西洋哲學史(三) (A history of philosophy (III)) by Frederick Copleston. S.J. trans. 陳俊輝 , 黎明 , 民82
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奧坎 (William of Ockham)的方法是：要分析(analysis)不要綜合(synthesis)，要批判(critic)不要思辨(speculation)。這兒所謂思辨，特別是指建構性的思考，譬如...為理性與信仰架橋的工作。奧坎的剃刀(Ockham's Rasor)是由經驗出發，謹慎使用名詞，除非必要，否則不允許任何多餘的東西存在。他的主張有三點：1.存在的是個別事物，我們對它們具有直覺的能力； 2.靈魂不在我們直覺的範圍之內，因此，不必去肯定或否定，也毋須在哲學上予以討論；3.我們無法藉著邏輯推論，由一物的存在肯定另一物的存在。
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在知識界中，十三世紀最偉大的成就是：理性與信仰，哲學與神學，已達到了一種綜合的實現。...都深信形成一種自然神學的可能性。
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十四世紀的唯名論者(nominalist)...打裂了十三世紀所得到的綜合...著意於分析...要批判而不想思辨。
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奧坎強調了對存在的個別事物直覺的首要性。於是，關於一個事物的存在，最先要問的問題便是：我們是否直覺它是存在的東西。例如：就精神性的靈魂而論，奧坎定會否認我們有任何這般的直覺。
Ockham stressed the primacy of intuition of the existent individual thing. In regard to a thing's existence the first question to ask, then, is whether we intuit it as existent. In the case of the spiritual soul, for example, Ockham would deny that we have any such intuition. (p.23)
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事實上，沒有一種從一物的存在到另一物存在的邏輯推論，可以等同於一種論證，或者有力的證明。
In fact, no logical infeence from the existence of one thing to the existence of another could amount to a 'demonstration' or cogent proof. (p.23)
page:71-72
奧坎專注於基督徒有關神的全能與自由的教義。他認為，沒有清除本質形上學...便無法保護這些教義。...例如，神係根據祂對人性的普遍觀念，而創造了人類。...並不是純粹任置由神的意志所隨意決定的東西。...如果世界上並沒有像人性這樣的東西；那麼，便沒有理由把有關人的一種普遍觀念，也就是說，有關人性的一種觀念歸因給神。
Ockham's preoccupation ... omnipotence and liberty. He thought that these doctrines could not be safeguarded without eliminating the metaphysic of essences ... from Greek sources.(p.61)...God creates man, for example, according to His universal idea of human nature. ... the natural moral law is not something purely arbitrary, capriciously determined by the devine will...if there were no such thing as human nature, there would be no reason for ascribing to God a universal idea of man, that is, an idea of human nature.(p.62)
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奧坎把口說的話與手寫的字兩者，和概念作了嚴格的區分...奧坎把概念，或概念的限定詞，叫做一種自然記號；因為，在他認為，對任何事物的直接理解，在人心中，會很自然地產生有關那個東西的一個概念。...知覺一條牛之時，在英國人與法國人的心中，終會形成同樣的觀念或自然記號。縱使前者會藉著一個約定俗成的記號cow用言語或文字把這個概念表達出來；而後者即會以另一個約定俗成的記號vache去表達它。...他把普遍性歸因於...自然記號，概念的限定詞。
Ockham distinguished, therefore, both the spoken word and the written word from the concept according to its meaning or logical significance.
Ockham called he concept or terminus conceptus a 'natural sign' because he thought that the direct apprehension of anything causes naturally in the human mind a concept of that thing...Perceiving a cow results in the formation of the same idea or 'natural sign' in the mind of the Englishman and of the Frenchman though the former will express this concept in word or writing by means of one conventional sign, 'cow', while the latter will express it by means of another conventional sign, 'vache'....he ascribed universality to ...natural sign, the terminus conceptus, of which he was thinking.(54-55)
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『這個人在跑』此一敍述裡，『人』這個語詞代表一個明確的個體。這即是『人的代用』的一個例子。但是，在『人是一物種』的陳述中，『人』這個語詞便代表了所有的人。這就是『簡單的代用』。最後，在『人是一個名詞』這一述句裡，被提到的乃是字本身，這便是『物的代用』。若就本身而論，『人』這個字詞可以發揮這些當中的任何一項功能；不過，只有在一個命題裡，它才能實際獲得上述功能之中明確的一種。於是，『代用』便是僅在一個命題中，屬於一個語詞的屬性。
in the statement 'the man is running' the term 'man' stands for a precise individual. This is an instance of suppositio personalis. But in the statement 'man is a species' the term 'man' stands for all men. This is suppositio simplex. Finally, in the statement 'Man is a noun' one is speaking of the word itself. This is suppositio materialis. Taken in itself the term 'man' is capable of exercising any of these functions; but it is only in a proposition that it actually acquires a determinate type of the functions in question. Suppositio, then, is 'a property belonging to a term, but only in a proposition'.(55)
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共相，並不是以任何方式存在於心靈之外的東西...它的性質乃是存在心靈裡。...共相並不屬於任何實體的本質或實質。...共相的存在，係在於一種理解力的活動...它的存在，單單依託於知性：相應於概念者，並無普遍的實體。
no universal is anything existing in any way outside the soul; but everything which is predicable of many things is of its nature in the mind, whether subjectively or objectively; and no universal belongs to the essence or quiddity of any substance whatever...The existence of the universal consists in an act of the understanding and it exists only as such. It owes its existence simply to the intellect: there is no universal reality corresponding to the concept.(57)
page:83-84
多瑪斯...認為，神依照祂心中所存有的一種人性觀念，創造出了所有屬於同種類的事物，也就是，有相同性質的事物。然而，奧坎卻抛棄這種有關神觀念的理論。...對於這些相似性，並沒有形上學的理由。...普遍概念即為理解(力)的一種行動。
St.Thomas...held that God creates things belonging to the same species, things, that is, with similar natures, according to an idea of human nature in the divine mind. Ockham, however, discarded this theory of divine ideas....there is no metaphyical reason for these similarities...the universal concept is an act of the understanding.(58)
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奧坎...他把科學區分為兩類：真實科學與理性科學。前者關涉著真實事物...後者則關涉...一些語詞。於是，邏輯－它處理著像種與類這些第二意向的語詞－便是一種理性科學。
He divides science into two main types, real science and rational science. The former is concerned with real things, in a sense to be discussed presently, while the latter is concerned with terms which do not stand immediately for real things. Thus logic, which deals with terms of second intention, like 'species' and 'genus', is a rational science.(59)
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任何科學－不管是真實的，還是理性的，僅是涉屬命題的。...普遍的語詞，係表徵著個別的事物，而非超心靈存在的普遍的實在。
any science, whether real or rational, is only of propositions...the universal terms stand for individual things, and not for universal realities existing extramentally.(59-60)
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直覺知識才是首要的與基本的。...『全體大於部分』...不意謂該命題即是天生的。缺乏了經驗，就不會宣示出這個命題。...除非被直覺地認知，否則沒有一個東西本身能夠自然地被認知。
intuitive knowledge is primary and fundamental...the proposition that the whole is greater than the part...this does not mean that the principle is innate. Without experience that proposition would not be enunciated;...Nothing can be known naturally in itself unless it is known intuitively.(62)
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對神的本質...我們不可能擁有一種自然知識：因為我們沒有有關神的自然直覺。...所有的知識，都基於經驗。
we cannot have a natural knowledge of the divine essence as it is in itself, because we have no natural intuition of God;...All knowledge is based on experience.(62)
page:92-93
直覺知識...藉著它，人便可以獲知一個事物到底是否存在。...是對一個作為存在物的事物的直截理解...毋須事物本身與行動之間的任何媒介，就可以直截認知事物本身。
Intuitive knowledge...one can know by means of it whether a thing is or not;...is thus the immediate apprehension of a thing as existent...the thing itself is known immediately without any medium between itself and the act by which it is seen or apprehended.(62-63)
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除非對象存在於適當的距離之內，否則，便不能自然地引生直覺知識；不過，超自然地引生，則是可能的。...藉著神的大能，對於一個不存在的事物，即可以產生直覺知識。
Intuitive knowledge cannot be caused naturally unless the object is present at the right distance;but it could be caused supernaturally...There can be by the power of God intuitive knowledge concerning a non-existent object.(64)
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奧坎的傾向...是將世界分裂成各不相同的實在；其中的每一種，都依賴著神。只是在它們之間，沒有必然的關係；世界秩序，在邏輯上並非先於神的選擇。
Ockham's tendency,...was to split up the world into distinct entities, each of wihch depens on God but between which there is no necessary connection: the order of the world is not logically prior to the divine choice, but it is logically posterior to the divine choice of individual contingent entities.(68)
page:100-101
關係，在心靈之外並沒有實物...諸關係都是在表徵絕對體的意向或語詞。
a relation as such has no reality outside the mind...Relations are thus 'intentions' or terms signifying absolutes;(69)
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奧坎並不否認：從一個既存事物的種種特質，也可能論斷它具有或曾有一個原因；他本人就使用過因果論證。然而，他卻否認有關一個事物的簡單知識可以提供我們對另一個事物的簡單知識。...縱使他並未駁斥因果論證的有效性...雖然人或許能夠知道某個既存事物具有一個原因；但是我們能確認...原因的唯一方式則要靠經驗。...已證實出來的是，火是熱的原因。
Ockham did not deny thaqt it is possible to conclude from the characteristics of a given thing that it has or had a cause; and he himself used causal arguments. He did, however, deny that the simple knowledge of one thing can provide us with the simple knowledge of another thing...though he does not reject the validity of causal argument...though one may can ascertain that this definite thing is the cause of that definite thing is by experience...it is proved that fire is the cause of heat.(71-72)
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神已創造了各不相同的事物；在它們之間，普遍流行的秩序，乃是純然的偶然。事實上，這些都是有規則的系列。只是，不能說兩個不同事物間的關聯，乃是必然的。
God has created distinct things; and the order which prevails between them is purely contingent. There are regular sequences as a matter of fact; but no connection between two distinct things can be said to be necessary.(73)
page:108-109
奧坎對場所與時間的處理，也訴諸經濟原則。...場所並不是一個...東西。...時間不是一種和運動有別的事物...是心靈的...一個語詞或名稱。
The principle of economy wa invoked too in Ockham's treatment of place and time...he insists that place is not a thing distinct from the surface...time is not a thing distinct from motion...it is mental...a 'term' or 'name'.(75-76)
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一，存在界的所有知識，奠基在經驗上。...二，對存在的實物...使用著經濟原則。例如，如果兩個要因，將足以解釋運動，人就不應該增加第三個要素。三，一旦有人設定了不必要與不可觀察的實物，這經常是由於語言已誤導了他們。
First, he bases all knowledge of the existent world on experience....Secondly, in his analysis of existent reality...he uses the principle of economy. If two factors will suffice to explain motion, for example, one should not add a third. Lastly, when people do postulate unnecessary and unobservable entities, it is not infrequently because they have been misled by language.(76)
page:120
在宇宙中有一種內存的目的論的秩序，這是不可能予以證實的；這種秩序的存在，必將肯定神的存在。...神是萬有的直接動力因，這是無法靠自然的理性加以證實。...不可能證明：除却朽壞的事物以外，還有其它的事物存在著。例如，在人身之中有一個精神的與不朽的靈魂。
In fine, it is impossible to prove that there is in the universe an immanent teleological order, the existence of which makes it necessary to assert God's existence....it cannot be proved by the natural reason that God is the immediate efficient cause of all things....He gives as one reason of this the impossibility of proving that there exist any things other than corruptible things. It cannot be proved, for instance, that there is spiritual and immortal soul in man.(82)
page:122-123
唯有靠信仰，才可明確知道神的獨一性...才可以認識神學論證的若干前提。
The unicity of God is known with certainty only by faity...since the premisses of theological arguments are known by faith.(83-84)
page:126
若不涉及神之外的某物，以它為對象，我們就不可能認識神的本質，...我們要不是不能認識神的單一性...就是不能認識祂的無限權能，神性的善或完美；畢竟，我們直接認識的乃是一些概念。這些概念不是真正的神，而是我們在命題中用來代表神的。
Neither the divine essence...nor anything intrinsic to God nor anything which is really God can be known by us without something other than God being involved as object. We cannot know in themselves either the unity of God...or His infinite power or the divine goodness or perfection; but what we know immediately are concepts, which are not really God but which we use in propositions to stand for God.(87)
page:128
第一，在神的知性上，並不會有任何的多元性。神的知性，是和神的意志與神的本質等同的。...第二，把神的觀念設定成一種創造中的媒介因素，是相當多餘的，而且也會誤導人。...毋須任何觀念的干涉，神便能夠認識受造物與創造他們。
In the first place there cannot be any plurality in the divine intellect. The divine intellect is identical with the divine will and the divine essence....In the second place, it is quite unnecessary, and also misleading, to postulate divine ideas as a kind of intermediary factor in creation....God can know creatures and create them without the intervention of any 'ideas'.(88-89)
page:129
觀念這個語詞，是一個內涵語詞。它直接涵指受造物本身；不過，却間接涵指神的知識或認知者。...受造物本身就是觀念。...換句話說，一方面假定神，另一方面假定受造物，就相當足夠了：神所認識的受造物，都是觀念。
the term 'idea' is a connotative term. It denotes directly the creature itself; but it connotes indirectly the divine knowledge or knower...the creature itself is the idea....In other words, it is quite sufficient to postulate God on the one hand and creatures on the other hand: the creatures as known by God are the 'ideas'.(89-90)
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奧坎已清楚指稱：人裡面有三種不同的形式存在。他不僅主張知性的靈魂與有感受性的靈魂，在人裡面各不相同；而且，也主張，有感受性的靈魂與體質的形式，在人與禽獸這兩者之中，真正有別。...不過，以人的總體性來說，他卻未否定人是一個統一體。
In any case Ockham clearly maintained the existence in man of three distinct forms. He argues not only that the intellectual soul and the sensitive soul are distinct in man, but also that the sensitive soul and the form of corporeity are really distinct both in men and brutes....man, taken in his totality, is a unity. There is only one total being of man, but several partial beings.(98)
page:147
奧坎在討論人的位格上，卻堅稱這種統一性。位格是一個知性的承負。...一個承負，乃是一個在身份上不能互換的，無法固持於任何事物的，而且也不受任何事物支持的完整的存有者。
Yet in discussing human ersonality Ockham insisted on this unity. The person is a suppositum intellectual...A suppositum is a complete being, incommunicable by identity, incapable of inhering in anything, and not suppported by anything.(100-101)
page:147-148
奧坎把位格界定成：一種知性的與完整的本性；它既不靠任何其它的東西來支撐著，而且也不能像一個部分配合另一個事物來形構某個存有者。...因此，人的位格是人的整個存有者，而不單單是理性的形式或靈魂。...奧坎和多瑪斯一致主張，人的靈魂在與死後身體分離的情態上，就不是一個位格了。
Ockham defines 'person' as an intellectual and complete nature, which is neither supported by anything else nor is able, as a part, to form with another thing one being....The human person, then, is the total being of man, not the rational form or soul alone....Ockham, therefore, maintains with St.Thomas that the human soul in the state of separation from the body after death is not a person.(101)
page:148
除非是照著自己的意思，不然沒有一種行動會受到責難。
No act is blameworthy unless it is in our power.(113)
page:149
除了神以外，沒有任何事物可以使意志得到滿足。
No object other than God can satisfy the will.(114)
page:197
尼古拉...指出應該設置的第一原則是：矛盾句不可能同時為真。矛盾原理，或毋寧說非矛盾原理，是首要的原理。而且，在消極的意義，亦即沒有更終極的原理，以及在積極的意義，亦即這個原理，必然優先於每種其它的原理...非矛盾原理是所有自然確定性的終極基礎。...任何其它的原理，可以化約成非矛盾原理...完全提供它自己的保證的，祇有非矛盾原理。...沒有矛盾，便不能夠否認它。...因此，非矛盾原理必須是首要的原理。
Nicholas remarks that the first principle to be laid down is that 'contradictions cannot be true at the same time'. The principle of contradiction or rather of non-contradiction, is the primary principle, and its primacy is to be acepted both in the negative sense, namely that there is no more ultimate principle, and in the positive sense, namely that the principle positively precedes and is presupposed by every other principle. Nicholas is arguing that the principle of non-contradiction is the ultimate basis of all natural certitude, and that while any other principle which is put forward as the basis of certitude is reducible to the principle of non-contradictioin, the latter is not reducible to any other principle. ...It is only the principle of non-contradiction which bears its own guarantee on tis face, so to speak. ...it can not be denied without contradiction. ...The principle of non-contradiction must therefore be the primary principle.(148)
page:347
神對尼古拉(Nicholas of Cusa,1401-1464)來說：是在一個獨特的與絕對無限的存有中的對立之統一。亦即若干相反事物的綜合。...超越在眾受造物中所發現的若干差異性與對立性。...神是最大的存有...也是最小的存有。
God is, for Nicholas, the coincidentia oppositorum, the synthesis of opposites in a unique and absolutely infinite being. ...God transcends these distinctions and oppositions...God is the greatest being (maximum),,,He is the least being (minimum). (p.235)
page:348
古撒尼古拉曾強調否定法...我們認識神是認識祂所不是的樣式，而不是祂存在的樣式。因此，對神本性的正面認識，我們的心智，是處在一種無知的狀態。...這種無知...它是博學的或有教養的無知。
Nicholas of Cusa laid emphasis on the via negativa, ...We know of God what He is not rather than what He is. In regard, therefore, to positive knowledge of the divine nature our minds are in a state of 'ignorance'. ...the 'ignorance'...it is thus 'learned' or 'instructed ignorance'. (p.235)
page:353
世界不是一個帶有一個限定的核心與周邊的有限範圍。任何一點都可以被當成，以及視為世界的核心；而且，它並沒有周邊。...神存在各處，或無所不在，因此可以說，神是世界的核心，...是世界的周邊。
The world is not, says Nicholas, a limited sphere with a definite centre and circumference. Any point can be taken and considered as the world's centre, and it has no circumference. God, then, can be called the centre of the world in view of the fact that He is everywhere or omnipresent and the circumference of the world in that He is nowhere, that is, by local presence. (239)
page:354
人也是世界...人是小宇宙...亦即神性的人一面鏡子。...類比可以使事物變得更加清楚。
'man is also the world' and explains that man is the microcosm...they call man the image of God. ...analogies...made things a bit clearer. (240)
page:354-355
尼古拉贊同柏拉圖的看法，即時間是永?琲漣庤H；...即然創造以前並沒有時間，那麼，我們就必須說，時間源自於永?琚C...由於世界來自永?琚A而不是來自時間...‘永恆的’這個名稱，比較屬於世界，而不屬於時間；因為，世界的綿延並不依賴時間...尼古拉在時間與綿延之間作了一種區分...如果運動消失了，那麼，就應該不會有時間，不過卻依然會有綿延。接連不斷的綿延...即是永恆。...世界的綿延，便是神的永恆形象；而且在某種意義上，也可以稱它為'無限的'。
Nicholas agrees with Plato that time is the image of eternity, and he insists that since before creation there was no time we must say that time proceeded from eternity. ...Thus the world is eternal because it comes from eternity and not from time. But the name 'eternal' belongs much more to the world than to time since the duration of the world does not depend on time. ...Nicholas thus makes a distinction between time and duration,...If motion disappeared, there would be no time; but there would still be duration. Successive duration...is eternity. ...The duration of the world is thus the image of the divine eternity and can be called in some sense 'infinite'.(240-241)
page:357
每一個別的事物都反映整個宇宙...宇宙是縮型在每一有限的事物裡。...因此，世界是一種和諧的體系...有一種多元性的統一。
each individual thing mirrors the whole universe....the universe exists contracte in every finite thing. ...The world is therefore a harmonious system...there is a 'unity in plurality'. (242)
page:431
培根...在<新工具>裡，便把注意力集中在印刷，火藥與磁鐵發明的實際效果上。它們業已改變事物的面向，以及世界的狀態。1.在文學上。2.在戰場上。3.在航海上。不過，像這一類的發明，卻不是來自傳統的亞理斯多德的物理學。
In the Novum Organum Bacon calls attention to the practical effects of the invention of printing, gunpowder and the magnet, which 'have changed the face of things and the state of the world; the first in literature, the second in warfare; the third in navigation'. But inventions such as these did not come from the traditional Aristotelian physics.(293)
page:435
培根...他把記憶，想像與理性，當成理性靈魂的三種能力後，便把歷史歸給記憶，詩詞歸給想像，以及把哲學歸給推理。
According to Bacon...Taking memory, imagination and reason to be the three faculties of the rational soul, he assigns history to memory, poetry to imagination and philosophy to reasoning. (295)
page:441
知識與權力走向同一件事。
Knowledge and human power come to the same thing. (300)
page:613
據亞理斯多德說，人們首先對比較明顯的事物感到驚奇，而後才提出...問題。...驚奇是哲學與科學這兩者的源頭。
According to Aristotle, men first felt wonder at the more obvious things and later raised difficulties and questions about more important matters;...The 'wonder' of which he speaks was the fountainhead of both philosophy and science.(407)
page:615
如果早期的宇宙論者曾發現自然，那麼，詭辯學派，蘇格拉底與柏拉圖便發現了人。
If the early cosmologists discovered Nature, the Sophists, Socrates and Plato discovered Man. (408)
奧坎 (William of Ockham)的方法是：要分析(analysis)不要綜合(synthesis)，要批判(critic)不要思辨(speculation)。這兒所謂思辨，特別是指建構性的思考，譬如...為理性與信仰架橋的工作。奧坎的剃刀(Ockham's Rasor)是由經驗出發，謹慎使用名詞，除非必要，否則不允許任何多餘的東西存在。他的主張有三點：1.存在的是個別事物，我們對它們具有直覺的能力； 2.靈魂不在我們直覺的範圍之內，因此，不必去肯定或否定，也毋須在哲學上予以討論；3.我們無法藉著邏輯推論，由一物的存在肯定另一物的存在。
page:1-2
在知識界中，十三世紀最偉大的成就是：理性與信仰，哲學與神學，已達到了一種綜合的實現。...都深信形成一種自然神學的可能性。
page:14
十四世紀的唯名論者(nominalist)...打裂了十三世紀所得到的綜合...著意於分析...要批判而不想思辨。
page:15
奧坎強調了對存在的個別事物直覺的首要性。於是，關於一個事物的存在，最先要問的問題便是：我們是否直覺它是存在的東西。例如：就精神性的靈魂而論，奧坎定會否認我們有任何這般的直覺。
Ockham stressed the primacy of intuition of the existent individual thing. In regard to a thing's existence the first question to ask, then, is whether we intuit it as existent. In the case of the spiritual soul, for example, Ockham would deny that we have any such intuition. (p.23)
page:16
事實上，沒有一種從一物的存在到另一物存在的邏輯推論，可以等同於一種論證，或者有力的證明。
In fact, no logical infeence from the existence of one thing to the existence of another could amount to a 'demonstration' or cogent proof. (p.23)
page:71-72
奧坎專注於基督徒有關神的全能與自由的教義。他認為，沒有清除本質形上學...便無法保護這些教義。...例如，神係根據祂對人性的普遍觀念，而創造了人類。...並不是純粹任置由神的意志所隨意決定的東西。...如果世界上並沒有像人性這樣的東西；那麼，便沒有理由把有關人的一種普遍觀念，也就是說，有關人性的一種觀念歸因給神。
Ockham's preoccupation ... omnipotence and liberty. He thought that these doctrines could not be safeguarded without eliminating the metaphysic of essences ... from Greek sources.(p.61)...God creates man, for example, according to His universal idea of human nature. ... the natural moral law is not something purely arbitrary, capriciously determined by the devine will...if there were no such thing as human nature, there would be no reason for ascribing to God a universal idea of man, that is, an idea of human nature.(p.62)
page:78-79
奧坎把口說的話與手寫的字兩者，和概念作了嚴格的區分...奧坎把概念，或概念的限定詞，叫做一種自然記號；因為，在他認為，對任何事物的直接理解，在人心中，會很自然地產生有關那個東西的一個概念。...知覺一條牛之時，在英國人與法國人的心中，終會形成同樣的觀念或自然記號。縱使前者會藉著一個約定俗成的記號cow用言語或文字把這個概念表達出來；而後者即會以另一個約定俗成的記號vache去表達它。...他把普遍性歸因於...自然記號，概念的限定詞。
Ockham distinguished, therefore, both the spoken word and the written word from the concept according to its meaning or logical significance.
Ockham called he concept or terminus conceptus a 'natural sign' because he thought that the direct apprehension of anything causes naturally in the human mind a concept of that thing...Perceiving a cow results in the formation of the same idea or 'natural sign' in the mind of the Englishman and of the Frenchman though the former will express this concept in word or writing by means of one conventional sign, 'cow', while the latter will express it by means of another conventional sign, 'vache'....he ascribed universality to ...natural sign, the terminus conceptus, of which he was thinking.(54-55)
page:79-80
『這個人在跑』此一敍述裡，『人』這個語詞代表一個明確的個體。這即是『人的代用』的一個例子。但是，在『人是一物種』的陳述中，『人』這個語詞便代表了所有的人。這就是『簡單的代用』。最後，在『人是一個名詞』這一述句裡，被提到的乃是字本身，這便是『物的代用』。若就本身而論，『人』這個字詞可以發揮這些當中的任何一項功能；不過，只有在一個命題裡，它才能實際獲得上述功能之中明確的一種。於是，『代用』便是僅在一個命題中，屬於一個語詞的屬性。
in the statement 'the man is running' the term 'man' stands for a precise individual. This is an instance of suppositio personalis. But in the statement 'man is a species' the term 'man' stands for all men. This is suppositio simplex. Finally, in the statement 'Man is a noun' one is speaking of the word itself. This is suppositio materialis. Taken in itself the term 'man' is capable of exercising any of these functions; but it is only in a proposition that it actually acquires a determinate type of the functions in question. Suppositio, then, is 'a property belonging to a term, but only in a proposition'.(55)
page:82
共相，並不是以任何方式存在於心靈之外的東西...它的性質乃是存在心靈裡。...共相並不屬於任何實體的本質或實質。...共相的存在，係在於一種理解力的活動...它的存在，單單依託於知性：相應於概念者，並無普遍的實體。
no universal is anything existing in any way outside the soul; but everything which is predicable of many things is of its nature in the mind, whether subjectively or objectively; and no universal belongs to the essence or quiddity of any substance whatever...The existence of the universal consists in an act of the understanding and it exists only as such. It owes its existence simply to the intellect: there is no universal reality corresponding to the concept.(57)
page:83-84
多瑪斯...認為，神依照祂心中所存有的一種人性觀念，創造出了所有屬於同種類的事物，也就是，有相同性質的事物。然而，奧坎卻抛棄這種有關神觀念的理論。...對於這些相似性，並沒有形上學的理由。...普遍概念即為理解(力)的一種行動。
St.Thomas...held that God creates things belonging to the same species, things, that is, with similar natures, according to an idea of human nature in the divine mind. Ockham, however, discarded this theory of divine ideas....there is no metaphyical reason for these similarities...the universal concept is an act of the understanding.(58)
page:85
奧坎...他把科學區分為兩類：真實科學與理性科學。前者關涉著真實事物...後者則關涉...一些語詞。於是，邏輯－它處理著像種與類這些第二意向的語詞－便是一種理性科學。
He divides science into two main types, real science and rational science. The former is concerned with real things, in a sense to be discussed presently, while the latter is concerned with terms which do not stand immediately for real things. Thus logic, which deals with terms of second intention, like 'species' and 'genus', is a rational science.(59)
page:86
任何科學－不管是真實的，還是理性的，僅是涉屬命題的。...普遍的語詞，係表徵著個別的事物，而非超心靈存在的普遍的實在。
any science, whether real or rational, is only of propositions...the universal terms stand for individual things, and not for universal realities existing extramentally.(59-60)
page:91-92
直覺知識才是首要的與基本的。...『全體大於部分』...不意謂該命題即是天生的。缺乏了經驗，就不會宣示出這個命題。...除非被直覺地認知，否則沒有一個東西本身能夠自然地被認知。
intuitive knowledge is primary and fundamental...the proposition that the whole is greater than the part...this does not mean that the principle is innate. Without experience that proposition would not be enunciated;...Nothing can be known naturally in itself unless it is known intuitively.(62)
page:92
對神的本質...我們不可能擁有一種自然知識：因為我們沒有有關神的自然直覺。...所有的知識，都基於經驗。
we cannot have a natural knowledge of the divine essence as it is in itself, because we have no natural intuition of God;...All knowledge is based on experience.(62)
page:92-93
直覺知識...藉著它，人便可以獲知一個事物到底是否存在。...是對一個作為存在物的事物的直截理解...毋須事物本身與行動之間的任何媒介，就可以直截認知事物本身。
Intuitive knowledge...one can know by means of it whether a thing is or not;...is thus the immediate apprehension of a thing as existent...the thing itself is known immediately without any medium between itself and the act by which it is seen or apprehended.(62-63)
page:94
除非對象存在於適當的距離之內，否則，便不能自然地引生直覺知識；不過，超自然地引生，則是可能的。...藉著神的大能，對於一個不存在的事物，即可以產生直覺知識。
Intuitive knowledge cannot be caused naturally unless the object is present at the right distance;but it could be caused supernaturally...There can be by the power of God intuitive knowledge concerning a non-existent object.(64)
page:99
奧坎的傾向...是將世界分裂成各不相同的實在；其中的每一種，都依賴著神。只是在它們之間，沒有必然的關係；世界秩序，在邏輯上並非先於神的選擇。
Ockham's tendency,...was to split up the world into distinct entities, each of wihch depens on God but between which there is no necessary connection: the order of the world is not logically prior to the divine choice, but it is logically posterior to the divine choice of individual contingent entities.(68)
page:100-101
關係，在心靈之外並沒有實物...諸關係都是在表徵絕對體的意向或語詞。
a relation as such has no reality outside the mind...Relations are thus 'intentions' or terms signifying absolutes;(69)
page:104-105
奧坎並不否認：從一個既存事物的種種特質，也可能論斷它具有或曾有一個原因；他本人就使用過因果論證。然而，他卻否認有關一個事物的簡單知識可以提供我們對另一個事物的簡單知識。...縱使他並未駁斥因果論證的有效性...雖然人或許能夠知道某個既存事物具有一個原因；但是我們能確認...原因的唯一方式則要靠經驗。...已證實出來的是，火是熱的原因。
Ockham did not deny thaqt it is possible to conclude from the characteristics of a given thing that it has or had a cause; and he himself used causal arguments. He did, however, deny that the simple knowledge of one thing can provide us with the simple knowledge of another thing...though he does not reject the validity of causal argument...though one may can ascertain that this definite thing is the cause of that definite thing is by experience...it is proved that fire is the cause of heat.(71-72)
page:106
神已創造了各不相同的事物；在它們之間，普遍流行的秩序，乃是純然的偶然。事實上，這些都是有規則的系列。只是，不能說兩個不同事物間的關聯，乃是必然的。
God has created distinct things; and the order which prevails between them is purely contingent. There are regular sequences as a matter of fact; but no connection between two distinct things can be said to be necessary.(73)
page:108-109
奧坎對場所與時間的處理，也訴諸經濟原則。...場所並不是一個...東西。...時間不是一種和運動有別的事物...是心靈的...一個語詞或名稱。
The principle of economy wa invoked too in Ockham's treatment of place and time...he insists that place is not a thing distinct from the surface...time is not a thing distinct from motion...it is mental...a 'term' or 'name'.(75-76)
page:109
一，存在界的所有知識，奠基在經驗上。...二，對存在的實物...使用著經濟原則。例如，如果兩個要因，將足以解釋運動，人就不應該增加第三個要素。三，一旦有人設定了不必要與不可觀察的實物，這經常是由於語言已誤導了他們。
First, he bases all knowledge of the existent world on experience....Secondly, in his analysis of existent reality...he uses the principle of economy. If two factors will suffice to explain motion, for example, one should not add a third. Lastly, when people do postulate unnecessary and unobservable entities, it is not infrequently because they have been misled by language.(76)
page:120
在宇宙中有一種內存的目的論的秩序，這是不可能予以證實的；這種秩序的存在，必將肯定神的存在。...神是萬有的直接動力因，這是無法靠自然的理性加以證實。...不可能證明：除却朽壞的事物以外，還有其它的事物存在著。例如，在人身之中有一個精神的與不朽的靈魂。
In fine, it is impossible to prove that there is in the universe an immanent teleological order, the existence of which makes it necessary to assert God's existence....it cannot be proved by the natural reason that God is the immediate efficient cause of all things....He gives as one reason of this the impossibility of proving that there exist any things other than corruptible things. It cannot be proved, for instance, that there is spiritual and immortal soul in man.(82)
page:122-123
唯有靠信仰，才可明確知道神的獨一性...才可以認識神學論證的若干前提。
The unicity of God is known with certainty only by faity...since the premisses of theological arguments are known by faith.(83-84)
page:126
若不涉及神之外的某物，以它為對象，我們就不可能認識神的本質，...我們要不是不能認識神的單一性...就是不能認識祂的無限權能，神性的善或完美；畢竟，我們直接認識的乃是一些概念。這些概念不是真正的神，而是我們在命題中用來代表神的。
Neither the divine essence...nor anything intrinsic to God nor anything which is really God can be known by us without something other than God being involved as object. We cannot know in themselves either the unity of God...or His infinite power or the divine goodness or perfection; but what we know immediately are concepts, which are not really God but which we use in propositions to stand for God.(87)
page:128
第一，在神的知性上，並不會有任何的多元性。神的知性，是和神的意志與神的本質等同的。...第二，把神的觀念設定成一種創造中的媒介因素，是相當多餘的，而且也會誤導人。...毋須任何觀念的干涉，神便能夠認識受造物與創造他們。
In the first place there cannot be any plurality in the divine intellect. The divine intellect is identical with the divine will and the divine essence....In the second place, it is quite unnecessary, and also misleading, to postulate divine ideas as a kind of intermediary factor in creation....God can know creatures and create them without the intervention of any 'ideas'.(88-89)
page:129
觀念這個語詞，是一個內涵語詞。它直接涵指受造物本身；不過，却間接涵指神的知識或認知者。...受造物本身就是觀念。...換句話說，一方面假定神，另一方面假定受造物，就相當足夠了：神所認識的受造物，都是觀念。
the term 'idea' is a connotative term. It denotes directly the creature itself; but it connotes indirectly the divine knowledge or knower...the creature itself is the idea....In other words, it is quite sufficient to postulate God on the one hand and creatures on the other hand: the creatures as known by God are the 'ideas'.(89-90)
page:144
奧坎已清楚指稱：人裡面有三種不同的形式存在。他不僅主張知性的靈魂與有感受性的靈魂，在人裡面各不相同；而且，也主張，有感受性的靈魂與體質的形式，在人與禽獸這兩者之中，真正有別。...不過，以人的總體性來說，他卻未否定人是一個統一體。
In any case Ockham clearly maintained the existence in man of three distinct forms. He argues not only that the intellectual soul and the sensitive soul are distinct in man, but also that the sensitive soul and the form of corporeity are really distinct both in men and brutes....man, taken in his totality, is a unity. There is only one total being of man, but several partial beings.(98)
page:147
奧坎在討論人的位格上，卻堅稱這種統一性。位格是一個知性的承負。...一個承負，乃是一個在身份上不能互換的，無法固持於任何事物的，而且也不受任何事物支持的完整的存有者。
Yet in discussing human ersonality Ockham insisted on this unity. The person is a suppositum intellectual...A suppositum is a complete being, incommunicable by identity, incapable of inhering in anything, and not suppported by anything.(100-101)
page:147-148
奧坎把位格界定成：一種知性的與完整的本性；它既不靠任何其它的東西來支撐著，而且也不能像一個部分配合另一個事物來形構某個存有者。...因此，人的位格是人的整個存有者，而不單單是理性的形式或靈魂。...奧坎和多瑪斯一致主張，人的靈魂在與死後身體分離的情態上，就不是一個位格了。
Ockham defines 'person' as an intellectual and complete nature, which is neither supported by anything else nor is able, as a part, to form with another thing one being....The human person, then, is the total being of man, not the rational form or soul alone....Ockham, therefore, maintains with St.Thomas that the human soul in the state of separation from the body after death is not a person.(101)
page:148
除非是照著自己的意思，不然沒有一種行動會受到責難。
No act is blameworthy unless it is in our power.(113)
page:149
除了神以外，沒有任何事物可以使意志得到滿足。
No object other than God can satisfy the will.(114)
page:197
尼古拉...指出應該設置的第一原則是：矛盾句不可能同時為真。矛盾原理，或毋寧說非矛盾原理，是首要的原理。而且，在消極的意義，亦即沒有更終極的原理，以及在積極的意義，亦即這個原理，必然優先於每種其它的原理...非矛盾原理是所有自然確定性的終極基礎。...任何其它的原理，可以化約成非矛盾原理...完全提供它自己的保證的，祇有非矛盾原理。...沒有矛盾，便不能夠否認它。...因此，非矛盾原理必須是首要的原理。
Nicholas remarks that the first principle to be laid down is that 'contradictions cannot be true at the same time'. The principle of contradiction or rather of non-contradiction, is the primary principle, and its primacy is to be acepted both in the negative sense, namely that there is no more ultimate principle, and in the positive sense, namely that the principle positively precedes and is presupposed by every other principle. Nicholas is arguing that the principle of non-contradiction is the ultimate basis of all natural certitude, and that while any other principle which is put forward as the basis of certitude is reducible to the principle of non-contradictioin, the latter is not reducible to any other principle. ...It is only the principle of non-contradiction which bears its own guarantee on tis face, so to speak. ...it can not be denied without contradiction. ...The principle of non-contradiction must therefore be the primary principle.(148)
page:347
神對尼古拉(Nicholas of Cusa,1401-1464)來說：是在一個獨特的與絕對無限的存有中的對立之統一。亦即若干相反事物的綜合。...超越在眾受造物中所發現的若干差異性與對立性。...神是最大的存有...也是最小的存有。
God is, for Nicholas, the coincidentia oppositorum, the synthesis of opposites in a unique and absolutely infinite being. ...God transcends these distinctions and oppositions...God is the greatest being (maximum),,,He is the least being (minimum). (p.235)
page:348
古撒尼古拉曾強調否定法...我們認識神是認識祂所不是的樣式，而不是祂存在的樣式。因此，對神本性的正面認識，我們的心智，是處在一種無知的狀態。...這種無知...它是博學的或有教養的無知。
Nicholas of Cusa laid emphasis on the via negativa, ...We know of God what He is not rather than what He is. In regard, therefore, to positive knowledge of the divine nature our minds are in a state of 'ignorance'. ...the 'ignorance'...it is thus 'learned' or 'instructed ignorance'. (p.235)
page:353
世界不是一個帶有一個限定的核心與周邊的有限範圍。任何一點都可以被當成，以及視為世界的核心；而且，它並沒有周邊。...神存在各處，或無所不在，因此可以說，神是世界的核心，...是世界的周邊。
The world is not, says Nicholas, a limited sphere with a definite centre and circumference. Any point can be taken and considered as the world's centre, and it has no circumference. God, then, can be called the centre of the world in view of the fact that He is everywhere or omnipresent and the circumference of the world in that He is nowhere, that is, by local presence. (239)
page:354
人也是世界...人是小宇宙...亦即神性的人一面鏡子。...類比可以使事物變得更加清楚。
'man is also the world' and explains that man is the microcosm...they call man the image of God. ...analogies...made things a bit clearer. (240)
page:354-355
尼古拉贊同柏拉圖的看法，即時間是永?琲漣庤H；...即然創造以前並沒有時間，那麼，我們就必須說，時間源自於永?琚C...由於世界來自永?琚A而不是來自時間...‘永恆的’這個名稱，比較屬於世界，而不屬於時間；因為，世界的綿延並不依賴時間...尼古拉在時間與綿延之間作了一種區分...如果運動消失了，那麼，就應該不會有時間，不過卻依然會有綿延。接連不斷的綿延...即是永恆。...世界的綿延，便是神的永恆形象；而且在某種意義上，也可以稱它為'無限的'。
Nicholas agrees with Plato that time is the image of eternity, and he insists that since before creation there was no time we must say that time proceeded from eternity. ...Thus the world is eternal because it comes from eternity and not from time. But the name 'eternal' belongs much more to the world than to time since the duration of the world does not depend on time. ...Nicholas thus makes a distinction between time and duration,...If motion disappeared, there would be no time; but there would still be duration. Successive duration...is eternity. ...The duration of the world is thus the image of the divine eternity and can be called in some sense 'infinite'.(240-241)
page:357
每一個別的事物都反映整個宇宙...宇宙是縮型在每一有限的事物裡。...因此，世界是一種和諧的體系...有一種多元性的統一。
each individual thing mirrors the whole universe....the universe exists contracte in every finite thing. ...The world is therefore a harmonious system...there is a 'unity in plurality'. (242)
page:431
培根...在<新工具>裡，便把注意力集中在印刷，火藥與磁鐵發明的實際效果上。它們業已改變事物的面向，以及世界的狀態。1.在文學上。2.在戰場上。3.在航海上。不過，像這一類的發明，卻不是來自傳統的亞理斯多德的物理學。
In the Novum Organum Bacon calls attention to the practical effects of the invention of printing, gunpowder and the magnet, which 'have changed the face of things and the state of the world; the first in literature, the second in warfare; the third in navigation'. But inventions such as these did not come from the traditional Aristotelian physics.(293)
page:435
培根...他把記憶，想像與理性，當成理性靈魂的三種能力後，便把歷史歸給記憶，詩詞歸給想像，以及把哲學歸給推理。
According to Bacon...Taking memory, imagination and reason to be the three faculties of the rational soul, he assigns history to memory, poetry to imagination and philosophy to reasoning. (295)
page:441
知識與權力走向同一件事。
Knowledge and human power come to the same thing. (300)
page:613
據亞理斯多德說，人們首先對比較明顯的事物感到驚奇，而後才提出...問題。...驚奇是哲學與科學這兩者的源頭。
According to Aristotle, men first felt wonder at the more obvious things and later raised difficulties and questions about more important matters;...The 'wonder' of which he speaks was the fountainhead of both philosophy and science.(407)
page:615
如果早期的宇宙論者曾發現自然，那麼，詭辯學派，蘇格拉底與柏拉圖便發現了人。
If the early cosmologists discovered Nature, the Sophists, Socrates and Plato discovered Man. (408)
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