒影之水，他感到他底美正在持續著，它尚未完成，它真得繼續下去。
page:121
Narcissus goes, then, to the secret spring...Only there can he fell that he is naturally doubled; he opens his arms, plunging his hands into his own image, and speaks to his own voice. Echo is not a nymph who dwells afar. She is within the spring. She is always with Narcissus. She is Narcissus. She has his voice. She has his face. He does not hear her in a great shout. He first hears her in a faint murmuring, the murmuring of his own seductive voice, his seducer's voice. As he gazes upon the waters, Narcissus discovers his identity and his duality, he discovers his dual powers of masculinity and femininity, and above all, his reality and his ideality.
Narcissus走向了神秘的泉水...祇有在那兒，他才能感到他本然地雙重性；他展開手臂，將手投入自己底影像，向自己底聲音說話。Echo並非是住在遙遠的小仙女，她就在泉水下，永遠伴隨著Narcissus，她就是Narcissus。她有他底聲音，有他底長像。他在吵雜聲中聽不到她，他在昏暗低語中、在他自己充滿誘惑聲的低語中、在他作為引誘者底聲音中、才首次聽見。當他凝視著水，他發現了他底身分與雙重性，陰與陽之雙重力量，尤其是發現了他底實在性與理想性。
page:121
Narcissism is not, in fact, always a source of neurosis. It has also a positive part to play in art and, by means of rapid transpositions, in literature. Sublimation is not always the negation of a desire; it is not always to be seen as sublimation against instincts. It can well be sublimation for an ideal. Here, Narcissus will cease to say "I love myself as I am" and say instead "I am as I love myself." I am effervescently because I love myself fervently. I wish to appear, therefore I must adorn my appearance. Thus, life is made rich and strange, and overlaid with a thousand images. Life grows; it transforms being.
事實上，Narcissus並不總是神經衰弱之源，在藝術、文學上，藉著快速地換位，他也扮演著積極的部分。昇華並非總是對欲望之否定；對本能之抗拒。它更可以是為著理想之昇華。此處，Narcissus將不再說『我愛上那另一個自己』，而應說『我就是我所愛的自己』。我是如此興奮，因為我熱愛自己。我期望表現，因此我必須裝扮外表。如此，生活變得豐富與陌生，重疊著上千的想像。生命在成長；它轉變了存有。
page:124
Prometheus...who raises man to stand and confront Destiny...All Shelley's demands for social justice are present and active in is work. Nevertheless, the imagination...is always completely independent of any social commitment. Indeed, we are convinced that the real poetic force of Prometheus Unbound has absolutely nothing to do with any kind of social symbolism. The imagination is...more cosmic than social...this force of psychic elevation...is preeminently concrete.
Prometheus...祂高舉人類去面對命運...雪萊所有對社會正義底要求都在作品中表露無遺。雖然，想像...總是完全獨立於任何社會承諾，的確，我們相信，《Prometheus Unbound》其中真正詩的力量與任何一種社會象徵主義全然無關。想像是...比社會更為宇宙性的...這心理向上提升之力...顯然十分具體。
page:125
when Shelley tells us that "poetry is a mimetic art," we must understand that poetry imitates what it does not see: human life in its innermost depths. It imitates forces rather than movements...Poetry alone can bring to light the hidden forces of our mental and spiritual life. Poetry is, in Schopenhauer's sense of the word, the phenomenon of these psychic forces. Any truly poetic image will have something about it that makes it resemble a mental operation.
當雪萊告訴我們『詩是一個模仿的藝術』，我們得懂得詩是模仿它所看不見的：在它內心深處的人性生活。它模仿力量而非運動...唯有詩能為隱藏於我們心靈、精神生活裡的力量獲得光亮。詩是，以叔本華底意思說，心理力量之現象。任何真正詩的想像將會使它像一個心理運作。
page:125
The poet's task is to set images in motion with his light touch, and so ascertain that in them, the human mind is operating humanly, that these are human images, humanizing cosmic forces. We are led, then, to the cosmology of the human. Instead of living out naive anthropomorphism, man is restored to profound and fundamental forces. Now, mental life is characterized by its predominant operation: it desires to grow, to rise up. Its instinct is to seek the heights.
詩人底工作是要以他底輕觸使想像處於運動狀態，然後在其間確定人底心智是人性的運作，確定這些人底想像、人性化宇宙的力量，這樣就導出人性之宇宙論。不是要活在神人同形論，人要恢復那深切的、根本的力量。現在，所謂心靈生活，要以它所具有優卓越的運作來看：它欲求成長、提昇。它底本能是要去尋求高度。
page:126
If a single image in a poem fails to fulfill this function of conferring lightness, then the poem is brought to the ground, and man returns to slavery, bruised by his chains.
如果詩中有一想像無法實現提供輕盈的功能，那這首詩就被帶往大地，人返回了奴役狀態，被他底枷鎖弄得鼻青臉腫。
page:126
Love for mankind sets us above our own being and offers no more than a little further assistance to one whose constant desire is always to live above his own being, at the summit of being. Thus, imaginary levitation is very ready to receive all the metaphors of human greatness; however, the psychic realism of levitation has its own driving force, which is, in effect, internal. This is indeed the dynamic realism of an aerial psyche.
對人類之愛將我們置於我們自己底存有之上，也對那些總想活在他自己存有之上、達到存有巔峰之人，提供了些微的助益。這樣，想像的飄浮早就準備好接受所有人性偉大之隱喻；然而，這飄浮的心理實在論有它自己底趨力，意即內在之力。這確定空中心理之動力實在論。
page:134
When we read, we discover the possibility of a different language from the one we use in our everyday lives, and this consciousness of new language is not passive...the reader is made different by difference...is unfixed by language.
當我們閱讀，我們發現了和日常生活不一樣的語言之可能性。並且這新的語言意識並非被動...讀者是因著不同而變得不同的...藉著語言才不會給固定住。
page:134
The best way to ensure that we continue to be transformed by language is to write what we read, to unfix our own language actively in response to the poet's language. To read a poem...is to discover ourselves as subjects who are conscious of being transformed by an object, by difference, who are in turn conscious of our own possibilities, of difference in us, of openness. Reading not only reveals what we are, it restores us to ourselves. It has, for Bachelard, an ontological dimension;...Without the desire to read, we cease to be human, for we lack that essential, sustaining relationship with an unfixing object.
能保證我們仍不斷地受語言而變化之最好方式就是寫下我們所讀到的，不去固定我們自己底語言，才可相應於詩人底語言。讀一首詩...要去發現我們自己是那個能意識到自己因著客體、因著差異、而轉變之主體，能意識到自己底可能性、差異性、與開放性。閱讀不僅揭示了我們是什麼，它也恢復了我們自身。就巴什拉來說，它有一存有學向度；...缺乏了閱讀之欲，我們不再是人，因我們缺乏了與不固定對象的本質的、持續的關係。
page:136
The problem is not how to choose between the good or evil uses of science, but how to teach the "human value" of science, how to make people understand that human nature and indeed the very structure of our consciousness make scientific progress necessary and inevitable.
問題不在於如何挑選科學好的或不好的用途，而在於如何教導科學中底『人性價值』，如何讓人們瞭解是人性與意識結構才使科學成為必要而不可或缺的。
page:136
The phrase "applied rationalism"...He used this phrase...in order to underline the difference between the closed, a priori reason of traditional philosophy and reason in modern science, which, because it is always applied, not only reaches beyond itself but in doing so modifies itself, which is therefore polemical and open.
『應用的理性主義』這詞...他提及...是為了強調在傳統哲學底封閉的、先天的理性與在現代科學底理性兩者之不同，因它總是應用著，它不僅達到自己之外，也更新著自己，因此是可爭論的與開放的。
page:138
"regional rationalism,"...Rationalism in modern science is "fragmented"...electrical rationalism, mechanical rationalism, the rationalism of energy and of quantum mechanics in general...and the rationalism of color.Reason in twentieth-century science is shown once again to be a differentiating activity.
『區域理性主義』...理性主義在現代科學是『片斷的』...電子理性主義、機械理性主義、能量與普遍量子力學理性主義...及色彩理性主義。理性，在二十世紀科學，再次顯出差異性的活動。
page:139
I am not simply a being who thinks, but one who thinks about a problem, who is therefore consciousness of a problem...The problem to be solved "polarizes" consciousness; it determines the way we think, it restructures past knowledge, it redirects our thinking, and in a word, it changes us. Consciousness is more than "consciousness of a problem"; it is "consciousness of being changed by a problem," of the "mobilization" of our intellect.
我並不祇是思維之存有，更是個思考問題之人、是問題之意識。...被兩極化意識所處理之問題；它決定了我們底想法，它重構了過去的知識，重導我們底思維，換句話說，它改變了我們。意識不僅僅是『問題之意識』；它更是『被問題所改變之意識』、是我們理智所『動員』之意識。
page:139
The cogitamus therefore in fact precedes the cogito; it is the fundamental cogito of the rationalist subject. Without this cogito of mutual obligation, this cogito of obligatory mutual induction, my own thought is in doubt: cogitamus ergo sum..."coexistence precedes existence."
事實上，我思之物先於我思；它是理性主體底基本我思。少了這相互強制的我思，強制相互歸納之我思，那我自己底思維就陷入懷疑中。我思之物故我在...『共在先於存在』。
page:140
Our situation is therefore not contingent, nor is it absurd or gratuitous, but it is a situation we choose, that we produce, that we order and constantly reorder. Consequently, our situation is more than a "human reality"; it is a "social reality", it is for-us. A philosophy that seeks to pay attention to the facts must, in Bachelard's view, attend to the facts of modern science, and he is critical of Husserlian phenomenology in particular for failing to do so.
我們底情境不是偶發的，亦非荒謬或多此一舉的，它反是我們所揀選的、產生的、我們規範再規範的。因此，我們底情境超出了『人性實在』；它是『社會實在』，是『為-我們』。依巴什拉觀點，一個想要明此之哲學家，就得觸及現代科學，他也正依此批判胡塞爾現象學未能這麼做。
page:140
Coexistence...develops the idea of what he terms "the divided subject," or more accurately, "the divided thinking subject",...He begins by considering "reflection," thinking in general, and argues that it is an activity controlled by our awareness of other people. We "internalize" others, as it were, and our intellectual progress depends on this. Thinking involves more than dialogue between subject and object; it requires a dialogue, an argument with someone else.
共在...發展了他所謂『分裂主體』觀念，更正確地說，是『分裂思維主體』，...他開始思考『反思』，普遍思維，並認為那是受控於我們知曉他人之活動。我們將他人給『內在化』了，而我們理智過程則依賴於此。思維所含蓋的不祇是主客對話；它還需要與別人之對話與論爭。
page:141
The superego internalizes parents or some other authoritarian figure from our childhood; it is therefore dogmatic, historical, and entirely closed. There is no dialogue here;...Intellectual self-surveillance, on the other hand, judges the past; it is a process of rectification in which the roles are constantly reversed, the judge is swiftly judged, and the poles of the divided self are held close together so that their relationship is dialectical and open.
弗洛依德底超我是在童年時期將父母或其它權威者特徵予以內在化；因此它是教條的、歷史的、全然封閉的，沒有任何對話；...反之，理智之『自我-監督』則判斷過去的事；是校正之過程，在其中，角色不斷互換，判斷轉為被判斷，主體所分裂之兩極緊靠相依，有著辯證與開放的關係。
page:141
The divided, thinking subject must maintain and sustain its divisions through a rigorous process of self-surveillance...It marks the first break with ordinary experience, with obedience to facts,...(Surveillance)2 is in fact applied rationalism, "consciousness of the rigorous application of a method," the dialectic of reason and experiment, demanding therefore constant breaks with both reason and experiment. More rigorous and fragmented is the divided consciousness of (surveillance)3, for it breaks with the rational past, with method itself, and with the rules of reason. Last, Bachelard considers the possibility of (surveillance)4, suggesting that it lies beyond science in poetry. Reading poetry, we maser thought itself; we are conscious of ourselves breaking with thought and with life,...(Surveillance)4, though difficult to grasp, is a state of extreme self-consciousness, consciousness of a divided, fragmentary, momentary self. It is seldom attained, and most of us must be content with a lesser degree of self-surveillance.
分裂的思維主體必須透過嚴格的自我-監督過程來維繫保持著它的分裂。...第一次分裂是要與日常生活經驗分裂，不服從於生活事實，...第二層監督其實是應用的理性主義，要嚴格地運要方法，是理性與實驗之辯證，因此要求不斷地與理性與實驗分裂。更嚴刻也更片斷的是第三層監督的分裂意識，因它與理性的過去分裂，與方法本身分裂，與理性準則分裂。最後，巴什拉想到第四層監督之可能性，提出詩學來超出科學。讀詩，我們掌控了思想本身；我們意識到自身與思維斷裂、與生活斷裂，...第四層監督，雖難掌握，卻是極端的自我意識，分裂的、片斷的、瞬間的意識。它少被達致，大部分的我們滿足於較低層次的自我監督。
page:142
Applied rationalism here means thinking with others, consciousness of others, any desire to be "original," "unique," and "absolute" being,...in Bachelard's eyes foolhardy. He is now very much aware of what he calls the "socialization of truth," "the union of minds in the truth," stressing...that modern science means a community, a culture in which we are all of us situated, and from which we must all learn to benefit: we discover our psychological complexity, divided selves bound to others, and with them to that rectified reality inseparable from scientific reason.
應用理性主義在此意謂著想到他人，想到他人底意識，任何想到成為『原初的』『單一的』『絕對的』存有...巴什拉看來都太莽撞了。現在他很在意的是他所謂的『真理之社會化』『心智在真理中之結合』，強調...現代科學意謂著社群，意謂著我們所處的文化，從中我們得以習得：發現自己底心理情結，與他人相連的分裂自我，以他們來校正與科學理性不可分的實在界。
Bachelard was the inventor of the "epistemological break," the proponent of discontinuity.
把什拉是"知識論斷裂"之發明者，不連續之提議者。
Bachelard...rejected the primacy of lived experience and the conception of the founding, sovereign subject. He did not, though, believe that "man is dead." He redefined man; he reinterpreted the relationship between subject and object, examining human creativity in both science and poetry and placing considerable emphasis on language.
巴什拉...拒絕生活經驗之優位，也拒絕基礎的、統治的主體之概念。雖然他並不相信”人已死”。他重新定義人；重新詮釋主體與客體關係，在科學與詩中檢驗人底創造性，並特別關注語言。
as he declared in La philosophie du non (1940), that "two people must first contradict each other if they really wish to understand each other. Truth is the child of argument, not of fond affinity" (134).
如同他在《否定之哲學》(1940)中所宣稱的，”兩個人倘若真想要彼此瞭解，那他們首先必須是相互對立的”。真理乃爭論之子，而非建立在肯定上。(134)
page:4
Man who through the power of his reason and his imagination creates “a new nature.” In science and in poetry, Bachelard believes, “the world is conditioned by man’s provocation”.
人，透過理性與想像力，創造了一個新自然。巴什拉相信，在科學與詩裡，世界受制於人底招惹。
page:4-5
The matrix of Bachelard’s thought is twentieth-century science, the “new scientific mind” which he dates from 1905, from Einstein’s special theory of relativity…showing how science has undermined our familiar epistemologies, so that neither rationalism nor realism, idealism nor materialism will serve as philosophies adequate to twentieth-century science. The year 1905 saw the break not just with all previous science, but with all previous philosophy.
巴什拉底思維主體是二十世紀科學，他以1905年愛因斯坦底狹義相對論訂為”新科學精神”…顯示出科學如何已削弱了我們所熟悉的知識論，以致於，理性主義與實在論、唯心論與唯物論，都將不能做為滿足二十世紀科學之哲學。1905年不僅顯示著與所有之前的科學斷裂，也與所有之前的哲學斷裂。
page:5
Bachelard’s notion of the “epistemological break” is probably what is best known and most widely quoted from his work, yet those who borrow it – Foucault, Derrida, Althusser – fail to see that this epistemological break brings humanism in its train, a humanism which, in its turn, breaks with traditional humanism.
巴什拉底”知識論斷裂”也許是最為人所知與最廣為被引用之想法。然而曾借用此想法的這些人－福科、德希達、阿圖塞－皆未能看出這個知識論斷裂也含蓋了人文主義本身，它也與傳統斷裂了。
Both Descartes and Kant understood the rational subject in terms of this notion of reason as a priori and deductive. If …the rational subject…is not the unchanging center of all knowledge and experience.
笛卡兒與康德以先驗與演繹之看法來瞭解理性主體。然而…這理性主體…並非所有知識與經驗之中心。
Mathematics and technology together produce phenomena…these efforts of mathematization are so successful that reality crystallizes along the axes provided by human thought, and new phenomena are produced. Thus, mathematics forms the axis of discovery, and only mathematical expressions allow us to think phenomena. This mathematics…is nondeductive, non-Euclidean…so inaugurating the “new scientific mind.”
數學與科技共同產生現象…這些數學化之努力是如此成功，致使實在得沿著人性思維所刻劃的斧鑿來具體化，新的現象就此產生。這樣，數學形成了發現之軸，也祇有數學表示式能讓我們去思考現象。這數學…是非演繹的、非歐幾何的…開創了”新科學精神”。
page:6
First,…Einstein’s theories were not deduced from Newton’s…It is the end therefore of reason as a closed system of necessity. Second, reason is no longer governed by…the ideal of identification.
首先…愛因斯坦底理論並非從牛頓理論演繹而來…因此，它是作為必然的封閉系統理性之終結。其次，理性不再受理想的同一性所管理。
page:7
Man are made different by difference, that mathematician is changed by his mathematics: psychologically speaking, you cannot fail to note the reaction of the mathematical tool on the user of that tool…our minds growing more agile, more alert, dynamic, creative.
人藉著差異而造成不同，數學家因他底數學而改變：以心理學來講，你不能不注意到數學工具對使用工具之人的影響…我們底心靈變得更機動、靈敏、活力、創意。
He sets out a “non-Cartesian epistemology,” an epistemology that is not against but rather beyond Descartes…We can no longer say “I think therefore I am” but rather “I think difference, therefore I become different, and being different, I think new differences.” Bachelard subverts Cartesian rationalism, and consequently he subverts Kantian idealism. If our minds are changed by scientific knowledge of the world, then we can no longer argue with Kant that the laws of the world conform to the laws of man’s mind. Bachelard therefore proposes…a “discursive idealism” which he defines as “the clear reconstruction of the self in confrontation with the not-self…a sequence of essentially different constructions”. The rational subject is no longer sovereign, no longer autonomous, identical, and unchanging, but rather transcended, upheld, created and recreated by something other than itself, by the “non-self,” by the discursive, dialectical, dynamic interrelationship between reason and reality.
他提出”非笛卡兒知識論”，一種不是對立而是跨越笛卡兒之知識論…我們不能再說『我思故我在』而該說『我思維差異，因此我成為不同，做為一不同者，我思維新的差異』。巴什拉顛覆笛卡兒理性主義，然後他顛覆康德觀念論。倘若我們底心智被世界底科學知識所改變，那麼我們不能再以康德之見以為世界定律要符應人們心智底定律。因此，巴什拉提出…”散亂的觀念論”，意指自我面對非我之重建…是一系列的本質上不同的建構。理性主體不再統制、不再自律、同一與不變，而是由不同於己之物、由非我、由理性與實在之間散亂的、辨證的、動態的交互關係所超越、所支持、創造和再造。
page:8
Mathematics is the instrument of modern science, and more than this, mathematics is a language…An equation…is a structure of difference, the equals sign in fact establishing difference between the known and unknown…every word expresses first of all a differentiation, otherwise it would be confused with all other words…The language of mathematics, like all language, is a structure of difference; its symbols and operators are arbitrary and autonomous…The mathematician like the poet is in language…Mathematics creates difference in response to a rich reality.
數學是現代科學之工具，不僅如此，數學是一種語言…恆等式是一差異之結構，等號建立了已知與未知之間的差異…每個字尤其是表達出一差異，否則它將與其它字產生混淆。數學語言，像所有語言一樣，是一差異結構；它底符號與操作元是任意與自律的…數學家，同詩人般，處在語言中。…數學創立差異以回應這豐富的實在。
page:9
Consciousness for Bachelard is consciousness of the imbrication of subject and object. He therefore refuses Bergson’s distinction between the “superficial self” and the “deep self,” he refuses the idea of duration as continuity. Instead, consciousness is of difference.
就巴什拉而言，意識是主體與客體重疊之意體。因此，他拒絕柏格森”表層我”與”深層我”之區分，他拒絕作為連續緜延之觀念。反之，意識是有不同的。
page:10
Because of the mental revolutions that necessarily accompany scientific inventions, mankind is turning into a mutating species, or to put it more precisely, into a species that needs to mutate, that suffers if it does not change. From an intellectual point of view, man needs to need. For Bachelard, difference is an ontological necessity. Since ordinary life is under the rule of identity, the only way we can experience and sustain this difference in ourselves is by thinking about science or, alternatively, by reading a poem.
因著心靈革命，伴隨著科學發明，人類變成一突變物種，更正確地說，變成一須要突變之物種，若它沒改變可就麻煩了。從理性觀點來看，人須要去須要。對巴什拉來說，差異是存有學的需要。因著日常生活是處在同一性之管制下，我們唯一能經驗與維持自身底差異，祇有靠對科學思維或讀詩。
page:11
the reader is called upon to continue the writer's images, he is aware of being in a state of open imagination. Reading poetic images brings us "the experience of openness, of newness., new images, new language, new possibilities in the world and in ourselves.
讀者被召喚去繼續作者底想像，他發覺正處於開放的想像力狀態。閱讀詩的想像帶給我們開放的、嶄新的體驗，體驗到在世界與我們自身新的想像、語言、與新的可能。
What he brings to it is an attitude of mind, a willingness to accept and not reduce complexity, to take reading a poem seriously, as an aspect of our relationship with something other than ourselves.
他所帶給詩的是一種心靈上的態度，一種願意接受複雜性而不予以簡化，好好地讀一首詩，以做為我們與它者關係之一個面向。
page:11
What Bachelard reads is images, not ideas...He reads material and dynamic images, neither perceptual nor rational, nor expressive of lived experience...he rejects psychoanalysis, preferring phenomenology. He does so because psychoanalysis is reductive; it reduces images to the unconscious, the unconscious to lived experience, to infantile social experience in particular.
巴什拉所讀的是想像，不是觀念...他讀物質的與動態的想像，不是知覺的亦非理智的，也非生活經驗的表達...他拒絕心理分析，傾向現象學。如此做是因為心理分析是還原的；將想像給還原成潛意識，將潛意識還原成生活經驗，尤其是孩提時的社會經驗。
page:12
Bachelard's material images, in which man and matter are conjoined, spring from "the zone of material reverie that precedes contemplation". His approach is never the diagnostic approach of the psychoanalytical critic; he is really interested not in the poet but in what the poet does to him: "literary images which are correctly dynamized will dynamize the reader".
巴什拉底物質想像，人與物質結合在其中，那是從先於沈思之物質夢想區域所冒出來的。他的方法絕非心理分析批評的診斷方式；他真正在意的不是詩人而是詩人對他做了什麼：正確的充滿活力的文學想像將使讀者活力充沛。
page:12
Bachelard turns from psychoanalysis to phenomenology precisely because this offers a better account of reading. La poetque de l'espace (1957) and La Poetique de la reverie (1960) are concerned first and foremost with reading, with the reader's consciousness of new language, of what he calls "the ecstasy of new images". However, he modifies Husserl...insisting on the dynamic relationship between subject and object, so that the reader's consciousness is changed by what he reads...."through the newness of his images, the poet is always the source of language....a poetic image...becomes a new being in our own language, it expresses us by making us what it expresses...Here, expression creates being.
巴什拉從心理分析轉向現象學正因現象學能對閱讀提供較好的說明。空間詩學(1957)與夢想詩學(1960)首要地是關注閱讀、關注讀者對新語言之意識，即他所謂"新想像之沈醉"。然而，他修正了胡塞爾...堅持主體與客體之動態關係，因此，讀者底意識會隨著他的閱讀的而改變...透過詩人想像之新穎性，詩人總是語言之源...一個詩的想像...成為在我們自己底語言中一個新的存有，它使我們成為它所要表達之物來表達出我們...在此，表達創造了存有。
page:12
For Bachelard,...He never in fact reads a poem as a whole, as a structure of images, preferring to remain "on the level of separate images".
巴什拉從未把詩當做全體、想像的結構來讀，而傾向保持著分開想像之層次。
page:12-13
Bachelard presents a poem not as a cultural or linguistic phenomenon but as a personal experience. A poem is not something that confirms a preexisting body of knowledge, a theory or a hypothesis; it is "an explosive", a shattering and shaking of our foundations. When we read, we are in language, in language which is not our own....This language...opens our own language.
巴什拉並不把詩當作文化的或語言的現象，而是個人經驗。一首詩不是要確認先在於知識之物或確認一個理論、一個假定；它是對我們根基之探險、摧毀與撼動。當我們閱讀，我們處在語言中，在一個不屬於自己底語言中...這語言...開啟了我們自己底語言。
page:13
Poems are human realities...poems are written language...he makes this written language an experience not of "closure" but of "openness." For Bachelard, reading something that has been written is quite different from listening to someone speaking, for the simple reason that the spoken word imposes itself on us, requires our submission and our presence, whereas in the written word, read and slowly reread, "thoughts and dreams reverberate". The written word plays between the poles of subject and object; it interweaves and holds together ideas and dreams, the world and the poet, the text and the reader. In Bachelard's view, the language of poetry expresses at one and the same time both subject and object; it abolishes the frontiers of the internal and external worlds, making them reciprocal and interdependent....they exemplify our relations with the world, the imbrication of subject and object.
詩是人性實在...詩是書寫的語言...他把書寫的語言當做開放的而非封閉的經驗。對巴什拉來說，閱讀被寫下的東西與聽到某人說話是根本不一樣的。理由很簡單，說的話語會強加於我們身上，要求我們屈從與在場，然而，書寫的字，要求我們緩緩地一讀再讀，思維與夢回盪著。書寫的字處在主客兩極，將觀念與夢、世界與詩人、文本與讀者交錯在一起。廢除了內在與外在世界之藩籬，使能互惠、相互依賴...他們例證了我們與世界、主客重疊之關係。
page:13
Man's being is an unfixed being. All expression unfixes him. This is surely important. Man is unfixed by language, not decentered. The question is not whether language is outside us or inside us.
人是不能被固定下來的存有。所有的表達都使他不固定。當然這非常重要。人藉著語言而解脫，而非去中心化。這並不是語言在我們之內或之外的問題。
Metaphysics, Bachelard declares, is bedeviled with this simple opposition, with this simple geometric intuition. It fails to see the complex human fact...Man is the being that lies half open, so that inside and outside flow together and are inseparable.
巴什拉宣稱，形上學受著這簡單對立、幾何直覺之困擾。不能看出複雜人性之事實...人是半開之存有，因此，內與外合一不可分。
page:14
Man's being is a spiral. Here, in the spiral, there is movement...no center.
人是縲旋的。其中有一無中心之運動。
page:16
The knowing subject...is made by his knowledge, and since scientific knowledge is always progressing and changing, dynamic and open, the subject will share these characteristics. Scientific knowledge is both polemical and poetic.
認知主體...是由他底知識所造成的，也因為科學知識永遠在進步與改變，動態的與開放的，這主體也將享有這些特性。科學知識既是爭論的也是詩性的。
The subject is modified by the "non-self," the transcendent other that engages him in endless polemics. He both creates and is created by his knowledge of an external reality.
主體被非我所修正，超越的它者在無止盡的爭論中參與之事。他既創造也受造於外在世界的知識。
idealism...cannot account for the continual movement, the continual progress of scientific knowledge, for the fundamental incompleteness of knowledge which he takes to be an epistemological postulate.
觀念論...無法說明持續運動、科學知識的不斷進步、做為知識論設準之基礎知識底不完備性。
page:17
This epistemological break is a fact; it proves the openness of scientific knowledge and disproves idealism, along with the notion of reason as an a priori deductive system, entirely necessary and entirely closed, independent of any reality.
知識論斷裂肯定了科學知識底開放性，不贊成觀念論式的理性主張，如同先驗的演繹系統，完全地必然與封閉的、獨立於實在界的系統。
The reality that modern science describes is not a given reality, not a reality that lies waiting to be found, but rather...a reality we construct....this constructed reality is not reality-for-the-subject, but rather reality-against-the subject. His conception of the interdependence of mind and reality, of subject and object, does not imply their unity, their convergence, their merging, but on the contrary, their "minimum opposition,"...their difference.
現代科學所描述的實在界並不是那給予的世界，不是那等著去發現的世界，而是我們建構出的世界。...這個建構的實在界不是為主體而存的，而是與主體對抗的世界。他這心靈與實在、主與客相互依賴之概念並不意謂著它們之統一、集中或合併，相反地，意謂著它們最起碼的對立...與差異。
page:18
The knower is consequently always aware of a gap between what he knows and what there is to know, always aware therefore of difference, which he constantly strives to overcome only to find it again opposing him.
認知者察覺到在認識的與該要認識的之間永遠有一段差距，有差異，他不斷地努力去克服，並再次發現到相對立的東西。
William James and pragmatism...'s notion of usefulness of profitability as the criterion of truth he regards as quite untenable in modern science....Instead of success, Bachelard emphasizes failure and error: "error...is the driving force in knowledge", "science is an enigma which is ever reborn". We succeed in understanding something only to realize all that we yet fail to understand...which through verification and rectification seeks precision and certainty, only to discover its own error as it confronts a resistant, unknowable, inexhaustible reality. Pragmatism is...a version of idealism.
William James與實證主義...將有用性與效益性視為真理之準則，這在現代科學來看是站不住腳的...巴什拉不以成功，而去強調失敗與失誤："失誤...在知識上是趨動力"。"科學是曾經再生之謎"。我們唯有認知到不能完全理解，才能成功地瞭解到某些東西...那些透過檢證、修正以求精準與確實性，僅不過是發現它自身在面對一個反抗的、未知的、無止盡的世界時之失誤。實證主義...是觀念論之另一版本而已。
page:19
Error...is an inevitable and indeed essential part of knowledge...the phenomenon is absolutely inseparable from the conditions of its detection. According to Heisenberg's principle, scientists cannot through experiment determine with exactitude both the position and the velocity of a subatomic particle, for when one is measured, the other is disturbed.
失誤...是不可避免且是知識底本質部分...現象絕對是與其偵測條件不可分的。根據海森堡底測不準原理，科學家無法由實驗正確地決定次原粒子底位置與速度，因為當這個被量到了，那個就被干擾了。
page:29
a reality which is not found but conquered. Consequently...we are no longer in a lived but in a thought world.
實在界不是被發現的，而是被征服的。因此...我們不再處於一生活的世界而在一思維的世界。
Bergson, in Durée et simultanéité(1922), discusses Einstein’s theory and quite explicitly equates reality with what is observed, perceived, and lived. “Real” time is for him “lived time”; it has unity, and is not in any way affected by relativity theory.
柏格森在《緜延與同時》討論到愛因斯坦底理論，把所觀察到的、知覺到的、生活上的皆等同於實在。對他而言，真實的時間即生命時間，它有統一性，不受相對論所影響。
“We do not think real time,” Bergson declares in L’Évolution créatrice, “we live it”…the time I wait for a lump of sugar to dissolve is “my impatience,” my “duration”; it is therefore “lived” not “thought” time.
柏格森在創化論宣稱，我們並不思考時間，我們活出時間…當我等待方糖融化時，是我在焦燥、我緜延；因此它是生活的、不是思維的時間。
page:29-30
At the same time, Bergson seeks to ensure the possibility of objective experience through the coincidence of “my duration” with that of the universe, and of consciousness with “organic evolution”, by positing a “life force”, a “current of consciousness” in all matter.
同時，柏格森想要保證客觀經驗之可能性，他將『生命衝力』與『意識流』置於物質當中，使得『我底緜延』與這個宇宙、意識與『有機的進化』、相互一致。
page:30
Initially, in Bergson’s Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Time and Free Will), the idea of duration, of immediate consciousness, was developed in order to prove human freedom, in opposition to thought, to the “superficial self,”.held to be determined by the requirements of social and practical life.
在柏格森底《時間與自由意志》中，根本上，緜延、直接意識等觀念，是為了證明人性自由而發展的，以便反對被社會及現實生活需要所決定的思維與『表面自我』。
Bachelard argues, thought is not determined by the need for practical action. Instead, it is characterized by contingency, by the arbitrary and the possible, that is to say by freedom. There are no longer any grounds for dividing the subject as Bergson did, and as a result, consciousness and thought, and with them the subject and the object, must be brought together.
巴什拉認為，思維並不受到現實行動之需要所決定。反之，它有著偶發性、任意與可能性，此即意謂著自由。不再有任何理由像柏格森那樣去分裂主體，如此看來，意識與思維、主體與客體、必得合一了。
There is succession without distinction, mutual penetration, solidarity…Bergson uses music as a simile for duration, as a model of consciousness: the notes of a melody may follow one another, but we hear them as a whole, one note merging into another, inseparable, changing qualities.
依次繼起而無區分，相互滲透，糾結…柏格森用音樂類比緜延、意識模型，旋律的音節彼此跟隨，我們是以全體來欣賞它們的，音符併入另一個不可分的、變動的性質。
page:43
"Transcendence," Heidegger writes, "defines the nature of the subject, it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity...being a subject means being an existent in transcendence and as transcendence". He goes on to say that "we call world that towards which man as such operates a transcendence and we define transcendence a 'being-in-the-world'". Developing this. Heidegger explains that "transcendence means project of the world, in such a way that the projecting being thus penetrated is as if traversed by the existent that he goes beyond, that "man founds (creates) the world only in so far as he founds himself in the midst of existence".
海德格寫道，"超越定義了主體底本性，它是主體性底基本結構...成為一個主體意謂著成為一個在超越中之存在者、與作為超越之存在者"。他繼續說道，"我們喚世界為人們要進行超越所朝向之處，我們把超越定義為"在世存有"。海德格解釋道，超越意謂著世界之籌劃，這樣的話，那滲入籌劃的存有如同被他跨出的存在者所跨越，人僅在存在中建立他自身來建立世界。
page:44-45
When he declares that the subject who thinks about an object acquires depth, he is going beyond Descartes, in fact, and the word "depth" is an important indicator of the non-Cartesian, Bachelardian cogito.
當巴什拉宣稱，思維客體之主體獲得深度，他就跨出了笛卡兒，事實上，"深度"這個詞是對非笛卡兒、巴什拉式我思、一個重要指標。
Reason for Bachelard is always "applied," always "transcendence" and "project." The Bachelardian cogito is therefore not solitary but dialectical: "T think about reality" because it is reality that makes me think.
理性，對巴什拉而言，總是"應用的"、"超越的"、與"籌劃的"。因此，這巴什拉式我思並非孤獨的而是辯證的: "我思維實在"因那是讓我思維之實在"。
page:45
The thinking subject's depth is proportional to the depth of the object that is thought.
思維主體底深度與被思維客體底深度是成比例的。
Matter has no "inside," no "depth" because it is not spatial but temporal and discontinuous, because it is rather than has energy. Pauli's exclusion principle is given particular importance by Bachelard because it puts an end to the idea that the "depth" of substance determines material properties...according to the exclusion principle no two electrons can have the same set of four quantum numbers, it follows that what determines one electron's individuality is other electrons, numerical difference. Difference is therefore a law of nature, an ontological necessity.
物質並無"內部"，無"深度"，因為它不是空間的而是時間的且是不連續的，因為它不是擁有能量而它就是能量。波里底排除原則對巴什拉尤為重要，因它終結了以實體底"深度"去決定物質底性質這種觀念。...根據排除原則，兩個電子不能共有同一組四個量子數，這樣的話，能決定電子底個體性的就要靠其它數量上不同的電子。因此，差異是自然法則，是存有學的必要。
page:46
Depth, where the subject is concerned has always been a metaphor, an expression of certain values - richness, diversity, possibility. However, because this "deep subject" was at the same time regarded as "pure immanence," as identity, these values could never become a fact.
深度，這個主體所關注的總是一個隱喻，表達某種價值 - 豐富生、多樣性、可能性。然而，因為"深度主體"同時也被視為"純內在"、同一性、這些不符實的價值。
Most important of all, the subject is made different by difference, "acquiring depth" through this polemical transcendence.
最重要的，主體乃由差異而變為不同，由爭論的超越而獲得深度。
page:47
Science in fact creates philosophy. The philosopher must therefore inflect his language so that it can express the supple, mobile character of contemporary thought. He must also respect that curious ambiguity which requires all scientific thinking to be translated at one and the same time into the language of realism and into that of rationalism.
事實上，是科學創造了哲學。因此，哲學家必須調整他底語言，好讓它能表達當代思維那靈活的、機動的特質。他也必須尊重那奇妙的模稜性，這要求所有的科學思維能同時被轉譯成實在論與理性主義的語言。
page:46
Science is a product of the human mind, a product which is in conformity with the laws of thought and which is also in accordance with the outside world.
科學是人類心智底產物，是與思維法則相符、亦與外在世界一致之產物。
page:50
there is now a kind of polemical generalization by virtue of which reason progresses from the question why? to the question why not? We shall make room for paralogy beside analogy; we shall show that in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of why not? has taken the place of the former philosophy of as if. In Nietzsche's words, anything that is decisive only comes into being in spite of. This is just as true in the realm of thought as it is in that of action. Every new truth comes into being in spite of the evidence, every new experiment is in spite of immediate experience.
現在有一種爭論的普遍化，藉此，理性由問為什麼？轉進到問為什麼不？我們除了類比之外也建立了形似論之可能；在科學哲學、在為何不之哲學、已取代了過去的宛似哲學。以尼采的話說，任何重要的事祇能變為不顧...之存有。在思維中的真實也如同在行動中的真實。新的真理已不管證據了，新的實驗也不顧直接經驗了。
page:53
Furthermore, it is perhaps in scientific activity that the two aspects of the ideal of objectivity are most clear, that is , the real and social value of objectivation.
很清楚地，所謂客觀性，在科學活動裡，具有兩個層面，真實的與社會的價值。
the aim of science is not simply "the assimilation of one thing and another, but first and foremost the assimilation of one mind and another." Without this assimilation, there would, in a manner of speaking, be no problem...the world would be our representation.
科學底目標不僅是要同化事物，更重要的是同化彼此的心智。"不妨說，沒有同化就沒難題...世界是我們底表象。
if, on the other hand, we were entirely dependent upon society, we should seek knowledge in the general, the useful, the accept: the world would be our convention.
另一方面，如果我們全依賴於社會，我們就會尋求普遍的、實用的、大家可接受的知識: 世界是我們底協定。
In actual fact, scientific truth is predictive...linking thought to experience in verification: the scientific world is, therefore, our verification. Modern science is founded upon the project, above the subject and beyond the immediate object.
實際上，科學真理是可預測的...思維與經驗在檢證中串起來: 因此，科學世界是我們底檢證。現代科學奠基在籌劃，高於主體，超出直接對象。
page:55
nobody untrained in Geometry may enter my house.
沒受過幾何學訓練的人不准進入我底房子。
page:56
If the wax is changing, then I am changing; I change along with my sensation, for at the moment in which I think this sensation, it constitutes my entire thinking, for feeling is thinking in the widest Cartesian sense of the cogito.
若蜂蠟正改變，那我也改變；我隨著感官而變，因那時，我思維著感官，它構成我整個思維，勍廣義地以笛卡兒我思來看，感覺就是思維。
Yet Descartes secretly believes in the reality of the soul as substance. He is dazzled by the instantaneous light of the cogito and so he does not cast doubt on the permanence of the I that is the subject of I think.
然而，笛卡兒神秘地相信靈魂實體之實在性。瞬間的我思之光把他給弄暈了，使他不會對我思主體之我底持久性加以懷疑。
page:59
Scientific action is essentially complex. The active empiricism of science develops trough complex, factitious truths, and not through those that are clear and adventitious. Innate truths have, of course, no place in science. Reason has to be formed in exactly the same way that experience has to be formed.
科學行動本質上是複雜的。主動的科學經驗論之發展是透過複雜的、人為的真理，而非清晰的、偶發的真理。當然，在科學裡，先天真理毫無立場。理性是被建構的，這與經驗被建構乃如出一轍。
page:62
Cogito implies not identity, not continuity, but discontinuity, difference. Here, we are conscious of ourselves as project, as pure project, transcended not by the world, the not-self, but by our own self, by difference latent within us, by the other that is our self.
我思並不意謂著同一、連續，反是不連續，差異。此處，我們意識自身為一籌劃，一純粹的籌劃，不是被世界或非我所超越，而是被我們自身、潛在的差異、內在自身底他者、所超越。
page:62-63
In vertical time, we are truly free, truly ourselves; in the "dialectics of duration," we pursue a dialogue with ourselves, with a self that is ever renewed, ever different. This special kind of self-reference, which is dialectical, rhythmic, coherent, and cohesive, will, he believes, bring great repose.
在垂直時間裡，我們才是真自由，真的自己；在綿延之辯證中，我們追求與一個嶄新的、不同的自己之對話。這種特別的自我參照，是辯證的、節奏的、連貫的與內聚的，帶來了巨大的安息。
page:63
Bergson regarded dreams, where we are cut off from external things, as giving us privileged access to the “deep self,” to pure consciousness. Bachelard’s own dream does not reveal duration or continuity, but instead complex layers of time, and what he calls “temporal superimposition.” The continuity of waking life, of transitive time, is disrupted when we sleep; verbal and visual time are “disengaged,” shown to be independent and discontinuous.
夢，是使我們與外界事物得以隔離之所在，柏格森認為，夢讓我們有權得以探得『深層自我』與純粹意識。巴什拉底夢則不是緜延或連續的，而是複雜的時間層次，是他所謂的『時間的加載』。醒時與時間移轉之連續性在我們入睡時中斷了；言說的與視覺的時間是散開的，各自獨立、不連續。
page:63
Bergson argues…that there can be no néant, but only being, only fullness and duration, since in trying to imagine nothing, not only do we remain conscious of ourselves but we have to imagine something in order to annihilate it. Nothingness is therefore a “pseudo-idea”;…For Bergson, nothing is new, nothing is created, reality is fullness.
柏格森認為，沒有空無這種東西，祇有存有、充實與緜延，因為當你試圖想像空無時，不僅我們仍意識到自己，也想像了要虛無化的東西。因此，空無是一『假觀念』，…就格柏森而言，沒有什麼是新的、創造的，實在即是充實的。
page:64
To think is to negate, and since both consciousness and time are for Bachelard a function of thought, nothingness is fundamental to our being, not a flaw but a fact, an ontological necessity. It is the guarantee of progress, of becoming.
思維即否定，就巴什拉來說，意識與時間皆是思維底功能，空無是我們存有底基礎，不是瑕疵而是事實，是一存有學的必須，是進步與生成之保證。
page:64
“rhythm analysis” is an form of psychotherapy, aiming to cure disturbed people by renewing their awareness of natural or biological rhythms. It differs from and goes beyond psychoanalysis by trying to establish not just a balance between consciousness and the unconscious but a “double movement,” a rhythmic interchange between the two poles of the psyche. Furthermore, “rhythm analysis” is a theory based on modern physics, where matter is energy, temporal and rhythmic. Everything is rhythmic, says Bachelard, we walk on vibrations, sit on vibrations, live in vibrations, and are ourselves vibrations.
『韻律分析』是心理治療的一個形式，讓患者重新體會對自然與生物的韻動以獲得治療。這不同於也超出了心理分析，它不僅使意識與潛意識保持平衡，也形成一雙重運動、在心理上兩極間的韻律互動。再說，韻律分析是基於現代物理之理論，物質即能量、時間與韻律。凡事皆韻律，巴什拉說，我們走在擺動上、坐在擺動上、活在擺動中，我們本身就是擺動。
page:64
Bachelard suggests that poetry can help us achieve this restful, vibrant self-reference. He is concerned not at all with the meaning of poetry, but only with the effect of poetry on the reader. Poetry is presented as a structure of ambiguity, and reading a poem as experiencing this ambiguity, superimposing images and interpretations.
巴什拉以為，詩有助於我們達到休息與擺盪的自我參照。他並不關心詩底意義，而關注於詩對於讀者之影響。詩所呈現之結構之模稜兩可的，讀詩即是去體驗這模糊性、加載的影像與詮釋。
page:65
It is the reader who chooses between the different meanings of an image, poetry also offers him the experience of creative self-reference. When we read a poem in this way, we accede to pure consciousness, to that active, vibrant repose which is pure project. The poet, like the mathematician, frees us from the prison of the conventional and the identical, so releasing us into difference, into an openness of being.
正是讀者他能在同一個影像選取不同的意義，詩也提供讀者一個創造的自我參照之體驗。當我們以這種方式閱讀一首詩，我們就加入了純粹意識、那個活動的、攞盪的、純籌劃的安息。詩人，像數學家，使我們脫離了傳統與同一的約束，使我們在差異中、存有底開放性中得到解放。
page:66-67
Reality makes what we see wait for what we say, and as a result of this we have objectively coherent thought, a simple superimposition of two terms which mutually confirm one another and usually suffice to give an impression of objectivity. We say what we see; we think what we say: time is truly vertical and yet it flows, too, along its horizontal course, bearing with it the different forms of our psychic duration, all according to the same rhythm. Dreaming is the very reverse of this, for it disengages these different kinds of superimposed time.
實在讓我們所見的去等待所說的，因此，我們客觀地有了一貫的思維，加載了兩個項目，彼此相互確認、能提供客觀性之印象。我們說出我們所看的；我們思維我們所說的：時間真的是垂直的，它也延著水平路線流動，承載著心理緜延的不同形式，全都根劇同一個韻律。夢則相當不同於此，因它將這些不同種類的加載時間給拆散了。
page:67
The most general and the most metaphysical method of approach would be to build up tiers of different kinds of cogito…which will put in the place of I think, therefore I am the affirmation that I think that I think, therefore I am.
最普遍也最形上的方法是建立不同層次的我思…把『我思故我在』替換成『我思我思之物故我在』。
page:68
Being is really and truly self-concerned, that is to say, the value of repose. Here, thought would rest upon itself alone. I think the I think would become the I think the I, this being synonymous with I am the I. This tautology is a guarantee of instantaneity.
存有真真實實地是自我關照，這就是說，安息底價值。此處，思維僅靠自己。我思我所思就成為我思這個我，意即我就是我。這樣同語反覆是瞬間性之保證。
page:69
We consider that if (cogito)1 is implied by efficient causes, then (cogito)2 can be ascribed to final causes, since if we act with an end in view, we are acting with a thought in view, while being at the same time conscious that we are thinking that thought. Only with (cogito)3 will we find formal causality in all its purity. This division into things, aims, and forms will of course seem artificial to any linear psychology that seeks to place all entities on the same level…If we take Schopenhauer’s fundamental axiom as our starting point and say that the world is my representation, then it is acceptable to attribute ends to the representation of representation, while forms that are constituted in those mental activities which imply both things and ends must be attributed to the representation of the representation of representation.
我們以為，若第一層我思意謂著動力因，那第二層我思就能歸到目的因，因為倘若我們以目的觀點來看，我們就正在以思維觀點來看，同時，存有意識到我們正在思考思維。祇有在第三層我思之淨化中，我們可發現到形式因。事物、目的、形式、這樣的區分當然對線性心理學來說太過造作了，它是要把所有的東西放在同一個層次上。…若我們拿叔本華底箴言做為起始點，說『世界是我底表象』，那麼，把目的歸給『表象之表象』就可被接受了。當心靈活動建構了蘊含事物與目的之形式，這個形式必得歸給表象之表象之表象。
page:70
We shall then no longer determine our own being by referring to things or even to thoughts, but rather by reference to the form of a thought. Mental and spiritual life will become pure aesthetics.
我們將不再以參照事物甚至思維，而是參照思維底形式，來決定我們自身底存有。心靈與精神生活將成為純美學。
page:70
What we need, then, is some kind of rational coherence to replace material cohesion. In other words, if we would like there to be a purely aesthetic kind of thought, we must transcend the dialectics of time by means of forms, by means of the attraction of one form to another. Were we to retain our ties with ordinary life and thought, this purely aesthetic activity would be entirely fortuitous, lacking any coherence or any duration.
我們所需要的是以某種理性的一貫性取代物質的一貫性。換言之，倘若我們想成為純美學式的思維，我們必須以形式間彼此之吸引為手段，以超越時間之辯證性。假若我們仍與和日常生活與思維保持聯繫，那這純美學活動將全是偶然的，缺乏任何一貫性或緜延。
page:71
We believe, however, that if human life is indeed placed in the framework of these natural rhythms, what we are determining is happiness, not thought. The mind needs a much closer pattern of reference points. If…intellectual life is to become the dominant form of life, physically speaking, with thought time prevailing over lived time, then we must devote all our efforts to the quest for an active repose that finds no satisfaction in what is freely bestowed by the hour and the season…this active, vibrant repose…he disturbs our calm and calms our disturbance, and moves from our heart to our mind, only to return at once from mind to heart.
總之我們相信，如果人底生活確是置於自然韻律底框架中，我們所決定的就是幸福而非思維。心智需要一更為貼近的參考點。若…理智生活為生活底主要形式，具體地講，就是思維時間勝過生活時間，那麼我們得盡一切努力去追求主動的安息，那個被任意安置在計時與季節中無法獲得滿足之安息…是主動的、擺盪的安息…他擾亂了我底平靜又平復了我底煩擾，從我底心靈走向心智，立刻又從心智返回心靈。
page:71
Lyricism should continue to be regarded as a purely physical charm, a myth that lulls us to sleep, a complex binding us to our past, to our youth and its impetuosity…which could well be called the Orpheus complex. This complex would correspond to our first and fundamental need to give pleasure and to offer solace; it would be revealed in the caresses of tender sympathy, and characterized by the attitude in which our being gains pleasure through the giving of pleasure, by the attitude of making some kind of offering. The Orpheus complex would be the exact antithesis of the Oedipus complex.
抒情主義應繼續被視為一個純肉體上的魅力、一篇哄我們入睡之神話、一種將我們與過去、與我們底年輕時代與衝動相繫的情結…這可謂之Orpheus情結。這個情結與我們最根本的需求相一致，去給出愉悅、提供撫慰；這將在温柔的共感生涯中顯露，藉由給出愉悅而獲得愉悅之態度、藉由能提供什麼之態度、來刻劃出來。Orpheus情結正可說是Oedipus情結之反證。
page:72
Rhythm analysis is the complete antithesis of Psychoanalysis in that it is a theory of childhood rediscovered, of childhood which remains a possibility for us always and opens a limitless future to our dreams…set out to explain the artist’s creative genius in terms of an eternal childhood. Creationism is, in fact, nothing other than the process of growing perpetually younger, and a method of systematic wonderment which helps us rediscover a pair of wondering eyes with which to look upon familiar sights. Every lyric state must originate in this truly enthusiastic knowledge. The child is our master…Childhood is the source of all our rhythms and it is in childhood that these rhythms are creative and formative. The adult must be rhythm analyzed in order that he may be restored to the discipline of that rhythmic activity to which he owes his own youth and its development.
韻律分析正是心理分析之反證，因為它是重新發現童年之理論，這個童年永遠為我們保留了可能性，為我們底夢開啟了不受限制的未來…藝術家底創造天分可解釋為永恆的童年。創造論，事實上，正是指那永遠在成長中的童年之過程，是一個使驚奇系統化之方法，幫助我們重新發現一雙驚奇的眼，用它來看待原本熟悉的景象。每一個抒情狀態必真正地原生於這熱忱的知識。孩童是我們底主人…童年是我們所有韻律之源，在童年中，這些韻律才是創造的、形式的。成人必須韻動分析，以便於他要回復到韻律活動之訓練上，在此，他欠自己一次年輕與發展。
page:73
Poetry is thus freed from the rule of habit, to become once again the model of rhythmic life and thought that it used to be, and so it offers us the best possible way of rhythm analyzing our mental life, in order that the mind may regain its mastery of the dialectics of duration.
詩脫離了習慣的規則，再次成為韻律生活與思維之模式，因此，它為我們底心靈生活進行韻律分析提供了一個最好的、可能的方式，以便心智能從緜延辯證中重新獲得主導地位。
page:79
Knowledge is won against previous knowledge – familiar ground again – but these past errors are now understood as other than purely scientific, as in fact psychological. The “three states” through which every scientist must progress – the concrete, the concrete-abstract, the abstract – may coexist, so that even the most mathematical of modern scientists can yield to “naïve curiosity” and “wonderment”. The scientist’s mind is not, Bachelard argues, tabula rasa, it is thoroughly prejudiced, marked by preconceived ideas and values.
知識是對舊知識之勝利－不能再熟悉的基礎－然而這些過去的錯誤現在並不認為是純科學的，而是心理學的。每個科學家皆經歷具體、具體－抽象、抽象、這共同存在之三態。因此，既使最數學式的現代科學家也會產生『天真的好奇』與『驚奇』。巴什拉提到，科學家底心智並非白板，它全然是帶著先前所信的觀念與價值之偏見。
page:79
Epistemological obstacles…: first…, immediate experience…; next…, ideas about the mystery of substance and of living things; then finally the most powerful epistemological obstacle of all, the libido, sexuality.
知識論障礙…：先是…立即的經驗…；再是…有關實體與生活事物之神秘觀念；最後也最夠力的知識論障礙，是力比多，性慾。
page:81
When we start looking for the psychological conditions in which scientific progress is made, we are very soon convinced that the problem of scientific knowledge must be posed in terms of obstacles…we shall see the cause of stagnation and even regression…we shall be able to discern the causes of inertia that we shall term epistemological obstacles…Whenever we look back and see the errors of our past, we discover truth through intellectual repentance.
當我們開始研究那促使科學進展之心理條件時，很快地我們相信，科學知識底問題必須以障礙之觀點來看…我們將看到造成停滯甚或倒退之原因…將能察覺到惰性的原因，我們稱之為知識論障礙…不論何時我們回顧且看到我們過去的錯誤，我們是透過理性的悔悟而發現真理的。
page:82
what we think we know very well will cast its shadow over what we ought to know. Even when it first approaches the cultural domain of science, the mind is never young. It is, in fact, rather old, as old as its prejudices. When we enter the realms of science, we grow intellectually younger, and we submit to a sudden, complete mutation that must contradict the past…
我們自認為非常瞭解的東西，它會在我們應該要去認識的東西上投下陰影。既使當它第一次接觸科學底文化領域，心智亦絕不年輕。事實上，它是老的，同它所持的偏見一樣老。當我們跨入科學領域，在理智上我們變年輕了，我們屈從於那個與過去相矛盾的、突然的、全然的靜默…
page:85
In our view, the fundamental principle of the pedagogics of the objective attitude is this: whoever is taught must teach. Any teaching that is received and not then passed on to others will produce a mind entirely devoid of dynamism and self-criticism…Most important of all, it fails to provide the psychological experience of human error.
依我們底觀點，客觀態度教育的根本原理是：被教的必須會教人。任何祇接受而不傳達給他人，這種教導將造成毫無機動力的、喪失自我批判力的心智…最重要的，它不能提供人性犯錯的心理經驗。
page:89
An objective discovery is at once a subjective rectification. If the object teaches me, then it modifies me. I ask that the chief benefit the object brings should be an intellectual modification…I wish to know for the sake of knowing, never for the sake of using…Certainly, the world will often resist, the world will always resist, and the efforts of mathematics must be ever renewed, growing ever more flexible, and constantly rectified.
一個客觀的發現即是一個主觀的修正。若客體教了我什麼，那它就修飾了我。客體對我最主要的好處該是在理智上的修飾…我是為了認知而想要認知，不是為了實用…當然，世界經常反抗，也永遠反抗，而數學之努力必得不斷地更新、更具彈性與修正。
page:92
the poetic images that interest Bachelard are to do with objects; they are…centered on objects. He describes reverie – a synonym for imagination here – as objectively specific,…The polarity of scientific reason and poetic imagination is plainly not the simple opposition of objectivity and subjectivity. Poetry…should give us both a view of the world and the secret of a soul, a being and objects at one and the same time.
巴什拉所感興趣的詩的想像，是與對象有關的，它們是以對象為中心。他把夢想－此處與想像同義－描述具有客觀性，…科學理性與詩的想像，顯然地，這兩極並非是客觀與主觀的簡單對立。詩…應同時一次既帶給我們世界觀也帶給我們一個靈魂的、存有的、對象的奧秘。
page:95
poetic images belong to the zone of material reveries that precede contemplation. The word “reveries” here points up one of the problems he faces, the problem of finding words to express his conception of imagination. He distinguishes between rêve and rêverie, making rêverie synonymous with poetic imagination. Reverie is not mere daydreaming; it is more the free play of the mind around objects, “centered” on objects, unlike le rêve, the night dream, pure subjectivity, unconsciousness of the world.
詩的想像是屬於在靜觀之前所進行物質夢想的區域。夢想這個字點出了巴什拉所面對的問題，他要找一個字來表達他底想像概念。他區分了夜夢與夢想，讓夢想同義於詩的想像。夢想不僅是白日夢而已，它更是心智繞著對象轉的自由嬉戲。不像夜夢，是純主體性、僅處在潛意識的世界裡。
page:95
Bachelard’s polemic with Freud forces him to admit, against himself, that it is not just thought that rules our being, that science is only one aspect of our relationship with matter. Freud also helps him to understand, against Bergson, that man is created by desire, not by need, by what Bachelard interprets as his desire to know, rather than, as Bergson argued, by his sense of the usefulness, the practical advantages of scientific knowledge.
巴什拉與弗洛依德之爭，迫使他也反對了自己，承認了統治我們的不僅祇有思維，科學也不是我們與物質的唯一關係。弗洛依德也幫了他對抗柏格森，瞭解到人是由欲望而非由需要所造的。這是巴什拉所指的求知欲，而非柏格森所指的，科學知識之實用性與實用的好處。
page:100-101
Primitive poetry must create its language, it must always be accompanied by the creation of a language, and thus it may well be hampered by the language that has already been learned. Poetic reverie itself will soon turn into scholarly reverie, that is to say, into the reverie learned in the schoolroom. We must rid ourselves of books and of teachers if we are to rediscover poetic primitivity.
原始詩必須創造出它底語言，它必須永遠伴隨著語言之創造，這樣，它就會受到既有語言之妨礙。詩的夢想本身很快地就會轉成學校的夢想，也就是說，轉成在學校所習的夢想。倘若我們要重新發現詩底原始性，那我們須擺脫書本與教師。
page:101
The basic theorem of projective geometry is as follows: what elements of a geometric form can , with impunity, be deformed in a projection in such a way that geometric coherence remains? The basic theorem of projective poetry is as follows: what elements of a poetic form can, with impunity, be deformed by a metaphor in such a way that poetic coherence remain? In other words, what are the limits of formal causality?
投影幾何學底基本理論是：幾何造形中，可有什麼要素在投影區可予以變形而使幾何圖形仍保有聯貫性、安然無恙？投影詩學底基本理論是：詩底形式，可有什麼要素能藉由隱喻予以變形而使詩仍保有聯貫性？換言之，形式因之極限是什麼？
page:101
Once we have thought for a while about the freedom and the limits of metaphor, we realize that certain poetic images are projected onto each other, with precision and accuracy, which means, in fact, that in projective poetry they are one and the same image. To take an example…”images” of inner fire, of hidden fire, of the fire that smolders beneath the ashes, of , in short, all unseen fire which, because it is unseen, requires metaphor, are all of them “images” of life. The projective bond is so primitive here that images of life can be easily translated into images of fire and vice versa.
祇要我們想想關於隱喻底自由與限制，就會知道某些詩的想像相互投影著，分毫不差，這意謂著在投影詩學裡，它們是相同的一個想像。舉例來說…內部的火、隱藏的火、灰下悶燒的火，簡言之，所有看不見的火之想像，因它看不見，才需要隱喻，它們皆是生活之想像。在此，投影之聯繫是那麼地原始，生活之想像能輕易地轉譯為火之想像，反之亦然。
page:102
From the union of water and earth comes a kind of soft paste, which is in fact one of materialism’s basic schemata…in which form is driven out, erased, and dissolved…since intuition has lost its preoccupation with form. The problem of form is now secondary. This soft pasty substance will give us our very first experience of matter.
從水與土之結合，形成一糊狀物，事實上，那是唯物論底基本圖示…在此，形式被排除了、刪掉了、融解了…因為直覺已失去了對形式之先佔性。形式之問題是次要的了。糊狀物底實體將帶給我們對物質之最初體驗。
page:102
It is no surprise, then, that water should be dreamed in its active ambivalence. There can be no reverie without ambivalence, and no ambivalence without reverie. Our dreams of water are centered by turns upon its power to soften and its power to agglomerate. Water unbinds and water binds.
不必奇怪，水應在它活動的雙面性格被夢想。沒有無雙面性格之夢想，也沒有無夢想之雙面性格。將水之夢置於中央，水底力量即是柔軟的亦是結塊的，是解放亦是繫結。
page:103
If it were possible to make a systemic study of these soft dreams, we should discover and come to know a mesomorphic imagination, that is to say, an imagination intermediate between formal imagination and material imagination. In a mesomorphic dream…objects take on a form and then they lose it…The soft, sticky object…is…indicative of the greatest ontological density of oneiric life.
如果有可能對柔軟夢境做系統的研究，我們應可發現並認識到一個中間形式的想像，也就是說，一個介於形式與質料之間的想像。處在中間形式夢境中…對象獲得了形式又失去了它…這既軟又黏的東西…顯示了夢境生活中存有學上最大的黏稠度。
page:103-104
The eye itself, pure vision, grows weary of solids. Its great wish is to dream deformation…then everything would be fluid in an intuition that was truly alive. Salvador Dali’s “soft watches” flow and drip over the table’s edge. They live in a sticky space-time…In Dali’s words, the soft watch is flesh, it is “brawn.”
眼睛本身，純視覺，厭倦了固體。它渴望著去夢想變形…這樣，在活生生的直覺中，凡事都成了流體。達利底軟鐘從桌緣流下。他們活在一個黏性的時空裡。…以達利的話說，軟鐘是肉體，是肌肉。
page:105
This adherence of water to matter cannot be understood if we limit ourselves to visual observation alone. To this we must add observation through touch…We shall thus be able to rectify the theory of homo faber, which is far too quick to assume an exact parallel between worker and geometer, between action and vision. We suggest, therefore, that both the remotest reverie and the harshest toil be reintegrated into the psychology of homo faber. The hand has its dreams, too, and its own hypotheses….The hand, then, helps us to dream matter.
倘若我們自限於僅以視覺觀察，就無法瞭解水對物質之黏著性。對此，我們須加入透過觸碰之觀察…我們將能修正『工作人』理論。它太快地假定了在勞動者與幾何學家、在行動與視覺之間是完全平行的。因此，我們建議，最遙遠的夢想與最粗糙的工具，兩者可整入『工作人』心理學。手有自己底夢和假設…手有助於我們去夢想物質。
page:105
This reverie…is necessarily in entire agreement with a particular kind of will to power, with the virile pleasure of penetrating substance, of touching the inward parts of substance, and coming to know what lies within the seed, conquering the earth from within, just as water conquers earth.
這個夢想…必然地完全同意那特別的一種權力意志，那陽剛性的喜悅、那滲透的實體、碰觸到實體底內部、並開始知道藏在種子裡面的是什麼，從內部來征服土地，正如水征服土一般。
page:105
A different kind of duration is now established in matter, a duration in which there is no interruption, no momentum, and no definite end in view. This duration is not therefore formed. It lacks the various stations of successive attempts at form, which we should find were we to consider work on solids.
現在，一種不同的緜延被建立在物質中，這個緜延，沒有中斷、沒有瞬間、也沒有明確的、看得見的目的。因此，這並非形式之緜延，它少了在形式中要有繼起的靜止狀態，我們才可以發現是否能以固體進行思考。
page:106
All real workers are those who have “lent a hand.” Theirs is an operative will, a manual will. This very special kind of will can be seen in the structure of our hands…If the Buddha has a hundred arms, it is because he handles and shapes matter. These soft pasty substances produce the dynamic hand which is almost the antithesis of the geometric hand of Bergson’s homo faber. This dynamic hand is no longer an organ of form but of energy. It symbolizes the imagination of force.
真正的勞動者是那些『借出一雙手』的人。他們所有的是操做意志、手工意志。這種特別的意志可從我們手底結構看出來。…若佛陀有上百雙手，那是因為他對物質有所掌握與塑造。這些軟泥實體產生了『動態手』，幾乎於柏格森工作人底『幾何手』正好對蹠。動態手不再是形式底器官，而是能量底器管。它象徵著力量之想像。
page:106
Any activity which involves handling some kind of soft paste will lead to the idea of a truly positive truly active material cause. What we have here is a natural projection…which carries all thought, all action, all reverie from man to things, from worker to his work. The theory of the Bergsonian homo faber can envisage the projection only of clear ideas. It has taken absolutely no notice of the projection of dreams. Crafts which carve and cut cannot teach us about matter in its inward, secret parts…The sculptor standing before his piece of marble is the punctilious servant of the formal cause…The modeler with his lump of clay finds form by deforming it, by the dreamy germination of the amorphous. It is the modeler who is closest to the inward, germinating dream.
任何投入在某種軟泥之活動都將導出真正積極的、主動的質料因。這裡我們所有的是自然的投射…把全部的思維、活動、夢想、從人投向事物，從勞動者投向作品。柏格森底工作人理論，可想成僅是清晰觀念之投射，它絕沒想到夢境之投射。雕刻品並不能教會我們在他內部、神秘部分底質料…雕刻家，佇立在大理石前，是位小心翼翼的、形式因底僕人…而帶著一塊黏土的塑模家，是由變形、由無形無狀的夢境成長、來發現形式。最接近內在的、成長夢境的、就是塑模家。
page:109
This is in fact the peculiar characteristic of the new literary mind...in that it changes its level of imagery, rising or falling along an axis which runs, in both directions from the organic to the mental and spiritual, and is never content with just one plane of reality. Thus, the literary image is privileged in that it acts as both an image and an idea.
事實上，這是是新文學心智之特性...因為它改變了想像的層次，從有機的、心靈的、精神的軸道，雙向的上昇又下降，它絕不會滿足於實在界底單一層面。這樣，文學心智就是不同於一般的，因為它既在想像又在觀念間活動。
page:110-111
Poetic imagination is not for Bachelard frivolous escapism, from which we must come smartly back to reality...Imagination...is a faculty of superhumanity. Man is man in proportion as he is superman. Man should be defined by the group of tendencies that drive him to go beyond the human condition.
詩的想像，對巴什拉來說，並非混吃等死的逃避主義，然後再巧妙地返回現實...想像...是超人文的能力。人某種程度上可說是超人。人藉由一群傾向而該被定義為趨使自己超出人性底條件者。
page:114
We must remember Bachelard's attitude to literary criticism. What disturbed him was...that he reduces the work to the terms of his judgment, that is to say the work has to fit into a preexisting framework of ideas; it is perceived through the grid of what is already knows, so that anything new or different is suppressed. Chief among the critic's preconceptions is that the work mirrors the life, that he must therefore in judging it reduce the work to the life.
我們必須記住巴什拉對文學批評之態度。讓他心煩的是...詩評者將作品還原成判斷語詞，意即，作品必得符合先在的觀念框架；知覺到那些早就知道的東西，因此，任何新的、不同的東西都受到壓迫。詩評者主要的想法是，作品反映了生活，因此他必須將作品還原到生活。
page:114
For Bachelard, this is illogical; it forgets the simple fact that poems - and indeed all literature, all works of art - have been created, that they imply a fundamental break with life: "the work of genius...is the antithesis of life".
對巴什拉來說，這是不合邏輯的；它忘了這個顯而易見的事實，詩-所有的文學與藝術品-已被創造出來，它們意謂著與生活根本的斷裂：『天才底作品...是生活之反證』。
page:115
poetry is language, and more especially new language...the function of poetry is to give new life to language by creating new images...Creation...always signals a break; it is not repetition but rupture.language is polyphonic and polysemic...the desire for alterity, for double meaning, for metaphor.
詩即語言，且是特殊的新語言...詩底功能是要藉由創造新的想像來為語言帶來新的生命。...創造...總是象徵著斷裂；它不是重覆而是分裂。語言是複音的，多義的...欲求著它者、雙重意義、與隱喻。
page:116
Bachelard's..."consciousness of language" is not, though, an experience of decentering; it does not lead to a denial of the reading subject. On the contrary, Bachelard always insists that the poet must create his reader, that the chief function of poetry is to transform us.
巴什拉底...『語意意識』並非是去中心之經驗；也不會導致對閱讀主體之否定。反之，巴什拉總是堅持詩人必須創造他底讀者，詩底主要功能是要讓我們變化氣質。
page:119
If we imagine Narcissus as standing in front of a mirror, then the resistance of mirror and metal will bar his way in whatever he tries to do...if he walks right round it, he will find nothing at all. The mirror is the prison of a distant world that eludes him, a world in which he can see himself without being able to grasp hold of himself, a world which is separated from him by a false distance that he can diminish but not overcome. The spring is, however, the very opposite, for it is a path that lies open before him.
假若我們設想Narcissus是站在鏡子前面，那麼，鏡子和金屬之阻抗將會阻礙任何他想去的地方。...倘若他順道而行，那他什麼都找不到。鏡子是一個遙遠世界之監獄，這個世界逃離了他、他能看到自己卻無法掌握自己，這個世界與他隔開了，他們之間存在著一能縮小卻不能克服的假距離。然而，泉水則正相反，因它在他面前，是一開放之途徑。
page:119-120
the spring's mirror offers, then, an opportunity for open imagination. Its rather imprecise and pale reflections suggest something idealized. As Narcissus gazes into the water reflecting his image, he feels that his beauty is continued, that it is not yet complete, that it must indeed be continued.
泉水之鏡為開放的想像提供了一個機會。它頗為不精準的、蒼白的倒影暗示了理想化的東西。當Narcissus凝視倒影之水，他感到他底美正在持續著，它尚未完成，它真得繼續下去。
page:121
Narcissus goes, then, to the secret spring...Only there can he fell that he is naturally doubled; he opens his arms, plunging his hands into his own image, and speaks to his own voice. Echo is not a nymph who dwells afar. She is within the spring. She is always with Narcissus. She is Narcissus. She has his voice. She has his face. He does not hear her in a great shout. He first hears her in a faint murmuring, the murmuring of his own seductive voice, his seducer's voice. As he gazes upon the waters, Narcissus discovers his identity and his duality, he discovers his dual powers of masculinity and femininity, and above all, his reality and his ideality.
Narcissus走向了神秘的泉水...祇有在那兒，他才能感到他本然地雙重性；他展開手臂，將手投入自己底影像，向自己底聲音說話。Echo並非是住在遙遠的小仙女，她就在泉水下，永遠伴隨著Narcissus，她就是Narcissus。她有他底聲音，有他底長像。他在吵雜聲中聽不到她，他在昏暗低語中、在他自己充滿誘惑聲的低語中、在他作為引誘者底聲音中、才首次聽見。當他凝視著水，他發現了他底身分與雙重性，陰與陽之雙重力量，尤其是發現了他底實在性與理想性。
page:121
Narcissism is not, in fact, always a source of neurosis. It has also a positive part to play in art and, by means of rapid transpositions, in literature. Sublimation is not always the negation of a desire; it is not always to be seen as sublimation against instincts. It can well be sublimation for an ideal. Here, Narcissus will cease to say "I love myself as I am" and say instead "I am as I love myself." I am effervescently because I love myself fervently. I wish to appear, therefore I must adorn my appearance. Thus, life is made rich and strange, and overlaid with a thousand images. Life grows; it transforms being.
事實上，Narcissus並不總是神經衰弱之源，在藝術、文學上，藉著快速地換位，他也扮演著積極的部分。昇華並非總是對欲望之否定；對本能之抗拒。它更可以是為著理想之昇華。此處，Narcissus將不再說『我愛上那另一個自己』，而應說『我就是我所愛的自己』。我是如此興奮，因為我熱愛自己。我期望表現，因此我必須裝扮外表。如此，生活變得豐富與陌生，重疊著上千的想像。生命在成長；它轉變了存有。
page:124
Prometheus...who raises man to stand and confront Destiny...All Shelley's demands for social justice are present and active in is work. Nevertheless, the imagination...is always completely independent of any social commitment. Indeed, we are convinced that the real poetic force of Prometheus Unbound has absolutely nothing to do with any kind of social symbolism. The imagination is...more cosmic than social...this force of psychic elevation...is preeminently concrete.
Prometheus...祂高舉人類去面對命運...雪萊所有對社會正義底要求都在作品中表露無遺。雖然，想像...總是完全獨立於任何社會承諾，的確，我們相信，《Prometheus Unbound》其中真正詩的力量與任何一種社會象徵主義全然無關。想像是...比社會更為宇宙性的...這心理向上提升之力...顯然十分具體。
page:125
when Shelley tells us that "poetry is a mimetic art," we must understand that poetry imitates what it does not see: human life in its innermost depths. It imitates forces rather than movements...Poetry alone can bring to light the hidden forces of our mental and spiritual life. Poetry is, in Schopenhauer's sense of the word, the phenomenon of these psychic forces. Any truly poetic image will have something about it that makes it resemble a mental operation.
當雪萊告訴我們『詩是一個模仿的藝術』，我們得懂得詩是模仿它所看不見的：在它內心深處的人性生活。它模仿力量而非運動...唯有詩能為隱藏於我們心靈、精神生活裡的力量獲得光亮。詩是，以叔本華底意思說，心理力量之現象。任何真正詩的想像將會使它像一個心理運作。
page:125
The poet's task is to set images in motion with his light touch, and so ascertain that in them, the human mind is operating humanly, that these are human images, humanizing cosmic forces. We are led, then, to the cosmology of the human. Instead of living out naive anthropomorphism, man is restored to profound and fundamental forces. Now, mental life is characterized by its predominant operation: it desires to grow, to rise up. Its instinct is to seek the heights.
詩人底工作是要以他底輕觸使想像處於運動狀態，然後在其間確定人底心智是人性的運作，確定這些人底想像、人性化宇宙的力量，這樣就導出人性之宇宙論。不是要活在神人同形論，人要恢復那深切的、根本的力量。現在，所謂心靈生活，要以它所具有優卓越的運作來看：它欲求成長、提昇。它底本能是要去尋求高度。
page:126
If a single image in a poem fails to fulfill this function of conferring lightness, then the poem is brought to the ground, and man returns to slavery, bruised by his chains.
如果詩中有一想像無法實現提供輕盈的功能，那這首詩就被帶往大地，人返回了奴役狀態，被他底枷鎖弄得鼻青臉腫。
page:126
Love for mankind sets us above our own being and offers no more than a little further assistance to one whose constant desire is always to live above his own being, at the summit of being. Thus, imaginary levitation is very ready to receive all the metaphors of human greatness; however, the psychic realism of levitation has its own driving force, which is, in effect, internal. This is indeed the dynamic realism of an aerial psyche.
對人類之愛將我們置於我們自己底存有之上，也對那些總想活在他自己存有之上、達到存有巔峰之人，提供了些微的助益。這樣，想像的飄浮早就準備好接受所有人性偉大之隱喻；然而，這飄浮的心理實在論有它自己底趨力，意即內在之力。這確定空中心理之動力實在論。
page:134
When we read, we discover the possibility of a different language from the one we use in our everyday lives, and this consciousness of new language is not passive...the reader is made different by difference...is unfixed by language.
當我們閱讀，我們發現了和日常生活不一樣的語言之可能性。並且這新的語言意識並非被動...讀者是因著不同而變得不同的...藉著語言才不會給固定住。
page:134
The best way to ensure that we continue to be transformed by language is to write what we read, to unfix our own language actively in response to the poet's language. To read a poem...is to discover ourselves as subjects who are conscious of being transformed by an object, by difference, who are in turn conscious of our own possibilities, of difference in us, of openness. Reading not only reveals what we are, it restores us to ourselves. It has, for Bachelard, an ontological dimension;...Without the desire to read, we cease to be human, for we lack that essential, sustaining relationship with an unfixing object.
能保證我們仍不斷地受語言而變化之最好方式就是寫下我們所讀到的，不去固定我們自己底語言，才可相應於詩人底語言。讀一首詩...要去發現我們自己是那個能意識到自己因著客體、因著差異、而轉變之主體，能意識到自己底可能性、差異性、與開放性。閱讀不僅揭示了我們是什麼，它也恢復了我們自身。就巴什拉來說，它有一存有學向度；...缺乏了閱讀之欲，我們不再是人，因我們缺乏了與不固定對象的本質的、持續的關係。
page:136
The problem is not how to choose between the good or evil uses of science, but how to teach the "human value" of science, how to make people understand that human nature and indeed the very structure of our consciousness make scientific progress necessary and inevitable.
問題不在於如何挑選科學好的或不好的用途，而在於如何教導科學中底『人性價值』，如何讓人們瞭解是人性與意識結構才使科學成為必要而不可或缺的。
page:136
The phrase "applied rationalism"...He used this phrase...in order to underline the difference between the closed, a priori reason of traditional philosophy and reason in modern science, which, because it is always applied, not only reaches beyond itself but in doing so modifies itself, which is therefore polemical and open.
『應用的理性主義』這詞...他提及...是為了強調在傳統哲學底封閉的、先天的理性與在現代科學底理性兩者之不同，因它總是應用著，它不僅達到自己之外，也更新著自己，因此是可爭論的與開放的。
page:138
"regional rationalism,"...Rationalism in modern science is "fragmented"...electrical rationalism, mechanical rationalism, the rationalism of energy and of quantum mechanics in general...and the rationalism of color.Reason in twentieth-century science is shown once again to be a differentiating activity.
『區域理性主義』...理性主義在現代科學是『片斷的』...電子理性主義、機械理性主義、能量與普遍量子力學理性主義...及色彩理性主義。理性，在二十世紀科學，再次顯出差異性的活動。
page:139
I am not simply a being who thinks, but one who thinks about a problem, who is therefore consciousness of a problem...The problem to be solved "polarizes" consciousness; it determines the way we think, it restructures past knowledge, it redirects our thinking, and in a word, it changes us. Consciousness is more than "consciousness of a problem"; it is "consciousness of being changed by a problem," of the "mobilization" of our intellect.
我並不祇是思維之存有，更是個思考問題之人、是問題之意識。...被兩極化意識所處理之問題；它決定了我們底想法，它重構了過去的知識，重導我們底思維，換句話說，它改變了我們。意識不僅僅是『問題之意識』；它更是『被問題所改變之意識』、是我們理智所『動員』之意識。
page:139
The cogitamus therefore in fact precedes the cogito; it is the fundamental cogito of the rationalist subject. Without this cogito of mutual obligation, this cogito of obligatory mutual induction, my own thought is in doubt: cogitamus ergo sum..."coexistence precedes existence."
事實上，我思之物先於我思；它是理性主體底基本我思。少了這相互強制的我思，強制相互歸納之我思，那我自己底思維就陷入懷疑中。我思之物故我在...『共在先於存在』。
page:140
Our situation is therefore not contingent, nor is it absurd or gratuitous, but it is a situation we choose, that we produce, that we order and constantly reorder. Consequently, our situation is more than a "human reality"; it is a "social reality", it is for-us. A philosophy that seeks to pay attention to the facts must, in Bachelard's view, attend to the facts of modern science, and he is critical of Husserlian phenomenology in particular for failing to do so.
我們底情境不是偶發的，亦非荒謬或多此一舉的，它反是我們所揀選的、產生的、我們規範再規範的。因此，我們底情境超出了『人性實在』；它是『社會實在』，是『為-我們』。依巴什拉觀點，一個想要明此之哲學家，就得觸及現代科學，他也正依此批判胡塞爾現象學未能這麼做。
page:140
Coexistence...develops the idea of what he terms "the divided subject," or more accurately, "the divided thinking subject",...He begins by considering "reflection," thinking in general, and argues that it is an activity controlled by our awareness of other people. We "internalize" others, as it were, and our intellectual progress depends on this. Thinking involves more than dialogue between subject and object; it requires a dialogue, an argument with someone else.
共在...發展了他所謂『分裂主體』觀念，更正確地說，是『分裂思維主體』，...他開始思考『反思』，普遍思維，並認為那是受控於我們知曉他人之活動。我們將他人給『內在化』了，而我們理智過程則依賴於此。思維所含蓋的不祇是主客對話；它還需要與別人之對話與論爭。
page:141
The superego internalizes parents or some other authoritarian figure from our childhood; it is therefore dogmatic, historical, and entirely closed. There is no dialogue here;...Intellectual self-surveillance, on the other hand, judges the past; it is a process of rectification in which the roles are constantly reversed, the judge is swiftly judged, and the poles of the divided self are held close together so that their relationship is dialectical and open.
弗洛依德底超我是在童年時期將父母或其它權威者特徵予以內在化；因此它是教條的、歷史的、全然封閉的，沒有任何對話；...反之，理智之『自我-監督』則判斷過去的事；是校正之過程，在其中，角色不斷互換，判斷轉為被判斷，主體所分裂之兩極緊靠相依，有著辯證與開放的關係。
page:141
The divided, thinking subject must maintain and sustain its divisions through a rigorous process of self-surveillance...It marks the first break with ordinary experience, with obedience to facts,...(Surveillance)2 is in fact applied rationalism, "consciousness of the rigorous application of a method," the dialectic of reason and experiment, demanding therefore constant breaks with both reason and experiment. More rigorous and fragmented is the divided consciousness of (surveillance)3, for it breaks with the rational past, with method itself, and with the rules of reason. Last, Bachelard considers the possibility of (surveillance)4, suggesting that it lies beyond science in poetry. Reading poetry, we maser thought itself; we are conscious of ourselves breaking with thought and with life,...(Surveillance)4, though difficult to grasp, is a state of extreme self-consciousness, consciousness of a divided, fragmentary, momentary self. It is seldom attained, and most of us must be content with a lesser degree of self-surveillance.
分裂的思維主體必須透過嚴格的自我-監督過程來維繫保持著它的分裂。...第一次分裂是要與日常生活經驗分裂，不服從於生活事實，...第二層監督其實是應用的理性主義，要嚴格地運要方法，是理性與實驗之辯證，因此要求不斷地與理性與實驗分裂。更嚴刻也更片斷的是第三層監督的分裂意識，因它與理性的過去分裂，與方法本身分裂，與理性準則分裂。最後，巴什拉想到第四層監督之可能性，提出詩學來超出科學。讀詩，我們掌控了思想本身；我們意識到自身與思維斷裂、與生活斷裂，...第四層監督，雖難掌握，卻是極端的自我意識，分裂的、片斷的、瞬間的意識。它少被達致，大部分的我們滿足於較低層次的自我監督。
page:142
Applied rationalism here means thinking with others, consciousness of others, any desire to be "original," "unique," and "absolute" being,...in Bachelard's eyes foolhardy. He is now very much aware of what he calls the "socialization of truth," "the union of minds in the truth," stressing...that modern science means a community, a culture in which we are all of us situated, and from which we must all learn to benefit: we discover our psychological complexity, divided selves bound to others, and with them to that rectified reality inseparable from scientific reason.
應用理性主義在此意謂著想到他人，想到他人底意識，任何想到成為『原初的』『單一的』『絕對的』存有...巴什拉看來都太莽撞了。現在他很在意的是他所謂的『真理之社會化』『心智在真理中之結合』，強調...現代科學意謂著社群，意謂著我們所處的文化，從中我們得以習得：發現自己底心理情結，與他人相連的分裂自我，以他們來校正與科學理性不可分的實在界。
posted by usher | 11:08 PM
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